X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Received: from [199.185.220.224] (HELO priv-edtnes40.telusplanet.net) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 4.3.4) with ESMTP id 986332 for flyrotary@lancaironline.net; Mon, 06 Jun 2005 14:21:04 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=199.185.220.224; envelope-from=echolakeresort@telus.net Received: from boucher-oddle24 ([207.194.26.30]) by priv-edtnes40.telusplanet.net (InterMail vM.6.01.04.04 201-2131-118-104-20050224) with ESMTP id <20050606182016.TRFN6568.priv-edtnes40.telusplanet.net@boucher-oddle24> for ; Mon, 6 Jun 2005 12:20:16 -0600 Received: from 127.0.0.1 (AVG SMTP 7.0.323 [267.6.4]); Mon, 06 Jun 2005 11:20:14 -0700 Message-Id: <42A493DB.000006.02760@BOUCHER-ODDLE24> Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2005 11:20:11 -0700 (Pacific Standard Time) X-Mailer: IncrediMail (3001609) From: "Echo Lake Fishing Resort (Georges Boucher)" References: To: Subject: Re: [FlyRotary] Re: EC2 problems - solved / rotary risks X-FID: FLAVOR00-NONE-0000-0000-000000000000 X-Priority: 3 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=======AVGMAIL-42A493DE0CE3=======" --=======AVGMAIL-42A493DE0CE3======= Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; boundary="------------Boundary-00=_NLDO12S0000000000000" --------------Boundary-00=_NLDO12S0000000000000 Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I see guys doubling up on water pumps (2 EWP in some cases) yet because there hasn't been a CAS failure (that we know of) they are not worried . = If you want true redundancy, you must double up on the systems that have a possibility of killing you engine (and you,no matter how remote) The CAS failure could be between the ECU & the CAS due to our application. Not to= be too critical, but I've seen some pretty scary (sloppy) installations. If = you follow the certificated aircraft procedures as far as securing, protectin= g & routing wires, hoses, pipes & components you can be on your way to a safe installation.=0D Georges B. (in my book, redundancy is job one)=0D -------Original Message-------=0D =0D From: Rotary motors in aircraft=0D Date: 06/06/05 10:32:38=0D To: Rotary motors in aircraft=0D Subject: [FlyRotary] Re: EC2 problems - solved / rotary risks=0D =0D Hi Al,=0D I fail to see how installing another CAS will 'dramatically' reduce=0D risk of all ECM causes.=0D =0D We have already said we have no history of failure of the CAS, how can=0D installing another CAS (with no history of failure), 'dramatically'=0D reduce the risk of failure?=0D =0D And how can installing another CAS have any influence on "the risk of=0D all ECM causes" ?=0D =0D I also have great respect for redundant systems, but I cannot see your=0D logic in this one. It is the 'dramatic reduction' that troubles me.=0D BR, Dave McC=0D =0D =0D On 06/06/2005, at 9:57 PM, al p wick wrote:=0D >=0D > =0D > Regarding CAS risk. It's not just crank angle sensor that is the risk=0D > item. Going to redundancy with the CAS will dramatically reduce risk=0D > of all ECM causes. Like this connector risk. I'm not always proponent=0D > of redundancy, but with my limited info on this item, I SUSPECT it's=0D > significant, positive step.=0D >=0D > -al wick=0D > Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by stock Subaru 2.5= =0D > N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland, Oregon=0D > Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel design=0D > info:=0D > http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html=0D =20 --------------Boundary-00=_NLDO12S0000000000000 Content-Type: Text/HTML; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I see guys doubling up on water pumps (2 EWP in some cases= ) yet because there hasn't been a CAS failure (that we know of) they= are not worried . If you want true redundancy, you must double up on the= systems that have a possibility of killing you engine (and you,no matter= how remote) The CAS failure could be between the ECU & the CAS due t= o our application. Not to be too critical, but I've seen some pretty scar= y (sloppy) installations. If you follow the certificated aircraft procedu= res as far as securing, protecting & routing wires, hoses, pipes &= ; components you can be on your way to a safe installation.
 Georges B. (in my book, redundancy is job one)
-------Original Message-------
 
Date: 06/06/05 10:= 32:38
Subject: [FlyRotar= y] Re: EC2 problems - solved / rotary risks
 
Hi Al,
I fail to see how installing another CAS will 'dramatically' reduce<= /DIV>
risk of all ECM causes.
 
  We have already said we have no history of failure of th= e CAS, how can
installing another CAS (with no history of failure), 'dramatically'<= /DIV>
reduce the risk of failure?
 
And how can installing another CAS have any influence on "the risk o= f
all ECM causes" ?
 
I also have great respect for redundant systems, but I cannot see yo= ur
logic in this one. It is the 'dramatic reduction' that troubles me.<= /DIV>
BR, Dave McC
 
 
On 06/06/2005, at 9:57 PM, al p wick wrote:
>
>  
> Regarding CAS risk. It's not just crank angle sensor that is th= e risk
> item. Going to redundancy with the CAS will dramatically reduce= risk
> of all ECM causes. Like this connector risk. I'm not always pro= ponent
> of redundancy, but with my limited info on this item, I SU= SPECT it's
> significant, positive step.
>
> -al wick
> Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by stock Su= baru 2.5
> N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland, Oregon
> Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel de= sign
> info:
 
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