X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Thu, 03 Jan 2013 09:04:58 -0500 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from imr-db01.mx.aol.com ([205.188.91.95] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 6.0.1) with ESMTP id 5992980 for lml@lancaironline.net; Thu, 03 Jan 2013 08:52:29 -0500 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=205.188.91.95; envelope-from=vtailjeff@aol.com Received: from mtaout-da02.r1000.mx.aol.com (mtaout-da02.r1000.mx.aol.com [172.29.51.130]) by imr-db01.mx.aol.com (Outbound Mail Relay) with ESMTP id 69CDE38000099 for ; Thu, 3 Jan 2013 08:51:54 -0500 (EST) Received: from [192.168.1.119] (24-107-65-42.dhcp.stls.mo.charter.com [24.107.65.42]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mtaout-da02.r1000.mx.aol.com (MUA/Third Party Client Interface) with ESMTPSA id 4F10CE0000C1; Thu, 3 Jan 2013 08:51:53 -0500 (EST) Subject: Fwd: Flying Lessons Weekly References: From: vtailjeff@aol.com Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-D976D82D-2B1E-4CEF-991C-1E810D3113BF X-Mailer: iPad Mail (9B206) X-Original-Message-Id: X-Original-Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2013 07:51:51 -0600 X-Original-To: Lancair Mailing List Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) x-aol-global-disposition: G X-AOL-SCOLL-SCORE: 1:2:526787520:93952408 X-AOL-SCOLL-URL_COUNT: 13 x-aol-sid: 3039ac1d338250e58cf9503b X-AOL-IP: 24.107.65.42 --Apple-Mail-D976D82D-2B1E-4CEF-991C-1E810D3113BF Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Enjoy...Jeff Sent from my iPad Begin forwarded message: > From: Mastery Flight Training, Inc. > Date: January 2, 2013 10:55:46 PM CST > To: > Subject: Flying Lessons Weekly > Reply-To: Mastery Flight Training, Inc. >=20 >=20 > =09 > Personal Aviation: Freedom. Choices. Responsibility. > Read FLYING LESSONS online. > FLYING LESSONS Weekly >=20 > FLYING LESSONS uses recent aircraft mishap reports to consider what might h= ave contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face s= imilar circumstances. Verify all technical information before applying it t= o your aircraft or operation, with manufacturer's data and recommendations t= aking precedence. YOU are the pilot-in-command, and are solely responsible f= or the decisions you make. > =C2=A9 2013 Mastery Flight Training, Inc. >=20 > This week=E2=80=99s lessons > In the December 20th FLYING LESSONS I began a review of the increasing rat= e of fatal accidents in personal and recreational aircraft use over the past= decade. The goal is to toward defining the apparent causes of this increas= e, opening channels of reader discussion about ways to make personal and rec= reational flying improve at least to the rates of business-use flying of sim= ilar type airplanes flown by non-professional pilots. > =20 > The big increase in fatal accidents in personal/recreational flying seems t= o be lost in the overall flat mishap and fatal crash rate of general aviatio= n as a whole, driven by the disproportionate number of (estimated) flying ho= urs in corporate aviation, most in turbine equipment flown by full-time prof= essional pilots. >=20 > I received a significant amount of well-informed, well-reasoned reader mai= l in response. Several readers disagree with the NTSB statistics I cited (in= cluding the same conclusions NTSB has published). Others agree that the pro= blem isn=E2=80=99t receiving the attention it deserves. Because several of t= he responses are fairly lengthy (I=E2=80=99m not complaining!), this week I=E2= =80=99ll launch right into the Debrief section and cover as many as reasonab= ly fit in a single issue of FLYING LESSONS. Be assured I=E2=80=99ll eventua= lly and fully quote all the responses I received. >=20 > Comments? Questions? Tell us what you think at mastery.flight.training@c= ox.net. >=20 > Thanks to AVEMCO Insurance for helping bring you FLYING LESSONS Weekly. > Debrief: Readers write about recent FLYING LESSONS >=20 > One reader writes: >=20 > I've suffered from the same criticism. "You're taking all the fun out of f= lying." Kinda like cancer taking all the fun out of smoking. >=20 > The reader, a well-known safety researcher who wishes to remain anonymous,= cautions that =E2=80=9Cthe