X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Fri, 06 Dec 2013 10:52:08 -0500 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from mail-ie0-f182.google.com ([209.85.223.182] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 6.0.7) with ESMTPS id 6628472 for lml@lancaironline.net; Fri, 06 Dec 2013 10:10:53 -0500 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=209.85.223.182; envelope-from=mwsletten@gmail.com Received: by mail-ie0-f182.google.com with SMTP id as1so1420590iec.27 for ; Fri, 06 Dec 2013 07:10:17 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.42.126.14 with SMTP id c14mr979117ics.86.1386342617609; Fri, 06 Dec 2013 07:10:17 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.64.226.166 with HTTP; Fri, 6 Dec 2013 07:10:17 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.64.226.166 with HTTP; Fri, 6 Dec 2013 07:10:17 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: X-Original-Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2013 09:10:17 -0600 X-Original-Message-ID: Subject: Re: [LML] Re: ERAU Study on Effects of Acft Certification From: Mark Sletten X-Original-To: Lancair Mailing List Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=20cf301afd07427eaf04ecdf0ba9 --20cf301afd07427eaf04ecdf0ba9 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 I'm not sure I get your point Hamid. No one suggested that individuals shouldn't do all they can to improve safety. But its not a secret that even well-intentioned FAA rules can compromise safety. For example, new Lancair builders seeking to improve their chances of surviving their first hundred hours via training face many regulatory barriers. The "industry" the author refers to in regards to Part 23 aircraft (she specifies older, in-service certified aircraft) is comprised of owners, maintainers, flight instructors and technology suppliers. Granted, flight instructors are limited in what they can do by the owners' willingness to engage them, but owners are clamoring for safety upgrades. The maintainers and technology suppliers who want to meet this demand are stymied by certification requirements that makes what should be relatively inexpensive safety improvements economically unfeasible. This is something the FAA acknowledged as long ago as 2009: http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/air/directorates_field/small_airplanes/media/CPS_Part_23.pdf "While the existing approach has produced safe airplanes for decades, technological advances have changed the original assumptions of the part 23 divisions. The new small turbine engines, composite airframes, and lightweight digital electronics offer part 23 airplanes the operational capability and performance of traditionally larger part 25 airplanes. Part 23 standards have evolved beyond their original intent to address the increasing performance and complexity. Unfortunately, the slow, simple part 23 airplanes have suffered as the standards have shifted towards more complex airplanes." I believe the study cited in the original article did a good job of verifying and quantifying the assumptions made in the FAA's 2009 report. Respectfully, --Mark Hamid wrote: Early in the article it states a fact: "...neither the overall accident rate nor the fatal rate has budged in more than a decade, despite industry efforts to reduce accidents." If the barrier to entry created by certification were a major factor in this, Experimental aviation would not only continue to improve drastically, in pace with the rapid advance in technology, but become as safe as driving. The fact is that it has not. The biggest contributor to accidents, as has been discussed and demonstrated many many times here on LML, is the faulty hardware between the pilot's ears, not the hardware that was not installed due to certification. But PhDs are granted for blaming the government for certification rules and not for calling out the idiot on his quest for a Darwin award. Regards, Hamid On 12/5/2013 10:57 AM, Mark Sletten wrote: Very interesting study regarding the effects of FAA certification requirements on flight safety. http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/Research-Study-Aircraft-Certification-Rules-Dont-Necessarily-Improve-Safety221068-1.html --Mark --20cf301afd07427eaf04ecdf0ba9 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I'm not sure I get your point Hamid. No one suggested th= at individuals shouldn't do all they can to improve safety. But its not= a secret that even well-intentioned FAA rules can compromise safety. For e= xample, new Lancair builders seeking to improve their chances of surviving = their first hundred hours via training face many regulatory barriers.

The "industry" the author refers to in regards to = Part 23 aircraft (she specifies older, in-service certified aircraft) is co= mprised of owners, maintainers, flight instructors and technology suppliers= . Granted, flight instructors are limited in what they can do by the owners= ' willingness to engage them, but owners are clamoring for safety upgra= des. The maintainers and technology suppliers who want to meet this demand = are stymied by certification requirements that makes what should be relativ= ely inexpensive safety improvements economically unfeasible.

This is something the FAA acknowledged as long ago as 2009:<= /p>

http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices= /air/directorates_field/small_airplanes/media/CPS_Part_23.pdf


"While the existing approach has produced safe airplanes for decades, = technological advances have changed the original assumptions of the part 23= divisions. The new small turbine engines, composite airframes, and lightwe= ight digital electronics offer part 23 airplanes the operational capability= and performance of traditionally larger part 25 airplanes. Part 23 standar= ds have evolved beyond their original intent to address the increasing perf= ormance and complexity. Unfortunately, the slow, simple part 23 airplanes h= ave suffered as the standards have shifted towards more complex airplanes.&= quot;

I believe the study cited in the original article did a good= job of verifying and quantifying the assumptions made in the FAA's 200= 9 report.

Respectfully,

--Mark

Hamid wrote:

Early in the article it states a fact: "...neither the = overall accident rate nor the fatal rate has budged in more than a decade, = despite industry efforts to reduce accidents." =A0If the barrier to en= try created by certification were a major factor in this, Experimental avia= tion would not only continue to improve drastically, in pace with the rapid= advance in technology, but become as safe as driving. The fact is that it = has not.

The biggest contributor to accidents, as has been discussed = and demonstrated many many times here on LML, is the faulty hardware betwee= n the pilot's ears, not the hardware that was not installed due to cert= ification. But PhDs are granted for blaming the government for certificatio= n rules and not for calling out the idiot on his quest for a Darwin award.<= /p>

Regards,

Hamid

On 12/5/2013 10:57 AM, Mark Sletten wrote:

Very interesting study regarding the effects of FAA certific= ation requirements on flight safety.

http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/Research-Study-Aircraft-Certificati= on-Rules-Dont-Necessarily-Improve-Safety221068-1.html

--Mark

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