X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Wed, 02 May 2012 09:00:15 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from nm19-vm0.bullet.mail.sp2.yahoo.com ([98.139.91.216] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.4.5) with SMTP id 5518229 for lml@lancaironline.net; Tue, 01 May 2012 17:36:45 -0400 Received-SPF: neutral receiver=logan.com; client-ip=98.139.91.216; envelope-from=ralphlove@stanfordalumni.org Received: from [98.139.91.65] by nm19.bullet.mail.sp2.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 01 May 2012 21:36:10 -0000 Received: from [98.139.44.70] by tm5.bullet.mail.sp2.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 01 May 2012 21:35:10 -0000 Received: from [127.0.0.1] by omp1007.access.mail.sp2.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 01 May 2012 21:35:10 -0000 X-Yahoo-Newman-Id: 544869.92724.bm@omp1007.access.mail.sp2.yahoo.com Received: (qmail 24955 invoked from network); 1 May 2012 21:35:09 -0000 X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3 X-YMail-OSG: G9kJCHgVM1lAgn.MxXgkkQjQ_Eq2nSGWnrlCmePa2pIb8Jm PlucUbJTbvXu1R_fzgbkHqe33e1YU0UR4f6.ss78mIwM.MyynOvGJuyw5tBu fj_wqjuF6C3U43IOE3IukvEvpdHmoKbvk.U.KnTNOpaWS.Ke98nrPvUijZZd r.LIA.xfImpHqcV0VV.rSfGuGvTrefzleNcRJyB0nBSSNcwHhxmwTqnMjD0A pmj6OsaEBAkqdYaOxMIGZ39HMM2GnoUW6EKH2WPC1Drfdr4p7BiYieF5ICCx JuZ3LC6moEnxsAiaKbOZnuVc2qaQCSwBjbL0.lnenl6qMZJuD2RZs_e.kxdw WKZ4YAX8ixZawIOfPVu90NmOLFziDDTKpd3L.eKThWL8Ojy20eOqI51ZWl0_ 1xxUkBiVfYhCii5IRZRABdwnGX2IyxRduFxHLlbY9RYb6Xn8BWyBk2SoO_yX HVMINzI3ZAfBP0gb39pZKETiC4B.gaawx3M8Gv9ScI6On1vNqiJXlXuRXhrI EjFIqBxOLz1So7dsVVwNTGStW4KFMRKsIanMXfj1nrhYc6WK7NUilPqCwCYV 57QJzdSRAke177jqqTnZtUDQnV1fg4vaQ0c.Ou.svmQa9 X-Yahoo-SMTP: O0s9NnaswBCimploNHufwcJQi58B5NjMy.C2WAjfZjgmjJOd Received: from [10.1.2.3] (ralphlove@70.89.148.209 with plain) by smtp104.sbc.mail.gq1.yahoo.com with SMTP; 01 May 2012 14:35:08 -0700 PDT Subject: Re: [LML] Re: Harry League & Pat Franzen fatal IVPT accident 4/23/2012 References: From: Ralph Love Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-D54D2D32-F4CA-4E77-96CC-D5CC263A2EAB X-Mailer: iPad Mail (9B176) In-Reply-To: X-Original-Message-Id: X-Original-Date: Tue, 1 May 2012 17:35:06 -0400 X-Original-To: Lancair Mailing List Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) --Apple-Mail-D54D2D32-F4CA-4E77-96CC-D5CC263A2EAB Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii I was in the air that day in the Pink Panther about 10 to 20 miles east of H= arry going from Bend to The Dallas for lunch and I can say the weather was d= efinitely not a problem for me. I have a friend who was near Harry at about t= he same altitude and he said the weather was not a problem. I know Harry had air conditioning but don't know anything about the installa= tion. Ralph Love N122PT Legacy On May 1, 2012, at 2:48 PM, Colyn Case wrote: > good things to check.... but were weather or a/c holes a factor in this= case? > On May 1, 2012, at 2:56 PM, Charlie Kohler wrote: >=20 > Lynn > =20 > I have raised the issue regarding the holes cut in the aft fuselage for th= e air-conditioning for several years. Several years ago I sat at a table wit= h Martin Hollman, and Tim Ong and we talked in general about gross weight in= creases over the years, modifications to the fuselage, etc. etc. Martin agre= ed at that time that the only solution was to have a new stress and flutter= analysis performed. > He raised a red flag regarding the AC holes. > =20 > I would suggest Lancair together with Lancair IV owners initiated a stress= and flutter analysis of the current state of the fleet. Turbines/IVP's with= winglets etc. etc. considering newly recommended the gross weights and airf= rame modifications. > =20 > Brent very ably addresses the issue when you are facing weather and you kn= ow you have a fragile airframe that you have cut two large holes in. > =20 > Here is his letter regarding another accident in which all the blame goes t= o the weather. I can think of several others that faced--- something---- and= did not fly out the other side. I wonder, if they had a sound airframe goin= g in. The latest accident has me questioning---just how bad was this weather= that caused airframe to come apart? Was airframe capable of handling 3G-5G ?= ? > =20 > =20 > Reread Brent Reagan's post from the Lancair list. > =20 > To all Lancair Pilots; > =20 > Late last month I was contacted by the NTSB in Atlanta regarding the crash= of N29ME. It seems that there was an CFS EFIS-2000 system installed in the= airplane and they had recovered the IDUs from the=20 > wreckage. They had learned from Kirk that the IDUs contained logs of the l= ast few flights and asked if I could recover the data for them. >=20 > I received the IDUs late last week and although the units had been severel= y damaged I was able to remove the flash data card from the MFD and, after s= ome repair work, extract the log files. >=20 > The investigation into this accident is ongoing and detailed public discus= sions of the data and conclusions should be reserved until the NTSB final re= port is issued. However, this report is some months away=20 > and there are two generic safety issues that that I would like to discuss i= n the hope of improving flight safety during this thunder storm season. >=20 > =46rom the Preliminary report: > The last flight left Portland Indiana at 15:45 eastern daylight time and p= roceeded normally for just under two hours when, at 17:30 the pilot requeste= d a left deviation for weather. The deviation was not granted=20 > until approximately 8 minutes later when the pilot then turned right 70 de= grees and remained on that course for 11 minutes while he descended from 17,= 000 to 13,000 feet. The plane then turned left, back on course.