analogy is flawed,=E2=80=9D but the point is tak= en=E2=80=94the temptation is strong for pilots (and those who teach and repo= rt on aviation) to gravitate to the =E2=80=9Clow and flat=E2=80=9D GA fatal c= rash record, and find ways to rationalize away the 25% increase in the rate o= f fatal personal/recreational crashes over the past decade. Certainly, as I= discussed in the December 20 LESSONS, the media has heavily reported the ov= erall flat rate, and all but ignored the NTSB data when broken down by =E2=80= =9Cclass=E2=80=9D of general aviation. >=20 > Aviation-savvy readers who know statistical investigation better than I re= plied to the report. David Kenny, frequent Debriefer and chief statistician= for AOPA=E2=80=99s Air Safety Institute (ASI), writes:=20 >=20 > Good morning, Tom. I was interested in your piece on accident rates on pe= rsonal flights, not least because the NTSB has been publicizing the same res= ult. Unfortunately, I have a suspicion that there=E2=80=99s less to this th= an meets the eye. >=20 > You=E2=80=99ll recall that the estimate of the personal accident rate come= s from two components: the number of accidents that the NTSB classifies as h= aving occurred on =E2=80=9Cpersonal=E2=80=9D flights, and the estimated numb= er of personal flight hours from the FAA activity survey. Neither attributi= on is free of error and both are potentially subject to bias. As a statisti= cian, when I see an overall rate that doesn=E2=80=99t budge decomposed into o= ne component that=E2=80=99s going up and others that are going down just eno= ugh to compensate, I tend to suspect that we=E2=80=99re seeing shifts in the= way those classifications are assigned rather than real-world trends that j= ust happen to offset one another. >=20 > I have some inquiries in to see whether the way the FAA estimates flight t= ime may have changed systematically during that time. I=E2=80=99ve already s= een some evidence that the NTSB=E2=80=99s classification of accident flights= may have been changing. I tend to think of any authorized flight by a stud= ent pilot as an instructional flight (an unauthorized flight to, say, visit h= is girl friend would have to be considered personal) =E2=80=93 but in 1991, t= he NTSB classified 20% of the accidents on student solos as having occurred o= n personal flights. In 2010, that figure was 39%. >=20 > The question of whether personal flights are really becoming more dangerou= s or whether we=E2=80=99re simply seeing a shift in how they decide which ac= cidents to toss into which buckets is one that deserves closer attention tha= n I=E2=80=99ve been able to give it this morning. In the meantime, though, I= =E2=80=99m not persuaded that the NTSB=E2=80=99s claim of an increasing pers= onal accident rate deserves to be taken at face value. I agree, though, tha= t the accident rate on personal flights is and remains higher than those in m= ost other types of general aviation. >=20 > Keep up the good work! >=20 > Thanks, David. Changing variables may indeed make the overall picture fuz= zy. Please read on=E2=80=A6 >=20 > Reader Nate Deuhr adds: >=20 > I find it interesting that in order to get fatal accident rate numbers to b= e whole numbers, the number of flight hours has to be 100,000. This is a com= mon tactic in statistical manipulation to make things that are very small se= em more significant. It's done to make them seem more meaningful. >=20 > Judging by the [NTSB=E2=80=99s] graphs, the fatal accident rate for person= al flying is roughly 2.5 accidents in 100,000 flight hours, if I'm reading i= t correctly? (It's also a notably difficult graph to read all the way across= to the right, another typical trick, when attempting to show a higher numbe= r over time.) >=20 > So, how about changing the flight hours to something a typical personal av= iator would fly? Say, for mathematical simplicity, 1000 hours? (How many "p= ersonal flying" pilots exceed 1000 hours in a lifetime? I honestly don't kno= w. Does "personal flying" include IFR? IFR in bad weather and marginal equip= ment? VFR? Etc. It doesn't say.) >=20 > Fixing the location of the decimal point to a more commonly seen number in= Private Pilot logbooks, this would lower the fatal accident