X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Received: from imr-da06.mx.aol.com ([205.188.169.203] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 6.0.1) with ESMTP id 6072784 for lml@lancaironline.net; Tue, 19 Feb 2013 17:51:07 -0500 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=205.188.169.203; envelope-from=Sky2high@aol.com Received: from mtaomg-db02.r1000.mx.aol.com (mtaomg-db02.r1000.mx.aol.com [172.29.51.200]) by imr-da06.mx.aol.com (Outbound Mail Relay) with ESMTP id 17D601C000064 for ; Tue, 19 Feb 2013 17:50:34 -0500 (EST) Received: from core-mtc001a.r1000.mail.aol.com (core-mtc001.r1000.mail.aol.com [172.29.235.1]) by mtaomg-db02.r1000.mx.aol.com (OMAG/Core Interface) with ESMTP id 99725E000082 for ; Tue, 19 Feb 2013 17:50:33 -0500 (EST) From: Sky2high@aol.com Full-name: Sky2high Message-ID: <250c7.7ebe824f.3e555bb8@aol.com> Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2013 17:50:32 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: [LML] UAS/UAV Dangers can be mitigated. To: lml@lancaironline.net MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="part1_250c7.7ebe824f.3e555bb8_boundary" X-Mailer: AOL 9.6 sub 168 X-Originating-IP: [67.175.156.123] x-aol-global-disposition: G DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=mx.aol.com; s=20121107; t=1361314234; bh=/r4U9q0x2pb1UBOx6/UI9MBSG0zhBIKb5JG9KVP/L+U=; h=From:To:Subject:Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=cKJTi5E+qoW+G8NuLp6SU16ZlEl2g7Yq7ZMmCMbFqhz7ro8JyEeDvip+aq7oJ67kY oXdRV2TxrjJSrpvQvU3W6DgipCYM0KTg+aUnQGGF4lMVke/ZL4FFQROEEaBlTxPN/p Rc/vyvuUcmS3dUzmkWL7YOF6GZgMSjrb18ro9uL0= X-AOL-SCOLL-SCORE: 1:2:514473824:93952408 X-AOL-SCOLL-URL_COUNT: 25 x-aol-sid: 3039ac1d33c8512401b921ee --part1_250c7.7ebe824f.3e555bb8_boundary Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en Jeff, =20 Thanks for sending a copy of that issue of CallBack since most probably=20 don't receive it. Interesting list of UAS control failures - Read on. =20 The FAA seems to be focused on having UASs avoiding other aircraft in their= =20 flight path - even to the extent that the UAS must simulate see and avoid= =20 rules (still some non-electric aircraft out there). =20 But hey, we see how these things wander about, lose their controller, have = =20 controller errors, etc. =20 How about GA having the ability to see them? Huh? Huh? =20 Wait, that sounds a lot like ADS-B! =20 Here is part of what I wrote to the NTSB (met a rep at OSH) after last=20 year's AirVenture: =20 At OSH I talked to the Army about their 100 Kt, 14' wing span UAV and=20 whether it would be equipped with ADS-B out. While the responder knew noth= ing=20 about ADS-B, he claimed that the FAA required them to have "see-and-avoid"= =20 capability before operating in the NAS. To that end, they would be equippe= d=20 with 3 radars, supposedly allowing them to "avoid." That is inadequate as= =20 GA would not "see" them, either electronically or visually. That UAV is ve= ry=20 small (even smaller than my wee Lancair 320) and would not be seen=20 visually until it is too late. For these UAVs to operate in NAS they shoul= d also=20 be transmitting ADS-B out (or, minimally - Mode S) so that ATC or on-board= =20 equipment could warn the GA pilot of their presence. Another problem is th= at=20 UAVs, whether military or not, will grow in size and speed. So, the=20 question is whether UAVs will be equipped with ADS-B out technology in ord= er to=20 safely operate any aircraft in the NAS?=20 I also talked to Air Force personnel unaware of NEXGEN and ADS-B. I asked= =20 whether MTRs (Military Training Routes) were still in use and they replied= =20 in the affirmative. I then asked if such military aircraft using those=20 routes would be equipped with ADS-B out capabilities? They didn't know. Th= is,=20 of course leads to the question of whether any military aircraft operating= =20 in the NAS, whether or not on a MTR, would be issuing ADS-B out data for t= he=20 safety of all aircraft operating in the area?=20 It would contribute to flight safety if military aircraft operating in=20 MOAs were also transmitting ADS-B out information.=20 The FAA seems to be encouraging GA to adopt ADS-B before the 2020 deadline= =20 and its use by the military would certainly be a positive argument for GA= =20 use. Garmin's recent announcements about ASD-B equipment (and other=20 avionics that are available) certainly brings the price within reason alon= g with=20 the FAA's commitment to have all 800 ADS-B ground stations operable in 201= 3.=20 .......