X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 12:36:31 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from qmta14.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net ([76.96.27.212] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.4.1) with ESMTP id 5092793 for lml@lancaironline.net; Mon, 15 Aug 2011 12:05:23 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=76.96.27.212; envelope-from=j.hafen@comcast.net Received: from omta22.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net ([76.96.30.89]) by qmta14.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net with comcast id Lffl1h00D1vN32cAEg4jiL; Mon, 15 Aug 2011 16:04:43 +0000 Received: from [10.0.1.3] ([67.171.49.26]) by omta22.emeryville.ca.mail.comcast.net with comcast id Lg4r1h00e0ZuYyj8ig4sbZ; Mon, 15 Aug 2011 16:04:52 +0000 From: John Hafen Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1084) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-16-109636371 Subject: Re: [LML] Re: hubris X-Original-Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 10:04:45 -0600 In-Reply-To: X-Original-To: "Lancair Mailing List" References: X-Original-Message-Id: <02597F83-443E-4717-ADC3-FCA21A359406@comcast.net> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1084) --Apple-Mail-16-109636371 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Flying is the root cause of accidents. Much like marriage is the = fundamental cause of divorce. John On Aug 15, 2011, at 5:40 AM, swaid rahn wrote: Bill, I don't think i want to fly anymore! Swaid On Sun, Aug 14, 2011 at 9:27 AM, William Miller wrote: Jeff,=20 Re: CEN09FA267 a Cirrus...and CHI07FA183 a Meridian Reading these accident reports, these guys were determined to get there = (-itis), or die. 200 foot overcast takeoff in a single engine airplane? = How's the chute going to help when you hit that unlit tower you ignored = in the NOTAM? Repeated challenge, after ATC warnings, of heavy = thunderstorms and freezing level? What was their preflight plan if the = thunderstorm did their usual bad stuff? None! There are reasons to die in airplanes, but in my experience, should = usually involve fighting to defend your homeland and family, not to = rendezvous with a rental car or hotel reservation. I wonder how many of = these guys have died for Hertz or Hilton? My old boss used to ask if we "had seen any red stars on the other = airplanes or ships out there", and then proceed to inquire why this = mission justified such a high risk. A sign at KIWS says "if you feel = this uncomfortable in this briefing room, now, what makes you think it = will get better, when you are out there in the klag?" Do you see any = "Red Stars" out there? I also see the same sequence, herein, as we discussed in the LOBO brief = at OSH. Most of us are unaware how dependent we are on spatial mapping = of our environment and, conversely, how extreme the confusion, when it = fails. This is because our spatial sense is so good, it hardly ever = fails us. We also forget (or may have never seen) how confusing things are when = our expected sequence of events, comes unglued. Have you practiced your = departure/spin recovery in a thunderstorm? Or even VMC with an = instructor? How about with ice on the prop and wing, and a failed pitot = static system? How's that going to work out fer ya? How long does it = take you to sort out which attitude is right, even with redundancy? Do = you think this airplane might get going real real fast, if you = accidentally align the velocity vector with the gravity vector at full = power. It does.... much faster than the unprepared victim can process = it: In my quick back of the envelope calculation, add 2200 Horsepower to = your existing 350! = Convert[(g 3000 Pound 240 Knot), Horsepower]=20 Do you think reducing power and speed-brakes will help here? Whoops... = there went my cabin pressure? Pop goes the left ear! Why is everything = spinning (baro-corriolis effect) ? It was not what we expected, so we have to recognize, disconnect from = the former expectation, and then solve a new problem with a new plan. = Autopilot complexity worsens this. Lack of simulators or instructors, = familiar with the kill zone, frustrates this. Single point (or single = technology) attitude failures really set you up for this. I retain my = vacuum system and it saved me again last month. Did you know you cannot = find the pitot heat switch or hit the terrain map button in severe = turbulence? That's why Garmin displays terrain warning windows = automatically, but it's usually too late. We had this debate over many iterations in US Naval fighters, with a = lot more engineering and flight test expertise, than we have access to = here. Even in those arguments, there was similar confusion of = redundancy, with relative reliability, robustness, elegance, standards, = appearance, etc,etc. There were equally strong disagreements in that = community. But, I think you will still see those boring, spinning = masses, in those airplanes, as backup.=20 If we recognize the boundaries and limitations of our aircraft, our = advanced systems, our training, and ourselves, we can avoid looking = really stupid, as in these examples. Also the wide field, splattering of = lunch, and parts, under the terminal descent, is pleasantly avoided.=20 There is a serious debate in flight test, about whether we can even = encompass an envelope of this complexity, in our flight tests. = Thereafter, it is just so easy to have overconfidence and have = complacency slowly drift in, over many successful near misses. Reread = the Challenger mishap report. It's not just general, or experimental = aviation, that's subject to this hazard.=20 Y'all be careful out there! Bill Miller What Rogers did not highlight was the fact the vehicle was never = certified to operate in temperatures that low. The O-rings, as well as = many other critical components, had no test data to support any = expectation of a successful launch in such conditions. Bob Ebeling from = Thiokol gave this severely succinct analysis: "we=92re only qualified to 40 degrees ...=91what business does anyone = even have thinking about 18 degrees, we=92re in no man=92s land --=20 Swaid L. Rahn Indigo Aviation, Inc. 940 Mock Road Springfield, Ga. 31329 Cell 912.655.0966 --Apple-Mail-16-109636371 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Bill, I don't think i want to = fly anymore!
Swaid