rate to 0.025 f= atal accidents per 1000 hours flown. That's a very small number. >=20 > My logbook in 21 years of flying recreationally has half of that number of= hours. Most pilots accrue maybe 100 hours in a good year, flying recreation= ally. Most rules of thumb for aircraft ownership also fall at 100 hours. In= 100 hours, there are 0.0025 fatal accidents, if I've done my math correctly= . > I'm not sure that saying a 20% increase in such small numbers is even outs= ide of the noise level when expressed that way. Multiply to 100,000 hours, i= t's still less than 3. The scope of the graphs is badly chosen if we are att= empting to relate the numbers to individual's typical logbooks. 1000 hours s= eems reasonable. >=20 > You have a good point, Nate. The numbers are indeed very small. Regardle= ss, they appear to have been increasing, especially in personal/recreational= flying. Once the true effect of aircraft triennial re-registration is full= y realized, which many believe will show a substantially smaller number of a= ctual airworthy airplanes in the fleet (and therefore many fewer thousands, o= r hundreds of thousands, of flying hours estimated annually), the rate per h= ours flown will likely increase even more. >=20 > Instead of focusing on the specific numbers and getting bogged down in sta= tistical theory, let=E2=80=99s agree that: > In a perfect world no one should die or, as a passenger or bystander on th= e ground, be killed as a result of an airplane crash. > Personal and recreational-use airplanes are involved in at least as many a= nd probably more deadly crashes than they were a decade ago. > Most fatal crashes are the result of the same situations faced by pilots a= gain and again. > Therefore, there should be things we can do to benefit from the tragic exp= erience of others, to reverse the increase in fatal crashes and get closer t= o the perfect world. > Reader John Townsley continues the discussion: >=20 > I don=E2=80=99t know where Bruce Landsberg finds the data to support his h= ypothesis that =E2=80=9Call it would take to dramatically reduce the rate of= serious and fatal crashes is for pilots to fly to the completion standards o= f the (U.S.) Private Pilot and, if instrument rated, Instrument Pilot Practi= cal Test Standards.=E2=80=9D. =46rom my read of accident reports and mishap= reports and from looking at the Nall Report as well as discussing the probl= em with the FAASTeam coordinators in this part of the US, relatively few ser= ious accidents have a root cause of stick =E2=80=98n rudder skills. In near= ly every case the pilot in command made serious errors in judgment, or accep= ted high levels of risk. This leads me to believe the disparity in the recr= eational/personal flying accident rate results from errors of judgment/ADM a= nd high risk tolerance, not the inability to fly the airplane.=20 >=20 > Well, I don=E2=80=99t want to speak for Bruce (beyond quoting him in the e= arlier report), but I tend to agree=E2=80=94not just because of the stick-an= d-rudder skills evaluated during Practical Tests, but because aeronautical d= ecision-making (ADM) and risk management are indeed evaluated in the Practic= al Test Standards (PTS) as well. >=20 > Let=E2=80=99s look at one example that=E2=80=99s on (Northern Hemisphere) m= inds this time of year, airframe icing. In the Private Pilot PTS, Area I: P= reflight Preparation, Task C: Weather Information, the examiner evaluates th= e Private Pilot applicant on =E2=80=9Cicing and freezing level information,=E2= =80=9D and ensure the pilot =E2=80=9Cmakes a competent go/no-go decision bas= ed on available weather information.=E2=80=9D Task A of the same Area requi= res the examiner to evaluate the applicant=E2=80=99s ability to =E2=80=9Cexp= lain=E2=80=A6operating limitations, placards=E2=80=A6and [the] POH [Pilot=E2= =80=99s Operating Handbook]/AFM [Approved Flight Manual].=E2=80=9D A very c= ommon airframe Limitation among GA airplanes is that =E2=80=9Cflight in icin= g conditions is prohibited.