=20 > Clearance was given to 11,000 feet and the last communication was at 17:49= . The last radar contact was at 17:55 at 11,700 feet. Level 5 thunderstorms w= ere reported in the area. >=20 > The data log records the conditions of flight once every 5 seconds. A new d= ata log is created when the system starts in flight mode and continues recor= ding until power is interrupted or the system resets. The=20 > last 8 data points of the flight (35 seconds) show that while cruising at 1= 87 KIAS the the nose pitched up 20 degrees and the plane climbed to 12,436 a= t a peak of 5,328 fpm and banked left 50 degrees (imagine a wing=20 > over). At 113 KIAS the nose pitched down 29 degrees below horizontal with a= left bank angle of 80 degrees. The G meter never goes negative but a large d= rop in oil pressure indicates that it may have been=20 > negative between data points. >=20 > The plane is in a steep left spiral dive with the peak rate of decent reac= hing 12,685 fpm. OAT is falling from 35 degrees F to 27 degrees F. Engine po= wer remains unchanged from the cruise setting of 70% and 2,400=20 > rpm. G forces are rising as the nose starts to come up. > The last data point is at 9,146 feet with the plane pitched down 35 degree= s (decreasing) and banked left 71 degrees (also decreasing).=20 > Decent rate is 10,208 fpm and airspeed is 253 KIAS. The airspeed is increa= sing at 7.1 knots per second and at this rate Vne will be reached in less th= an 3 seconds. The G load is 3.75 Gs positive (it had climbed=20 > from 0.68 Gs in the last 10 seconds). Within 5 seconds an event occurs tha= t an observer on the ground hears and describes as an explosion... >=20 > I can not say what actually happened in this case. We can consider a hypot= hetical scenario as a way to better understand the dynamics of flight. Imagi= ne that the plane flew through an updraft / downdraft wind=20 > shear. A sudden drop in OAT can indicate a downdraft. While in the downdra= ft, the ground track shows the plane reversed course with the final data poi= nt being just before re-penatrating the downdraft /=20 > updraft interface. It is easy to imagine that the wind shear could apply t= he additional loads needed to fail the wings. >=20 > Besides the sorrow of loosing four souls, members of the Lancair community= , there are two things that are, in my view, most apparent. The pilot reques= ted a deviation for weather that the controller did not=20 > grant due to traffic. "Weather" in this case was level 5 thunder storm cel= ls. I cannot say what the pilot should have done but he did have the option o= f saying "unable" or "I am declaring an emergency and turning=20 > left". Controllers are sitting safe and snug on the ground. The pilot is r= esponsible for the safety of the flight regardless of what the controller sa= ys. If you are in an unsafe situation, do whatever you need to do to change p= roblems that must be solved in the air to problems that can be solved on the= ground. The worst administrative action is far better than the best funeral= . The second apparent thing is that if you know you are about to get, or are= being, knocked around, get your speed down under Va and keep the wings leve= l. Pitch for speed and power for altitude. Never dive for an=20 > assigned altitude. We all know these things but it can't hurt to review th= em in your mind to reinforce the understanding of your responsibilities as P= IC. >=20 > My deepest sympathies and heartfelt condolences go to the families and fri= ends of the victims. >=20 > To everyone else, fly safe, please. >=20 > Regards > Brent Regan > --------------------------------------------------------------------------= -------- > =20 > My inspections over the years have brought several areas of weakness to li= ght. I would suggest all owners check their airplanes for a debonding of the= skin between the very aft end of the main landing gear doors. > =20 > Also check for structural security and construction of the box that surrou= nds the elevator push tube. > With someone's help, go to the tail tiedown area and push up with your bac= k. You will see movement of the skin if there is a debond. Quite often when= I have discovered this I asked the owner if he was a self-taught pilot? And= did he have any hard landings? Most admitted it. I recall one case (pre-Buy= ) in Northern California where the owner refused to consider fixing this sit= uation to effect the sale. He didn't think it was a big issue at all. > =20 > =20 > Additionally I suggest you read http://www.vansaircraft.com/pdf/hp_limts.= pdf > =20 > =20 > Charlie K. > =20 > See me on the web at > www.Lancair-IV.com > =20 >=20 > From: Lynn Farnsworth > To: lml@lancaironline.net=20 > Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 4:24 PM > Subject: [LML] Re: Harry League & Pat Franzen fatal IVPT accident 4/23/201= 2 >=20 > =20 > =20 > =20 > =20 > Subject: Harry League & Pat Franzen fatal IVPT accident 4/23/2012 > It is my sad duty to report Mr. Harry League and Mr. Pat Franzen were kill= ed yesterday when the IVPT, N66HL, > =20 > [Lynn Farnsworth] It appears to me that the aircraft disintegrated in-flig= ht. What kind of flight profile would include doing training that would lead= to an in-flight breakup? > =20 >=20 >=20 >=20 --Apple-Mail-D54D2D32-F4CA-4E77-96CC-D5CC263A2EAB Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
I was in the air that day i= n the Pink Panther about 10 to 20 miles east of Harry going from Bend to The= Dallas for lunch and I can say the weather was definitely not a problem for= me. I have a friend who was near Harry at about the same altitude and he sa= id the weather was not a problem.
I know Harry had air conditionin= g but don't know anything about the installation.