On Sun, Aug 14, 2011 at 9:27 AM, William = Miller <cwfmd@yahoo.com> = wrote:
=
Jeff,
Re: CEN09FA267 a Cirrus...and CHI07FA183 a Meridian
Reading these accident reports, these guys were determined to get = there (-itis), or die. 200 foot overcast takeoff in a single engine = airplane? How's the chute going to help when you hit that unlit tower = you ignored in the NOTAM?  Repeated challenge, after ATC warnings, = of heavy thunderstorms and freezing level? What was their preflight plan = if the thunderstorm did their usual bad stuff? None!
 There are reasons to die in airplanes, but in my experience, = should usually involve fighting to defend your homeland and family, not = to rendezvous with a rental car or hotel reservation. I wonder how many = of these guys have died for Hertz or Hilton?
 My old boss used to ask if we "had seen any red stars on the = other airplanes or ships out there", and then proceed to inquire why = this mission justified such a high risk. A sign at KIWS says "if you = feel this uncomfortable in this briefing room, now, what makes you think = it will get better, when you are out there in the klag?" Do you see any = "Red Stars" out there?=20
 I also see the same sequence, herein, as we discussed in the = LOBO brief at OSH. Most of us are unaware how dependent we are on = spatial mapping of our environment and, conversely, how extreme the = confusion, when it fails. This is because our spatial sense is so good, = it hardly ever fails us.
 We also forget (or may have never seen) how confusing things = are when our expected sequence of events, comes unglued. Have you = practiced your departure/spin recovery in a thunderstorm? Or even VMC = with an instructor? How about with ice on the prop and wing, and a = failed pitot static system? How's that going to work out fer ya? How = long does it take you to sort out which attitude is right, even with = redundancy? Do you think this airplane might get going real real fast, = if you accidentally align the velocity vector with the gravity vector at = full power. It does.... much faster than the unprepared victim can = process it:
 In my quick back of the envelope calculation, add  2200 = Horsepower to your existing 350!         =                     =                     =                   =   Convert[(g 3000 Pound 240 Knot), Horsepower] 
Do you = think reducing power and speed-brakes will help here?  Whoops... = there went my cabin pressure? Pop goes the left ear! Why is everything = spinning (baro-corriolis effect) ?
 It was not what we expected, so we have to recognize, = disconnect from the former expectation, and then solve a new problem = with a new plan. Autopilot complexity worsens this. Lack of simulators = or instructors, familiar with the kill zone, frustrates this. Single = point (or single technology) attitude failures really set you up for = this. I retain my vacuum system and it saved me again last month. Did = you know you cannot find the pitot heat switch or hit the terrain map = button in severe turbulence? That's why Garmin displays terrain warning = windows automatically, but it's usually too late.
 We had this debate over many iterations in US Naval fighters, = with a lot more engineering and flight test expertise, than we have = access to here. Even in those arguments, there was similar confusion of = redundancy, with relative reliability, robustness, elegance, standards, = appearance, etc,etc. There were equally strong disagreements in that = community. But, I think you will still see those boring, spinning = masses, in those airplanes, as backup. 
 If we recognize the boundaries and limitations of our = aircraft, our advanced systems, our training, and ourselves, we can = avoid looking really stupid, as in these examples. Also the wide field, = splattering of lunch, and parts, under the terminal descent, is = pleasantly avoided. 
There is a serious debate in flight test, about whether we can even = encompass an envelope of this complexity, in our flight tests. = Thereafter, it is just so easy to have overconfidence and have = complacency slowly drift in, over many successful near misses. Reread = the Challenger mishap report. It's not just general, or experimental = aviation, that's subject to this hazard. 
Y'all be careful out there!
Bill Miller

What Rogers did not highlight = was the fact the vehicle was never certified to operate in temperatures = that low. The O-rings, as well as many other critical components, had no = test data to support any expectation of a successful launch in such = conditions. Bob Ebeling from Thiokol gave this severely succinct = analysis:
"we=92re only qualified to 40 degrees ...=91what business does = anyone even have thinking about 18 degrees, we=92re in no man=92s = land
=



-- =
Swaid L. Rahn
Indigo Aviation, Inc.
940 Mock = Road
Springfield, Ga. 31329
Cell 912.655.0966



= --Apple-Mail-16-109636371--