=E2=80=9D Throughout the PTS, it=E2=80=99s the e= xaminer=E2=80=99s responsibility to evaluate the applicant=E2=80=99s risk ev= aluation, judgment and Single-Pilot Resource Management. >=20 > If the Practical Test is properly administered, and if the pilot performs t= o the Practical Test Standards on every flight throughout his or her career,= then that pilot will: > Know when icing conditions are forecast or likely to exist; > Know the limitations against flight in icing conditions that apply to the a= irplane flown; and therefore > Observe the limitation against flight in icing conditions. > Whether Practical Tests for pilot certificates and ratings are actually ad= ministered in such a way to achieve this outcome is grist for a future discu= ssion. >=20 > In the icing example, the pilot meeting the PTS will not try to climb thro= ugh an icing layer to clear skies above because he/she has a powerful engine= , or descend through a layer of below-freezing cloud attempting to =E2=80=9C= dive through it=E2=80=9D to warmer air below, or accept the possibility of i= ce by cruising in cold clouds or precipitation because the sky is clear from= the base of the cloud ceiling to the Minimum Enroute Altitude. He or she w= ill avoid the ice-free air completely, either by: > selecting an altitude that does not require any ice penetration; > diverting around the potential icing conditions, even if that means not be= ginning an approach into reported or suspected icing clouds at the end of a t= rip but instead immediately diverting to an alternate; or > delaying or canceling the flight if none of those other options exists.=20= > Having a turbocharged engine for rapid climb, or knowing the icing layer i= s only a few hundred feet thick, or being a master of the Skew-T, Log P diag= ram does not change the prohibition against flight in icing conditions. Avo= idance is what you=E2=80=99d be expected to do on a Practical Test (oral or f= light) given the conditions; fly to the Practical Test Standards and you suc= cessfully avoid the threat. >=20 > Please note that I am not trying to refute on John=E2=80=99s remarks, beca= use I think he and I would agree that the PTS are not always taught and eval= uated that way. It=E2=80=99s a matter of defining what I mean (and I believ= e Bruce does as well) by "meeting the standards." Yet, using our example, p= ilots still fly non-ice-approved airplanes into icing conditions. Practical= Tests tend to focus on the physical flying skills that are important but no= t those that, as John correctly observes, are the locus of most fatal genera= l aviation crashes=E2=80=94the pilot=E2=80=99s risk management and decision-= making. Reader Townsley continues: > =20 > Your desire to =E2=80=9Cclose the gap=E2=80=9D between business flying and= personal flying ignores the significant differences that exist in the suppo= rt systems, procedures, initial training, recurrent training, and equipment.= >=20 > At least as a beginning, my desire is simply to close the gap between pers= onal/recreational flying and what the NTSB defines as =E2=80=9Cbusiness=E2=80= =9D flying=E2=80=94flight that serves but is incidental to the conduct of bu= siness, flown by a single-pilot Pilot-in-Command who is not employed as a fu= ll-time pilot. The NTSB=E2=80=99s distinction between a Personal/Recreation= al flight and a Business flight is the difference between a Piper Saratoga f= lown on a family vacation and that same Piper Saratoga flown by the same pil= ot when he/she is flying across the state to a business meeting. This is con= trasted with Corporate flying, which has a significantly improved record ove= r even Business flying, in large part likely because of the support systems,= crew requirements, training and equipment Corporate flying enjoys. Accord= ing to the NTSB, the Business flight (meeting this definition) has a fatal a= ccident rate three times lower than the very similar Personal/Recreational f= light. This is the gap that I believe can be most readily closed. >=20 > Here reader Townsley superbly observes: >=20 > Arguments to the contrary do not appear to me to shed light, rather they m= erely obfuscate and divert us from investigating the three fundamental issue= s:=20 > How to teach (and maintain) judgment and decision making skills; =20 > How to instill a low level risk preference in pilots; and > How to increase decision support systems available to recreational and per= sonal flyers to business aviation standards =E2=80=93 assuming that the busi= ness aviation accident rate is the metric against which recreational and per= sonal flying will be measured.