=20 I received no response or acknowledgment of these concerns. =20 Then I wrote Aero-News about this topic - again no response. =20 Notice the glaring absence of any reference to UAS/Military use of ADS-B by= =20 either the FAA, NTSB or any news media such as AOPA, Aero-News, AvWeb, =20 etc. =20 To further educate yourself about the ever growing population of UASs, see = =20 _http://flash.aopa.org/asf/unmannedaircraft/index.cfm?WT.mc_id=3D130215epil= ot& WT.mc_sect=3Dsap_=20 (http://flash.aopa.org/asf/unmannedaircraft/index.cfm?WT.mc_id=3D130215epil= ot&WT.mc_sect=3Dsap)=20 =20 Note again no reference of the use of ADS-B in UASs for safety's sake. =20 What's up?=20 =20 Scott Krueger =20 Trouble? You bet UASs =20 =20 In a message dated 2/13/2013 2:59:02 P.M. Central Standard Time, =20 vtailjeff@aol.com writes: Problem viewing / mobile device: _CLICK HERE_=20 (http://campaign.r20.constantcontact.com/render?llr=3Dpq6xrobab&v=3D001e5Wo= bZtxxKSPY4 U02cLc-nHPLJDmH8pPu1-ddNnvP2jebRYUdcHgZdH6QitD5LgggrnYU7lgnkP14QSmFUqXOZhK6= Keli5BUP_yAWSfv0Iq7S BlHumxxaNOejRtljlW4hzkb3TnAINBkVCGZDekm50Gwb30BrTkrAWAfN9Qex3ILBirbXl0x5dxC= D QfnUFCx) =20 (http://campaign.r20.constantcontact.com/render?llr=3Dpq6xrobab&v=3D001e5Wo= bZtxxKSPY4U02cLc-nHPLJDmH8pPu1-ddNnvP2jebRYUdcHgZdH6QitD5LgggrnYU7lgnkP 14QSmFUqXOZhK6Keli5BUP_yAWSfv0Iq7SBlHumxxaNOejRtljlW4hzkb3TnAINBkVCGZDekm50= G wb30BrTkrAWAfN9Qex3ILBirbXl0x5dxCDQfnUFCx) =20 (http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback.html) =20 Issue 397 February 2013 =20 =20 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) =E2=80=94 also referred to as =E2=80=9CUnm= anned Aerial=20 Vehicles=E2=80=9D (UAV=E2=80=99s), =E2=80=9CRemotely Piloted Vehicles=E2= =80=9D (RPV=E2=80=99s), =E2=80=9Cunmanned aircraft=E2=80=9D or =E2=80=9Cdrones=E2=80=9D =E2=80=94 come in a wide range of configurati= ons and sizes, and have=20 multiple military and civilian functions.=20 UAS operations utilize a Pilot-in-Command who is controlling the aircraft= =20 from a remote location. In the event of a data link failure or other=20 malfunction the system may revert to a pre-programmed mode.=20 The FAA is under congressional mandate to integrate most UAS into the=20 National Airspace System (NAS) by 2015 (2014 for UAS weighing less than 55= =20 pounds) with the primary focus and authority being safety. In planning the= =20 integration of UAS into the NAS, the FAA has to develop a safe and efficie= nt=20 way that these systems can operate in the same airspace as crewed aircraft= =20 without creating a hazard to other aircraft or to people and property on= =20 the ground.=20 To date, UAS access to the NAS remains restricted pending development of= =20 appropriate operational procedures, standards, and policies. The FAA =20 approves UAS operations on a case-by-case basis. UAS authorized by the FAA= to=20 operate in controlled airspace have to comply with appropriate FAR or=20 equivalent military standards related to aircraft and operator certificati= on as =20 well as equipment and communication requirements. =20 The following ASRS reports are presented to increase Pilot and Controller= =20 awareness of UAS operations and to provide some insight into the systems= =20 from an Operator=E2=80=99s viewpoint. Additionally, UAS Operators may gain= a better =20 appreciation of the interaction of UAS with other elements in the NAS.=20 =20 UAS Altitude Excursions Four ASRS reports describe incidents in which UAS departed from their=20 assigned altitude. In the first report, an Air Traffic Controller observed= a=20 UAS altitude deviation and also expressed concern for the consequences of= =20 UAS data link failures.=20 =E2=96=A0 While working an adjacent sector, I witnessed a UAS deviate from= his=20 assigned altitude. This UAS was cleared to maintain FL350. The [UAS] aircr= aft=20 descended out of FL350 to FL300 without a clearance. When questioned by= =20 the Air Traffic Controller, the Remote Pilot stated that he could not=20 maintain FL350 so he descended.=20 I feel this event happened due to the training of the Remote Pilots of=20 the unmanned aircraft. The accountability and standards for remotely pilot= ed,=20 unmanned aircraft should be equal to the standards of commercial pilots.= =20 Also, unmanned aircraft must be held to the same restrictions as manned = =20 aircraft. For example, in a [UA] System, if the aircraft = =20 loses data link it will fly its programmed flight plan. It will not=20 maintain its last assigned altitude. This can affect the Controller=E2=80= =99s ability to=20 maintain positive separation.