X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 07:39:45 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from mta21.charter.net ([216.33.127.81] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.4.1) with ESMTP id 5091791 for lml@lancaironline.net; Sun, 14 Aug 2011 12:00:26 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=216.33.127.81; envelope-from=troneill@charter.net Received: from imp09 ([10.20.200.9]) by mta21.charter.net (InterMail vM.7.09.02.04 201-2219-117-106-20090629) with ESMTP id <20110814155949.OGVX3880.mta21.charter.net@imp09> for ; Sun, 14 Aug 2011 11:59:49 -0400 Received: from [192.168.1.100] ([75.132.241.174]) by imp09 with smtp.charter.net id LFzp1h00A3mUFT705Fzp9F; Sun, 14 Aug 2011 11:59:49 -0400 X-Authority-Analysis: v=1.1 cv=1b2X7W/SifksZeClH/haT1SUt4udqxFGF00pZw2/jJk= c=1 sm=1 a=yUnIBFQkZM0A:10 a=VxlS/kh5Y2KhHY/Xui1ATg==:17 a=oiUKtE7TP4Db9FyiN8oA:9 a=QHSPwcx5iyh3CzJPON8A:7 a=pILNOxqGKmIA:10 a=8pif782wAAAA:8 a=dxPP25at_O2Q79cDC3MA:7 a=VxlS/kh5Y2KhHY/Xui1ATg==:117 From: Terrence O'Neill Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1084) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-36-22942113 Subject: Re: [LML] hubris X-Original-Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 10:59:51 -0500 In-Reply-To: X-Original-To: "Lancair Mailing List" References: X-Original-Message-Id: <5C074160-D427-4E00-ADBC-051FAD8AD1C6@charter.net> X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1084) --Apple-Mail-36-22942113 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Excellent comments, including some 'inconvenient truths'. Going a step farther for 'experimental' designers: ALL airplanes need = flight brakes for unusual attitude saves, AOA vanes (not lights) for = staying within or returning into the envelope 'no-matter-what'; and = synthetic vision with everything, and a backup; and for VFR, strobes, = and traffic-with-altitude reporting on the glass display. Maybe in another ten years ... Terrence L235/320 N211ALL On Aug 14, 2011, at 8:27 AM, William Miller wrote: >=20 > Jeff,=20 > Re: CEN09FA267 a Cirrus...and CHI07FA183 a Meridian >=20 > Reading these accident reports, these guys were determined to get = there (-itis), or die. 200 foot overcast takeoff in a single engine = airplane? How's the chute going to help when you hit that unlit tower = you ignored in the NOTAM? Repeated challenge, after ATC warnings, of = heavy thunderstorms and freezing level? What was their preflight plan if = the thunderstorm did their usual bad stuff? None! > There are reasons to die in airplanes, but in my experience, should = usually involve fighting to defend your homeland and family, not to = rendezvous with a rental car or hotel reservation. I wonder how many of = these guys have died for Hertz or Hilton? > My old boss used to ask if we "had seen any red stars on the other = airplanes or ships out there", and then proceed to inquire why this = mission justified such a high risk. A sign at KIWS says "if you feel = this uncomfortable in this briefing room, now, what makes you think it = will get better, when you are out there in the klag?" Do you see any = "Red Stars" out there? > I also see the same sequence, herein, as we discussed in the LOBO = brief at OSH. Most of us are unaware how dependent we are on spatial = mapping of our environment and, conversely, how extreme the confusion, = when it fails. This is because our spatial sense is so good, it hardly = ever fails us. > We also forget (or may have never seen) how confusing things are when = our expected sequence of events, comes unglued. Have you practiced your = departure/spin recovery in a thunderstorm? Or even VMC with an = instructor? How about with ice on the prop and wing, and a failed pitot = static system? How's that going to work out fer ya? How long does it = take you to sort out which attitude is right, even with redundancy? Do = you think this airplane might get going real real fast, if you = accidentally align the velocity vector with the gravity vector at full = power. It does.... much faster than the unprepared victim can process = it: > In my quick back of the envelope calculation, add 2200 Horsepower to = your existing 350! = Convert[(g 3000 Pound 240 Knot), Horsepower]=20 > Do you think reducing power and speed-brakes will help here? = Whoops... there went my cabin pressure? Pop goes the left ear! Why is = everything spinning (baro-corriolis effect) ? > It was not what we expected, so we have to recognize, disconnect from = the former expectation, and then solve a new problem with a new plan. = Autopilot complexity worsens this. Lack of simulators or instructors, = familiar with the kill zone, frustrates this. Single point (or single = technology) attitude failures really set you up for this. I retain my = vacuum system and it saved me again last month. Did you know you cannot = find the pitot heat switch or hit the terrain map button in severe = turbulence? That's why Garmin displays terrain warning windows = automatically, but it's usually too late. > We had this debate over many iterations in US Naval fighters, with a = lot more engineering and flight test expertise, than we have access to = here. Even in those arguments, there was similar confusion of = redundancy, with relative reliability, robustness, elegance, standards, = appearance, etc,etc. There were equally strong disagreements in that = community. But, I think you will still see those boring, spinning = masses, in those airplanes, as backup.=20 > If we recognize the boundaries and limitations of our aircraft, our = advanced systems, our training, and ourselves, we can avoid looking = really stupid, as in these examples. Also the wide field, splattering of = lunch, and parts, under the terminal descent, is pleasantly avoided.=20 > There is a serious debate in flight test, about whether we can even = encompass an envelope of this complexity, in our flight tests. = Thereafter, it is just so easy to have overconfidence and have = complacency slowly drift in, over many successful near misses. Reread = the Challenger mishap report. It's not just general, or experimental = aviation, that's subject to this hazard.=20 > Y'all be careful out there! > Bill Miller >=20 > What Rogers did not highlight was the fact the vehicle was never = certified to operate in temperatures that low. The O-rings, as well as = many other critical components, had no test data to support any = expectation of a successful launch in such conditions. Bob Ebeling from = Thiokol gave this severely succinct analysis: > "we=92re only qualified to 40 degrees ...=91what business does anyone = even have thinking about 18 degrees, we=92re in no man=92s land --Apple-Mail-36-22942113 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1252
Jeff, =
Re: CEN09FA267 a Cirrus...and CHI07FA183 a = Meridian