=20 > The FAASTeam model of recurrent training, which relies upon carrots and no= t sticks, approximates a scaled down recurrent training model of business fl= ying =E2=80=93 minus the annual or semi-annual check rides mandated for Part= 135 pilots. While the accident rate for participants in FAASTeam seminars i= s reported by the FAA to be quite low, it still exceeds the business metric=E2= =80=A6 It also, as a voluntary program, is (in my opinion) likely to attrac= t a more risk-averse slice of the GA population. So, how do you propose to e= stablish a social norm for risk tolerance that is suitably low (and what mig= ht it be?) that would encompass and engage all recreational and personal fly= ing aviators? >=20 > That is the grail=E2=80=94how do we convince pilots to better evaluate ris= k at least enough they stop repeating the same deadly mistakes we read about= week after week (which is, after all, the basis of FLYING LESSONS)? Read o= n: >=20 > We already have in the FARs a very complex and comprehensive set of regula= tions that are very difficult to enforce (probably impossible), and that in f= act have the greatest utility in bringing sanctions post mishap when an infr= action is pretty obvious, or when an individual is observed in a flagrant ac= t that demands enforcement action. Can we legislate judgment? If so, what a= mount of overhead (in terms of regulatory presence and user costs) is accept= able to you and to AOPA? Clearly, increased costs will likely adversely aff= ect recreational and personal flying. Of course, that in itself may =E2=80=9C= improve=E2=80=9D accident statistics by reducing the participating populatio= n. >=20 > I am an active participant in FAASTeam seminars, I encourage others to par= ticipate, I facilitate and have taught many seminars =E2=80=93 yet I recogni= ze from observing many hundreds of pilots that individual attitudes toward r= isk vary tremendously, perhaps even more than skill. There is also a great v= ariation in how pilots judge themselves =E2=80=9Cfit to fly=E2=80=9D. Just l= ook at the NTSB reports to get a measure of the number of pilots who have ex= perienced a mishap because of illness, possible (but seldom affirmed by post= accident investigation) unanticipated effects of over-the-counter drugs, il= legal drugs (booze, MJ, etc.), or Rx drugs, and the emerging issues of cogni= tive deficiencies from disease. In the final analysis, these are not skill i= ssues. They are expressions of risk tolerance and what we call =E2=80=98ADM= =E2=80=99. In the absence of a Dispatcher who dispassionately evaluates the= risk of the flight, recreational flyers and pilots of personal flights are f= ree to accept whatever risk that is acceptable to them at that moment. As w= ith rock climbing, motor cycling, white water kayaking, and participating in= marathons in Death Valley, personal flying has a higher degree of risk than= business flying by the very nature of the activity. Your rhetoric, and the l= anguage used by Landsberg are unhelpful in addressing the fundamentally diff= erent nature of personal and recreational flying. >=20 > Thanks for a superb Debrief, John. In light of what I=E2=80=99ve written h= ere about business vs. personal/recreational flying and the full scope of th= e Practical Test Standards, I hope we can continue this discussion. The fac= t that you volunteer so much of your time and expertise as a FAASTeam repres= entative tells me you have not given up the fight to do something about pilo= t judgment and attitudes. >=20 > Speaking of the FAASTeam, FAA Outreach Program Manager Bryan Neville, who a= mong many other things administers www.faasafety.gov (which reprints FLYING L= ESSONS each week), writes: >=20 > It has been an exciting year for aviation, especially when we only look at= the good things that happened! >=20 > Regarding the statement from Bruce Landsberg, and your comment, I must poi= nt out that the WINGS Program uses the PTS as the standard for performance, a= nd we address the Primary Accident Causal Factors in the tasks