You ask me all these questions about my installation. I don't understand
why. It has no bearing on the subject. Let's pretend I fly the highest risk
aircraft ever made. Does that mean all my risk statements below have no
substance? Does that mean there are no rotary risks?
I apologize for my "long winded" remark. I can see how it would appear
condescending and inappropriate.
Hi
Al, I was not going to bother replying to your posts but your last one pushed
me over the top. I have a couple of questions:
1)
Do you have two ECMs? Having redundant crank angle sensors is
great, feeding them all into one computer is no better then having
only one crank sensor.
2)
Have you tested limp home mode on climb out?
3)
How is your power output with a partially shorted temp sensor? I'm
betting it is not going to be too good - like none.
4)
How old is your ECM? Most people junk their cars after 10 years, where
did you get data to support the reliability of the ECM as it ages?
I do have some
experience in automobile failure modes, I am a licensed auto technician
with OBDII training. I have colleagues who work on Subaru's, one fellow works
at a local dealership, and two others work at independent garages. FYI
Subaru's, like every other vehicle ever made, do come in on a hook and
they do coast to a stop from time to time.
One
last thing, you wrote:
"Sorry for being so
long winded, I have the impression that stuff like this haven't been discussed
before."
That's right, we are all morons that don't grasp concepts like risk and
redundancy. While I plan to have fully redundant ignition and fuel,
(using an EC-2 as primary and a megaSquirtNSpark as a backup)
Tracy (and his many customers) concluded that some inputs like a crank
angle sensor did not represent a failure risk, he seems like a pretty smart
guy who considers the decisions he makes. 1600+ hours suggests to me
that his decisions are pretty good.
You
may be a great analyst - your skills as a diplomat leave a lot to be
desired.
--
Ian
First, let's try to get a perspective.
There is no job as creative as that of Design Engineer. This guy is
making hundreds of decisions. How many inputs do I need, what size resistor,
how wide should that track be, how do I isolate that from vibration, etc
etc. It's a very very high risk activity. So easy to overlook something.
Many of the decisions are arbitrary. You are just making your best guess.
The Japanese produce superior products. When we analyzed their success
30 years ago, we found they used certain tools in the design and validation
phase that U.S. designers didn't. One of these is the FMEA (see web site).
They get a group of engineers together and say" Ok, this is our best
guess on how it should be designed, what's going to fail?". They go thru
each characteristic and rate them for risk. Then they find a way to prove
how far from failure each of those items are.
For example, they'll say"Ok, the alternator is going to fail. This will
produce an ac voltage." So then they measure how large the ac voltage can
get before the device dies. Then they take action if there is not a large
safety margin, retest. They end up with numbers that measure their safety
margin.
So I would encourage reviewing all the various failure modes of the
ECM. Deliberately subject it to experiences beyond what it will normally
see. Unplug each sensor, see how it handles it. Apply heat way beyond
normal, apply vibrations beyond normal. There are very simple ways to do
this. It doesn't have to be some long drawn out thing.
However, statistically, we know if you have true redundancy in
this particular device, then you get to multiply the probability of failure.
So if the probability of shut down is 1 time in 1000 hours, since we have
two with independent probabilities, our odds plummet to 1 time in 1
million hours. So all you need are two independent
circuits.
When in doubt, just take a look at what the auto designers have done.
They use more than one sensor to measure each characteristic. They compare
the sensor results to historical data. They instantly recognize the sensor
is providing false data, then warn you, and use tables or other sensor to
keep you plugging along. That's why you don't see vehicles sitting on the
side of the road.
Sorry for being so long winded, I have the impression that stuff like
this haven't been discussed before.
-al wick
Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by
stock Subaru 2.5
N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland,
Oregon
Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel
design
info:
http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html
Al,
What changes would be required? (reference
your statement below)
Bill Schertz
KIS Cruiser # 4045
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2005 9:50
PM
Subject: [FlyRotary] Re: Rotary
risks
You bring up very important points. If you guys can develop robust
solutions for each of the challenges, then you can end up with a
powerplant that has some fabulous failure modes. Here is a great
example, I suspect your ECM shutdown risk is now somewhere around 1 time
in 1000 (maybe 500) hours. But with simple changes that make the
system genuinely redundant, you would automatically raise that to 1
time in 1000000 hours. That is fantastic for a custom low volume
ECM.