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Thanks Bob. As a courtesy, I made a point of not reading any previous
posts. So you're as innocent as can be. My post wasn't well written, not
a lot of facts, and very contrary. So nothing wrong with jumping on it.
So I still haven't made it thru the old newsletters, but I found a
section I was so impressed with. Tracy had some electrical problem, then
next thing he's reviewing a number of the original design assumptions.
That is what it's about. He didn't just treat the one issue, he asked the
question "What else in the system has assumptions". I was most impressed.
When you guys review the past incidents, are you able to find multiple
causes? Are you able find how it applies to your plane, or tend to think
"That doesn't apply to me.....?". -al wick
Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by stock Subaru 2.5
N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland, Oregon
Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel design info:
http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html
On Fri, 3 Jun 2005 19:05:43 -0600 Bob White <bob@bob-white.com> writes:
Hi Al,
Welcome to the list. I'm looking forward to hearing more about your
analysis. I've been critical of your cross posted comment and been
chastised for reacting to it out of context. I admit guilt.
Bob W.
On Fri, 3 Jun 2005 12:56:29 -0700
al p wick <alwick@juno.com> wrote:
> Allright. Hang me.
> > First, someone cross posted my email on the subject. Totally fine by me.
> Second, I haven't seen any previous posts on the subject, so blast away!
> > I just joined. It may not be apparent, but my goal is to reduce flight
> risks. Regardless of type of power plant.
> > My background. My entire work career dealt with failures. Day after day
> investigating the causes for each failure. Huge variety. Mechanical,
> electrical, systemic, you name it. More significantly, eventually I had
> the power to change the response to failures. This allowed me to test my
> theories on how to eliminate them. So there would be a failure, I'd
> implement a change, then measure how often the failure occurred in the
> future. Investigate, alter the solution, remeasure. There are all these
> patterns to failures that we usually don't notice. It's remarkable. > > When I first started looking into the rotary risks, I was shocked. I
> thought "My God, I have to let these guys know!". But instead, I ignored
> it for a few days,question my perception, then started the process of
> measuring the risks instead of relying on impressions. I'm not done, far
> from it. But it's so clear that the path most take is of extreme risk, I
> thought it best to post what I had so far. I thought "maybe one or two
> guys will read this and take more effective action at reducing risk". > > I have already measured the Lyc risks. Yikes! Quite a bit higher than I
> expected. They have significant crank, valve and head risk. The total is
> 1 failure per 1800 hours. This based on 49k flight hours in Cozy
> aircraft over 5 year period.
> > > > > -al wick
> Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by stock Subaru 2.5
> N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland, Oregon
> Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel design info:
> http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html
> > >> Homepage: http://www.flyrotary.com/
> >> Archive: http://lancaironline.net/lists/flyrotary/List.html
> > -- http://www.bob-white.com
N93BD - Rotary Powered BD-4 (real soon)
>> Homepage: http://www.flyrotary.com/
>> Archive: http://lancaironline.net/lists/flyrotary/List.html
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