we require. W= hy is it so easy to forget about the WINGS Program? >=20 > That=E2=80=99s a two-part Debrief, Bryan. First you=E2=80=99re right: com= pleting a Phase of FAA wings requires the pilot to log at least three hours o= f flight instruction including emphasis on all areas of the Practical Test S= tandards. It=E2=80=99s far more involved than the minimal one-hour requirem= ent of the Flight Review which, as I advocate, should (but does not) stipula= te specific areas of review, or requirements for basic competence (unlike th= e Instrument Proficiency Check). Yes, completing a WINGS phase reinforces a= t least the stick-and-rudder component of pilot proficiency. >=20 > The second part of my response is to your question Why is it so easy to fo= rget about the WINGS Program? Since FAA funding for FAA WINGS seminars was d= ecimated several years ago, and since most FAASTeam Program Managers (the FA= A employees responsible for the program in the various Regions and District O= ffices) rarely if ever present safety programs themselves, the FAA=E2=80=99s= safety program became almost entirely dependent on volunteer FAASTeam repre= sentatives. These valuable volunteers do great work, but the frequency and g= eographic diversity of WINGS seminars are lacking in many areas where volunt= eers can=E2=80=99t fill the void (or, like me, do things like researching an= d writing FLYING LESSONS Weekly, leaving little time for organizing and deli= vering live WINGS events).=20 >=20 > Consequently, where in the past the FAA employee-run WINGS seminars were c= ommon, now attaining WINGS credit is usually something done as a consequence= of doing something else: complete enough AOPA online seminars and you can a= lso get WINGS credit if you bother to apply; finish a type-specific pilot tr= aining course and if you and your instructor both go to the extra effort you= can also add on a WINGS certificate. I have the greatest respect for you, B= ryan, and the Program Managers who are trying to deliver a safety program wi= th almost no resources, often as an additional duty to other full-time dutie= s in an increasingly understaffed FAA. But that=E2=80=99s why I think it=E2= =80=99s =E2=80=9Cso easy to forget the WINGS Program.=E2=80=9D I apologize f= or not promoting it more, as a safety advocate, a FAASTeam Lead Representati= ve in the FAA=E2=80=99s Central Region, and as a past FAA Safety Team Repres= entative of the Year. =20 >=20 > Summing it all up, remember that as reader Dr. Bill Rhodes wrote, >=20 > If safe utility is the goal, we have examples of pilots who accomplish tha= t routinely; sadly their expertise is for the most part left uncelebrated. >=20 > And as John and Martha King have derived noncorporate general aviation=E2=80= =99s =E2=80=9Csafety=E2=80=9D record is about the same per mile traveled as m= otorcycles in the United States. That means the vast majority of pilots do s= uccessfully and safely complete personal and recreational general aviation f= lights every day. Flying can be done without death, injury or damage. It=E2= =80=99s up to each of us to ensure that we evaluate and manage risk, exercis= e caution in the terribly unforgiving environment of flight, and use good st= ick-and-rudder skills, for today=E2=80=99s flight. Fly like you=E2=80=99re t= aking a checkride=E2=80=A6because in a very real sense you are flying a Prac= tical Test on every flight. > =20 > I=E2=80=99ll have a few more reader responses, and undoubtedly some Debrie= fing related to this week=E2=80=99s discussion, in the next edition of FLYIN= G LESSONS Weekly. >=20 > What do you think? Let us hear from you at mftsurvey@cox.net. > It costs a great deal to host FLYING LESSONS Weekly. Reader donations hel= p cover the expense of keeping FLYING LESSONS online. Please support FLYING= LESSONS through the secure > PayPal donations button at www.mastery-flight-training.com. > Thank you, generous supporters. > Share safer skies. Forward FLYING LESSONS to a friend. > Something to say? Let us learn from you, at mftsurvey@cox.net. > Question of the Month >=20 > Readers continue the discussion on What makes a good instructor?