X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Received: from m12.lax.untd.com ([64.136.30.75] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 4.3.4) with SMTP id 984784 for flyrotary@lancaironline.net; Sat, 04 Jun 2005 18:16:33 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=64.136.30.75; envelope-from=alwick@juno.com Received: from m12.lax.untd.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by m12.lax.untd.com with SMTP id AABBLELAHAE72ZUJ for (sender ); Sat, 4 Jun 2005 15:15:35 -0700 (PDT) X-UNTD-OriginStamp: L941HVjjYzDhN3itp//mkLBBB3RdatAr0HKHMUWSWa+4DtgynRtbqg== Received: (from alwick@juno.com) by m12.lax.untd.com (jqueuemail) id KUPDSX86; Sat, 04 Jun 2005 15:14:58 PDT To: flyrotary@lancaironline.net Date: Sat, 4 Jun 2005 15:13:56 -0700 Subject: Re: [FlyRotary] Re: Rotary risks Message-ID: <20050604.151405.2820.4.alwick@juno.com> X-Mailer: Juno 5.0.33 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Juno-Line-Breaks: 3-121 From: al p wick X-ContentStamp: 46:23:1877330572 X-MAIL-INFO:10f5f518ada9dd95d1dc61183861f821ed317561991da5f9ad997531996899bc9de8cd3df535180518b9ad28f86c982895a9b5e84565b1016d7dbd6d45008d0098ac0d25bdf11c7825accc4dcc7d2c1ce9cc00cdcd053d31057531f5b9bcbca9cc2db1bd797d01a53c3c414cf98ddc391d35488139750505c181edd1119d5c995cd9 X-UNTD-Peer-Info: 127.0.0.1|localhost|m12.lax.untd.com|alwick@juno.com Good point Dale. Clearly you want to focus on the big risk items. In my field it's referred to as the 80/20 rule. Meaning 80% of the risk can be eliminated by addressing only 20% of the items. Just have to figure out which items are the 20% ones. Lot's of ways to do that. -al wick On Sat, 4 Jun 2005 11:37:50 -0400 Dale Rogers writes: > Then again, is this where our inventive efforts would > yield the most value, at this time? So far, it seems that > the Mazda CAS is one of the _least_ vulnerable of the engine > management components. > > So far, the most fragile parts of the system have turned > out to be the intake and fuel systems. So that is where a > lot of attention has been, of late. > > My $.002 (.02, after 35 years of inflation) > > Dale R. (___ > COZY MkIV-R13B #1254 |----==(___)==----| > Ch's 4, 5, 16 & 23 in progress o/ | \o > > > > From: al p wick > > Date: 2005/06/04 Sat AM 10:43:11 EDT > > To: "Rotary motors in aircraft" > > Subject: [FlyRotary] Re: Rotary risks > > > > First, let's try to get a perspective. > > There is no job as creative as that of Design Engineer. This guy > is > > making hundreds of decisions. How many inputs do I need, what > size > > resistor, how wide should that track be, how do I isolate that > from > > vibration, etc etc. It's a very very high risk activity. So easy > to > > overlook something. Many of the decisions are arbitrary. You are > just > > making your best guess. > > > > The Japanese produce superior products. When we analyzed their > success 30 > > years ago, we found they used certain tools in the design and > validation > > phase that U.S. designers didn't. One of these is the FMEA (see > web > > site). They get a group of engineers together and say" Ok, this is > our > > best guess on how it should be designed, what's going to fail?". > They go > > thru each characteristic and rate them for risk. Then they find a > way to > > prove how far from failure each of those items are. > > For example, they'll say"Ok, the alternator is going to fail. This > will > > produce an ac voltage." So then they measure how large the ac > voltage can > > get before the device dies. Then they take action if there is not > a large > > safety margin, retest. They end up with numbers that measure their > safety > > margin. > > > > So I would encourage reviewing all the various failure modes of > the ECM. > > Deliberately subject it to experiences beyond what it will > normally see. > > Unplug each sensor, see how it handles it. Apply heat way beyond > normal, > > apply vibrations beyond normal. There are very simple ways to do > this. It > > doesn't have to be some long drawn out thing. > > > > However, statistically, we know if you have true redundancy in > this > > particular device, then you get to multiply the probability of > failure. > > So if the probability of shut down is 1 time in 1000 hours, since > we have > > two with independent probabilities, our odds plummet to 1 time in > 1 > > million hours. So all you need are two independent circuits. > > When in doubt, just take a look at what the auto designers have > done. > > They use more than one sensor to measure each characteristic. > They > > compare the sensor results to historical data. They instantly > recognize > > the sensor is providing false data, then warn you, and use tables > or > > other sensor to keep you plugging along. That's why you don't see > > vehicles sitting on the side of the road. > > > > Sorry for being so long winded, I have the impression that stuff > like > > this haven't been discussed before. > > > > > > -al wick > > Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by stock > Subaru 2.5 > > N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland, Oregon > > Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel > design info: > > http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html > > > > > > >> Homepage: http://www.flyrotary.com/ > >> Archive: http://lancaironline.net/lists/flyrotary/List.html > > -al wick Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by stock Subaru 2.5 N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland, Oregon Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel design info: http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html