R= alph Love
N122PT
Legacy

On May 1, 2012, at 2:48 P= M, Colyn Case <colyncase@earth= link.net> wrote:

good things to check....    but were weather or a/c holes a fac= tor in this case?
On May 1, 2012, at 2:56 PM, Charlie Kohler w= rote:

<= span style=3D"RIGHT: auto" id=3D"yiv835078949yui_3_2_0_24_1335439774688102">= Lynn
 
I have raised the iss= ue regarding the holes cut in the aft fuselage for the air-conditioning for s= everal years. Several years ago I sat at a table with Martin Hollman, a= nd Tim Ong and we talked in general about gross weight increases over t= he years, modifications to the fuselage, etc. etc. Martin agreed at that tim= e that the only solution was to  have a new stress and flutter analysis= performed.
He raised a red flag r= egarding the AC holes.
 
I would suggest Lanca= ir together with Lancair IV owners initiated a stress and flutter analysis o= f the current state of the fleet. Turbines/IVP's with winglets etc. etc. considering newly recommended the gross weights and airframe modificatio= ns.
 
Brent very ably addresses the issue when you are f= acing weather and you know you have a fragile airframe that you have cu= t two large holes in.
 
Here is his letter regarding another accident in w= hich all the blame goes to the weather. I can think of several others that f= aced--- something---- and did not fly out the other side. I wonder, if t= hey had a sound airframe going in. The latest accident has me questioni= ng---just how bad was this weather that caused airframe to come apart? Was a= irframe capable of handling 3G-5G ??
 
 
Reread Brent Reagan's post from the Lancair list.=
 
&= nbsp;To all Lancair Pilots;
 
Late last month I was contacted= by the NTSB in Atlanta regardin= g the crash of  N29ME. It seems that there was an CFS EFIS-2000 system i= nstalled in the airplane and they had recovered the IDUs from the
wrecka= ge. They had learned from Kirk that the IDUs contained logs of the last few f= lights and asked if I could recover the data for them.

I received the= IDUs late last week and although the units had been severely damaged I was a= ble to remove the flash data card from the MFD and, after some repair work, e= xtract the log files.

The investigation into this accident is ongoing= and detailed public discussions of the data and conclusions should be reser= ved until the NTSB final report is issued. However, this report is some months away
and there are two generic safety issues that= that I would like to discuss in the hope of improving flight safety during t= his thunder storm season.