=20 > A good instructor teaches pilots how to handle the unknown. One of a beg= inning pilot=E2=80=99s biggest problems is anxiety. The general public has s= o many misconceptions. Many pilots begin flight training nervous and with v= arious amounts of fear. Most find comfort in flying after a few lessons, bu= t some student pilots are so nervous they never finish learning how to fly. A= good instructor must sense pilots anxiety and adjust the training to give t= he pilot the opportunity experience as many unknowns as possible. > As a 33 year CFI, I have always defined a good teacher as "one who can suc= cessfully create an environment that is conducive to the learning of the tas= k at hand." This takes creativity and flexibility on the part of the instruc= tor, and is dynamic in that the needs of each student and what it is they ar= e learning is a unique event every time, and no two students are the same. T= his in my opinion is what makes teaching both challenging and rewarding at t= he same time. > I think the best instructors teach rules, regulations, flying technique, b= lended with real world experience and practical real-world flying. Then, I t= hink, it is important to fly with multiple instructors to get a well-rounded= education. In general, I believe there is a difference between how we fly a= nd how we train. > Thanks, readers! >=20 > What do you think makes a good instructor pilot? Let us know! >=20 >=20 > =20 > Aviation: Freedom. Choices. Responsibility. >=20 > Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety MCFI > 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year > 2008 FAA Central Region Flight Instructor of the Year >=20 > I welcome your comments and suggestions. Contact mastery.flight.training@= cox.net. If someone has forwarded this message to you and you want to have = FLYING LESSONS sent directly to you each week, you may subscribe for free. = =20 >=20 > Holder of an ATP certificate with instructor, CFII and MEI ratings and a M= asters Degree in Aviation Safety, 2010 National FAA Safety Team Representati= ve of the Year and 2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year, Master CFI Thoma= s P. Turner has been Lead Instructor for Bonanza pilot training program at t= he Beechcraft factory; production test pilot for engine modifications; aviat= ion insurance underwriter; corporate pilot and safety expert; Captain in the= United States Air Force; and contract course developer for Embry-Riddle Aer= onautical University. He now directs the education and safety arm of a 9300= -member pilots=E2=80=99 organization. With over 3800 hours logged, includin= g more than 2400 as an instructor, Tom writes, lectures and instructs extens= ively from his home at THE AIR CAPITAL--Wichita, Kansas.=20 >=20 > Subscribe > For Piston Beechcraft Pilots >=20 > The Beech Weekly Accident Update is now posted on the Mastery Flight Train= ing, Inc. website >=20 > 10 Tips for Avoiding Gear Up and Gear Collapse Mishaps >=20 > There are those who have...and those who won't have a landing gear-related= mishap (LGRM), if they know the most common scenarios of LGRMs, and the 10 t= echniques for avoidance. If you fly a retractable gear airplane, you need t= o view Those Who Won't. $25 may prevent totaling your airplane.=20 >=20 > Share safer skies: Forward FLYING LESSONS to a friend=20 > Copyright =C2=A9 2013 Mastery Flight Training, Inc., All rights reserved. > You are receiving this email because you have subscribed to the free Flyin= g Lessons weekly e-newsletter from Mastery Flight Training, Inc. >=20 > Our mailing address is: > Mastery Flight Training, Inc. > 247 Tiffany Street > Rose Hill, KS 67133 >=20 > Add us to your address book > unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences=20 --Apple-Mail-D976D82D-2B1E-4CEF-991C-1E810D3113BF Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Enjoy...Jeff

Sent f= rom my iPad

Begin forwarded message:

From: Mastery Flight Training, Inc. <mastery.flight.training@cox.net&= gt;
Date: January 2, 2013 10:55:46 PM CST
To: <vtailjeff@aol.com>
Subject:= Flying Lessons Weekly
Reply-To: Mastery Flight Training, I= nc. <mastery.flight.tr= aining@cox.net>

=20 Flying Lessons Weekly =09 =20 =20

Pers= onal Aviation: Freedom.  Choices.  Responsibility.

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