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From: Hans Conser <conserreceipts@earthlink.net>
Subject: Re: [FlyRotary] Re: Rotary risks
Date: Sat, 4 Jun 2005 19:00:19 -0600
To: "Rotary motors in aircraft" <flyrotary@lancaironline.net>

I believe the CAS is just a coil.  No moving parts.


On Jun 4, 2005, at 4:13 PM, al p wick wrote:

> Good point Dale. Clearly you want to focus on the big risk items. In my
> field it's referred to as the 80/20 rule. Meaning 80% of the risk can 
> be
> eliminated by addressing only 20% of the items. Just have to figure out
> which items are the 20% ones. Lot's of ways to do that.
>
> -al wick
>
>
> On Sat, 4 Jun 2005 11:37:50 -0400 Dale Rogers <dale.r@cox.net> writes:
>>    Then again, is this where our inventive efforts would
>> yield the most value, at this time?  So far, it seems that
>> the Mazda CAS is one of the _least_ vulnerable of the engine
>> management components.
>>
>>    So far, the most fragile parts of the system have turned
>> out to be the intake and fuel systems.  So that is where a
>> lot of attention has been, of late.
>>
>> My $.002 (.02, after 35 years of inflation)
>>
>> Dale R.                              (___
>> COZY MkIV-R13B #1254          |----==(___)==----|
>> Ch's 4, 5, 16 & 23 in progress      o/ | \o
>>
>>
>>> From: al p wick <alwick@juno.com>
>>> Date: 2005/06/04 Sat AM 10:43:11 EDT
>>> To: "Rotary motors in aircraft" <flyrotary@lancaironline.net>
>>> Subject: [FlyRotary] Re: Rotary risks
>>>
>>> First, let's try to get a perspective.
>>> There is no job as creative as that of Design Engineer. This guy
>> is
>>> making hundreds of decisions. How many inputs do I need, what
>> size
>>> resistor, how wide should that track be, how do I isolate that
>> from
>>> vibration, etc etc. It's a very very high risk activity. So easy
>> to
>>> overlook something. Many of the decisions are arbitrary. You are
>> just
>>> making your best guess.
>>>
>>> The Japanese produce superior products. When we analyzed their
>> success 30
>>> years ago, we found they used certain tools in the design and
>> validation
>>> phase that U.S. designers didn't. One of these is the FMEA (see
>> web
>>> site). They get a group of engineers together and say" Ok, this is
>> our
>>> best guess on how it should be designed, what's going to fail?".
>> They go
>>> thru each characteristic and rate them for risk. Then they find a
>> way to
>>> prove how far from failure each of those items are.
>>> For example, they'll say"Ok, the alternator is going to fail. This
>> will
>>> produce an ac voltage." So then they measure how large the ac
>> voltage can
>>> get before the device dies. Then they take action if there is not
>> a large
>>> safety margin, retest. They end up with numbers that measure their
>> safety
>>> margin.
>>>
>>> So I would encourage reviewing all the various failure modes of
>> the ECM.
>>> Deliberately subject it to experiences beyond what it will
>> normally see.
>>> Unplug each sensor, see how it handles it. Apply heat way beyond
>> normal,
>>> apply vibrations beyond normal. There are very simple ways to do
>> this. It
>>> doesn't have to be some long drawn out thing.
>>>
>>> However, statistically, we know if you have true redundancy in
>> this
>>> particular device, then you get to multiply the probability of
>> failure.
>>> So if the probability of shut down is 1 time in 1000 hours, since
>> we have
>>> two with independent probabilities, our odds plummet to 1 time in
>> 1
>>> million hours. So all you need are two independent circuits.
>>> When in doubt, just take a look at what the auto designers have
>> done.
>>> They use more than one sensor to measure each characteristic.
>> They
>>> compare the sensor results to historical data. They instantly
>> recognize
>>> the sensor is providing false data, then warn you, and use tables
>> or
>>> other sensor to keep you plugging along. That's why you don't see
>>> vehicles sitting on the side of the road.
>>>
>>> Sorry for being so long winded, I have the impression that stuff
>> like
>>> this haven't been discussed before.
>>>
>>>
>>> -al wick
>>> Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by stock
>> Subaru 2.5
>>> N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland, Oregon
>>> Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel
>> design info:
>>> http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>>  Homepage:  http://www.flyrotary.com/
>>>>  Archive:   http://lancaironline.net/lists/flyrotary/List.html
>>
>>
>
>
> -al wick
> Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by stock Subaru 2.5
> N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland, Oregon
> Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel design 
> info:
> http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html
>
>>>  Homepage:  http://www.flyrotary.com/
>>>  Archive:   http://lancaironline.net/lists/flyrotary/List.html
>