 =46rom the Preliminary report:
The= last flight left Portland Indiana at 15:45 eastern daylight time and procee= ded normally for just under two hours when, at 17:30 the pilot requested a l= eft deviation for weather. The deviation was not granted
until approxima= tely 8 minutes later when the pilot then turned right 70 degrees and remaine= d on that course for 11 minutes while he descended from 17,000 to 13,000 fee= t. The plane then turned left, back on course.
Clearance was given to 11= ,000 feet and the last communication was at 17:49. The last radar contact was at 17:55 at 11,700 feet. Level 5 thunderstorms were repo= rted in the area.

The data log records the conditions of flight once every 5 seconds. A new data log is created when the system star= ts in flight mode and continues recording until power is interrupted or the s= ystem resets. The
last 8 data points of the flight (35 seconds) show tha= t while cruising at 187 KIAS the the nose pitched up 20 degrees and the plan= e climbed to 12,436 at a peak of 5,328 fpm and banked left 50 degrees (imagi= ne a wing
over). At 113 KIAS the nose pitched down 29 degrees below hori= zontal with a left bank angle of 80 degrees. The G meter never goes negative= but a large drop in oil pressure indicates that it may have been
negati= ve between data points.

The plane is in a steep left spiral dive with= the peak rate of decent reaching 12,685 fpm. OAT is falling from 35 degrees= F to 27 degrees F. Engine power remains unchanged from the cruise setting o= f 70% and 2,400
rpm. G forces are rising as the nose starts to come up.<= br>The last data point is at 9,146 feet with the plane pitched down 35 degrees (decreasing) and banked left 71 degrees (also decre= asing).
Decent rate is 10,208 fpm and airspeed is 253 KIAS. The airspeed= is increasing at 7.1 knots per second and at this rate Vne will be reached i= n less than 3 seconds. The G load is 3.75 Gs positive (it had climbed
fr= om 0.68 Gs in the last 10 seconds). Within 5 seconds an event occurs that an= observer on the ground hears and describes as an explosion...

I can n= ot say what actually happened in this case. We can consider a hypothetical s= cenario as a way to better understand the dynamics of flight. Imagine that t= he plane flew through an updraft / downdraft wind
shear. A sudden drop i= n OAT can indicate a downdraft. While in the downdraft, the ground track sho= ws the plane reversed course with the final data point being just before re-= penatrating the downdraft /
updraft interface. It is easy to imagine tha= t the wind shear could apply the additional loads needed to fail the wings.

Besides the sorrow of loosing four souls, m= embers of the Lancair community, there are two things that are, in my view, m= ost apparent. The pilot requested a deviation for weather that the controlle= r did not
grant due to traffic. "Weather" in this case was level 5 thund= er storm cells. I cannot say what the pilot should have done but he did have= the option of saying "unable" or "I am declaring an emergency and turning <= br>left". Controllers are sitting safe and snug on the ground. The pilot is r= esponsible for the safety of the flight regardless of what the controller sa= ys. If you are in an unsafe situation, do whatever you need to do to change p= roblems that must be solved in the air to problems that can be solved on the= ground. The worst administrative action is far better than the best funeral= . The second apparent thing is that if you know you are about to get, or are= being, knocked around, get your speed down under Va and keep the wings level. Pitch for speed and power for altitude. Never div= e for an
assigned altitude. We all know these things but it can't hurt t= o review them in your mind to reinforce the understanding of your responsibi= lities as PIC.

My deepest sympathies and heartfelt condolences go to t= he families and friends of the victims.

To everyone else, fly safe, p= lease.

Regards
Brent Regan
-------------------------------= ---------------------------------------------------
 
My inspections over the years h= ave brought several areas of weakness to light. I would suggest all owners c= heck their airplanes for a debonding of the skin between the very aft end of= the main landing gear doors.
 
Also check for structural secur= ity and construction of the box that surrounds the elevator push tube.
With someone's help, go to the t= ail tiedown area and push up with your back. You will see movement= of the skin if there is a debond.  Quite often when I have discovered t= his I asked the owner if he was a self-taught pilot? And did he have any har= d landings? Most admitted it. I recall one case (pre-Buy) in Northern C= alifornia where the owner refused to consider fixing this situation to effec= t the sale. He didn't think it was a big issue at all.
 
 
Addition= ally  I suggest you read http://www.vansaircraft.com/pdf/hp_limts.pdf
 
 
Charlie K= .
 
See me on the web at
www.Lancair-IV.com
 

From: Lynn Farnsw= orth <farnsworth@charter.net>
To: lml@lancaironline.net
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 4:24 PM
Subject: [LML] Re: Harry League &= amp; Pat Franzen fatal IVPT accident 4/23/2012

Subject:<= span style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'sans-serif'; FONT-SIZE: 10pt" class=3D"yiv835078= 949ms__id1153"> Harry League & Pat Franzen fatal IVPT accident 4/23/2012=