X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Thu, 07 Nov 2013 09:10:07 -0500 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from fmailhost03.isp.att.net ([204.127.217.103] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 6.0.7) with ESMTP id 6580086 for lml@lancaironline.net; Thu, 07 Nov 2013 08:39:45 -0500 Received-SPF: none receiver=logan.com; client-ip=204.127.217.103; envelope-from=bbradburry@bellsouth.net Received: from desktop (adsl-98-85-145-16.mco.bellsouth.net[98.85.145.16]) by isp.att.net (frfwmhc03) with SMTP id <20131107133908H0300pnn8he>; Thu, 7 Nov 2013 13:39:08 +0000 X-Originating-IP: [98.85.145.16] From: "Bill Bradburry" X-Original-To: "'Lancair Mailing List'" References: In-Reply-To: Subject: RE: [LML] Re: Legacy Canopy Problem X-Original-Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2013 08:39:19 -0500 X-Original-Message-ID: <4FFD594E62D347FE804915B12012170A@Desktop> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_002D_01CEDB94.DA777E30" X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 Thread-Index: Ac7bubkHcTObt4wRRVuFsCNtaRIbNAABM+yQ X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.0.6002.18463 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_002D_01CEDB94.DA777E30 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Jeff, Other than size, what are the differences in the two populations? Bill _____ From: Lancair Mailing List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of Jeff Edwards Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2013 8:03 AM To: lml@lancaironline.net Subject: [LML] Re: Legacy Canopy Problem The safety minded individual usually makes the changes required to reduce risk; sees the benefit of risk reduction; etc. they, as a population are not the problem. In the last five years 48 serious Lancair accidents. Three involved LOBO members; 45 involved non members. Why the differences? There are distinct differences in these two populations. Does anyone know the pilot of the recent fatal Lancair accident in Oregon. I will bet not. Jeff On Nov 6, 2013, at 10:24 AM, Todd Long wrote: Jeff a question for you about the 10% you think would implement the system. I'm guessing that that 10% is probably mostly made up of the safety conscious minded pilot with good discipline.? Or is it the experimenter/Tinker that never flies anyways? Typing and grammar errors courtesy of Siri and the iPhone. On Nov 6, 2013, at 11:10, vtailjeff@aol.com wrote: Not to undermine or negate the great posts about recommended aircraft improvements I would also make the following comments. Addressing the pilot situation only: As a long time CFI and former long time FAA designated pilot examiner my observations from flying with hundreds of different pilots is as follows: The overall GA pilot population does not routinely use checklists. Rather, they get in the aircraft and start up and go. Items get missed all of the time. Some are critical like doors and canopies some are not critical. There is a standard out there for using checklists. it is contained in many documents. One could not pass an FAA check ride without using the checklists yet it is routine in my industry to observe pilots not utilize them at all. Why do pilots not use checklists? here are a few thoughts or excuses. 1. It takes time and energy. 2. They have done it many times before. 3. What could go wrong? 4. My flight instructor never taught me... 5. The other pilots do it this way. The question from a piloting perspective is...."how do you regard checklists?" If you do not use good habits like many pro crews have been trained to and use, then you are at a higher risk like the Legacys mentioned here. Even if there was a solution to put in an additional latch or safeguard would you install it? Would you use it? Would you add the additional step to a checklist you may not use now? There is no perfect solution here. I support adding a safeguard, but prior research on these safety hardware issues shows it will not be implemented by more than about 10% of the population. Aviation safety has always been a belt and suspenders approach. Reexamine your habits, make the necessary changes, and install important safety improvements. Jeff LOBO Sent from my iPad On Nov 6, 2013, at 7:29 AM, Mike's Gmail wrote: I beg to differ about the door issue on the ES. I got to look over an ES that returned after the door opened in flight. 60% of the R/H H stab was missing the leading edge. The empennage was cracked 2/3 around the tail and the roof of the cabin was badly damaged. Cargo doors on the 4p and ES's have had their day too.. Mike Larkin Sent from my iPhone On Nov 6, 2013, at 5:32 AM, Gary Casey wrote: I've read lots of comments on this, but most seem to be like putting one's head in the sand. If something is likely to kill, something should be done. At least three fatalities is far, far too many to write off as just a few pilots who couldn't handle a "tricky" situation. And to think that there must be some sort of build defficiency doesn't make sense either - the important features of the aircraft are almost identical - pin locations and canopy shapes. And this is not the way to find out that you "just weren't meant to be a pilot." And to say, "just remember to latch it" just doesn't cut it. A secondary latch copied from millions of car's hood latches should do the job. As for "so easy it's not worth discussing" I've yet to read hundreds of comments from those that have had it happen. Hoping that Darwin's theory has already weeded out the "bad" pilots is just plain unrealistic. I know, believing that you are better than those others has a degree of satisfaction associated with it, but does it make sense? Something needs to be done - I'm really surprised the NTSB hasn't gotten into the act. Sooner or later they will, unless the owners do something first. No, I'm not directly affected, as I drive an ES - which, by the way, has it's own door-opening issues, but not proven to be in the same realm. Gary Casey From: Mark Sletten < mwsletten@gmail.com> I strongly suspect the reason we don't hear about incidents where an open canopy didn't interfere with controllability is because it's not really an event worth discussing, plus there's an element of embarrassment. "Hey guys, I forgot to close my canopy before take-off and had to come back to land before I could finish my trip." Don't really hear too many stories about people forgetting to turn on the transponder either. "Hey guys, I forgot turn on the transponder before takeoff. ATC reminded me, so I turned it on." --Mark ------=_NextPart_000_002D_01CEDB94.DA777E30 Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Jeff,

 

Other than size, what are the = differences in the two populations?