Reading these accident reports, these guys = were determined to get there (-itis), or die. 200 foot overcast takeoff = in a single engine airplane? How's the chute going to help when you hit = that unlit tower you ignored in the NOTAM?  Repeated challenge, = after ATC warnings, of heavy thunderstorms and freezing level? What was their = preflight plan if the thunderstorm did their usual bad stuff? = None!
 There are reasons to die in airplanes, but in my = experience, should usually involve fighting to defend your homeland and = family, not to rendezvous with a rental car or hotel reservation. I wonder how many of these guys have died for = Hertz or Hilton?
 My old boss used to ask if we "had seen = any red stars on the other airplanes or ships out there", and then = proceed to inquire why this mission justified such a high risk. A sign = at KIWS says "if you feel this uncomfortable in this briefing room, now, = what makes you think it will get better, when you are out there in the = klag?" Do you see any "Red Stars" out there?
 I also see the = same sequence, herein, as we discussed in the LOBO brief at OSH. Most of = us are unaware how dependent we are on spatial mapping of our environment and, conversely, how extreme the confusion, when it = fails. This is because our spatial sense is so good, it hardly ever = fails us.
 We also forget (or may have never seen) how = confusing things are when our expected sequence of events, comes = unglued. Have you practiced your departure/spin recovery in a = thunderstorm? Or even VMC with an instructor? How about with ice on the = prop and wing, and a failed pitot static system? How's that going to = work out fer ya? How long does it take you to sort out which attitude is = right, even with redundancy? Do you think this airplane might get going = real real fast, if you accidentally align the velocity vector with the = gravity vector at full power. It does.... much faster than the = unprepared victim can process it:
 In my quick back of = the envelope calculation, add  2200 Horsepower to your existing 350!       =                     =                     =                     =   Convert[(g 3000 Pound 240 Knot), = Horsepower] 
Do you think = reducing power and speed-brakes will help here?  Whoops... there = went my cabin pressure? Pop goes the left ear! Why is everything = spinning (baro-corriol= is effect) ?
 It was not what we expected, so = we have to recognize, disconnect from the former expectation, and then = solve a new problem with a new plan. Autopilot complexity worsens this. Lack of simulators or instructors, familiar with the kill zone, frustrates = this. Single point (or single technology) attitude failures really set = you up for this. I retain my vacuum system and it saved me again last = month. Did you know you cannot find the pitot heat switch or hit the = terrain map button in severe turbulence? That's why Garmin displays = terrain warning windows automatically, but it's usually too = late.
 We had this debate over many iterations in US = Naval fighters, with a lot more engineering and flight test expertise, = than we have access to here. Even in those arguments, there was similar = confusion of redundancy, with relative reliability, robustness, = elegance, standards, appearance, etc,etc. There were equally strong = disagreements in that community. But, I think you will still see those = boring, spinning masses, in those airplanes, as = backup. 
 If we recognize the boundaries and = limitations of our aircraft, our advanced systems, our training, and ourselves, we can avoid looking = really stupid, as in these examples. Also the wide field, splattering of = lunch, and parts, under the terminal descent, is pleasantly = avoided. 
There is a serious debate in flight test, about = whether we can even encompass an envelope of this complexity, in our = flight tests. Thereafter, it is just so easy to have overconfidence and = have complacency slowly drift in, over many successful near misses. = Reread the Challenger mishap re= port. It's not just general, or experimental aviation, that's subject to this = hazard. 
Y'all be careful out there!
Bill = Miller

What Rogers did not highlight = was the fact the vehicle was never certified to operate in temperatures = that low. The O-rings, as well as many other critical components, had no = test data to support any expectation of a successful launch in such = conditions. Bob Ebeling from Thiokol gave this severely succinct = analysis:
"we=92r= e only qualified to 40 degrees ...=91what business does anyone even have = thinking about 18 degrees, we=92re in no man=92s = land

= --Apple-Mail-36-22942113--