 

Bill

 

From: = Lancair Mailing List = [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of Jeff Edwards
Sent: Thursday, November = 07, 2013 8:03 AM
To: = lml@lancaironline.net
Subject: [LML] Re: Legacy = Canopy Problem

 

The safety minded individual usually makes the changes required = to reduce risk; sees the benefit of risk reduction; etc. they, as a = population are not the problem. In the last five years 48 serious Lancair accidents. = Three involved LOBO members; 45 involved non members. Why the differences? = There are distinct differences in these two = populations. 

 

Does anyone know the pilot of the recent fatal Lancair accident = in Oregon. I = will bet not.

 

Jeff

 


On Nov 6, 2013, at 10:24 AM, Todd Long <toddlong1@gmail.com> wrote:

Jeff a question for you about the 10% you think would implement = the system. I'm guessing that that 10% is probably mostly made up of the = safety conscious minded pilot with good discipline.? Or is it the = experimenter/Tinker that never flies anyways?

Typing and grammar errors courtesy of Siri and the = iPhone.


On Nov 6, 2013, at 11:10, vtailjeff@aol.com wrote:

Not to undermine or negate the great posts about recommended = aircraft improvements I would also make the following = comments. 

 

Addressing the pilot situation = only: 

 

As a long time CFI and former long time FAA designated pilot = examiner my observations from flying with hundreds of different pilots is as = follows:

 

The overall GA pilot population does not routinely use = checklists. Rather, they get in the aircraft and start up and go. Items get missed = all of the time. Some are critical like doors and canopies some are not = critical. There is a standard out there for using checklists. it is contained in = many documents. One could not pass an FAA check ride without using the = checklists yet it is routine in my industry to observe pilots not utilize them at all. 

 

Why do pilots not use checklists? here are a few thoughts or = excuses.

 

1. It takes time and energy.

2. They have done it many times = before.

3. What could go wrong?

4. My flight instructor never taught = me...

5. The other pilots do it this way.

 

The question from a piloting perspective is...."how do you = regard checklists?" 

 

If you do not use good habits like many pro crews have been = trained to and use, then you are at a higher risk like the Legacys mentioned = here.

 

Even if there was a solution to put in an additional latch or = safeguard would you install it? Would you use it? Would you add the additional = step to a checklist you may not use now?

 

There is no perfect solution here. I support adding a safeguard, = but prior research on these safety hardware issues shows it will not be = implemented by more than about 10% of the = population. 

 

Aviation safety has always been a belt and suspenders approach. Reexamine your habits, make the necessary changes, and install important = safety improvements.

 

Jeff

LOBO 

Sent from my iPad


On Nov 6, 2013, at 7:29 AM, Mike's Gmail <legacyl2k@gmail.com> = wrote:

I beg to differ about the door issue on the ES.  I got to = look over an ES that returned after the door opened in flight.  60% of = the R/H H stab was missing the leading edge.  The empennage was cracked 2/3 = around the tail and the roof of the cabin was badly damaged.   =  

 

Cargo doors on the 4p and ES's have had their day too.. =  

 

Mike Larkin

Sent from my iPhone


On Nov 6, 2013, at 5:32 AM, Gary Casey <casey.gary@yahoo.com> wrote:

I've read lots of comments on this, but most seem to be like putting one's = head in the sand.  If something is likely to kill, something should be = done.  At least three fatalities is far, far too many to write off as = just a few pilots who couldn't handle a "tricky" situation.  And to = think that there must be some sort of build defficiency doesn't make sense = either - the important features of the aircraft are almost identical - pin = locations and canopy shapes.  And this is not the way to find out that you = "just weren't meant to be a pilot."  And to say, "just remember = to latch it" just doesn't cut it.  A secondary latch copied from millions of car's hood latches should do the job.  As for "so = easy it's not worth discussing" I've yet to read hundreds of comments from = those that have had it happen.  Hoping that Darwin's theory has already weeded = out the "bad" pilots is just plain unrealistic.  I know, = believing that you are better than those others has a degree of satisfaction associated = with it, but does it make sense?  Something needs to be done - I'm really = surprised the NTSB hasn't gotten into the act.  Sooner or later they will, = unless the owners do something first.  No, I'm not directly affected, as I = drive an ES - which, by the way, has it's own door-opening issues, but not = proven to be in the same realm.

Gary Casey

 <= /o:p>

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