=20 An Operator reported losing aerodynamic control of the UAS and was too=20 busy reestablishing control to immediately notify ATC of the problem. It i= s=20 not known if the UAS Copilot had communications capability with ATC. =20 =E2=96=A0 I requested a climb from FL190 to FL250 to climb above weather. = Before=20 entering into a climb, I asked the Copilot to perform a full sweep with th= e=20 camera to look for clouds and adverse weather. None was noted. =20 Climbing through FL210, conditions were encountered that affected the=20 performance of the [UAS] aircraft and resulted in a loss of altitude from = FL210=20 to 16,500 feet MSL. Due to my efforts to fully regain positive control of = =20 the aircraft, I failed to declare an emergency. As soon as I regained=20 positive control, I initiated an immediate climb to the cleared altitude o= f=20 FL250. ATC advised of the deviation in altitude. I advised ATC that the=20 descent was due to weather and the aircraft was currently in a climb to FL= 250. =20 The flight level request was amended to FL290 in order to fly above the=20 weather.=20 A Certificate of Authorization (COA) from the FAA authorizes a UAS=20 operator to use a defined airspace and includes special provisions unique = to each=20 operation. Most, if not all, COAs require coordination with an appropriat= e=20 Air Traffic Control facility and may require the UAS to have a transponder= =20 to operate in certain types of airspace. The UAS Operator who submitted=20 this report to ASRS was operating in accordance with a COA when the data l= ink=20 to the UAS was lost.=20 =E2=96=A0 My UAV was conducting assigned missions at FL200 in accordance w= ith a=20 COA issued by the FAA. At one point in the mission the UAV descended to FL= 190=20 without an ATC clearance. At the time of this violation, we lost a=20 control link=E2=80=A6with the [UAS] aircraft. As we were then unable to ve= rify the=20 aircraft=E2=80=99s position or obtain critical flight information, the com= mand link with=20 the [UAS] aircraft was disabled releasing it on its emergency mission=20 profile in accordance with the approved emergency checklist. The [UAS] ai= rcraft=20 then began squawking 7600 and entered autonomous flight proceeding direct= =20 to the assigned emergency mission loiter point and descended to a =20 pre-programmed altitude of FL190.=20 The remote command link with the UAV was lost for several minutes. This=20 command link allows the aircraft to be flown by a PIC approximately 1,000= =20 miles away using satellite relayed commands. It was this link that was los= t=20 and the aircraft was then released to its pre-programmed emergency=20 rendezvous point where it would then be picked up visually and landed by o= n-site =20 operators. In this case the command link was regained after several minute= s=20 and the aircraft flown directly by the PIC to a point where it could be=20 visually acquired by the on-site crew and was landed safely. Maintenance = =20 investigation is required to ascertain the reason for the lost link before= the=20 aircraft is again released for flight operations.=20 In another report from a UAS Operator, the aircraft experienced an=20 altitude and heading deviation due to loss of the data link, but the Opera= tor made=20 a timely report to ATC. =E2=96=A0 Due to an inadvertent SPMA (Signal Processor Modem Assembly) res= et=20 during a backup communications power up, the UAS experienced a Lost Link = =20 situation. The UAS was cruising at FL230 to avoid weather when the Lost Li= nk=20 occurred. The Operator failed to update the Lost Link Profile to reflect t= he=20 ATC clearance which caused the aircraft to turn towards the closest Lost L= ink=20 entry point and initiate a descent to FL190 which was the previous Lost= =20 Link Profile. The Operator immediately called ATC and notified Center that= =20 the link should be regained within two minutes. Once the SPMA link was=20 reestablished, the aircraft climbed to its previous altitude of FL230. =20 No additional information was requested by Center after communications=20 were regained and the flight continued without further incident. A softwar= e=20 change request is being researched for added protection from inadvertent S= PMA=20 resets.=20 =20 Close Encounter A small UAS encountered by the Pilot of a manned aircraft may have been=20 outside its designated airspace. If ATC is not aware of a UAS, Pilots have= to=20 rely on see and avoid procedures and handle UAS conflicts the same as=20 conflicts with manned aircraft.=20 =E2=96=A0 My passengers and I noticed an oblong shaped UAV (approximately = two to=20 three feet long with a long antenna) passing us in the opposite direction= =20 within 100 feet of our left wing on the 45-degree entry to Runway 15=E2= =80=A6. The=20 object did not show up on my TCAS system as a threat. These vehicles need = to=20 show up in the cockpit as a threat or stay within the Military Operating= =20 Area (MOA). =20 =20 Additional UAS information can be found at the following FAA websites: =20 * _http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/_=20 (http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/) =20 * _http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=3D68004_=20 (http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=3D68004) =20 * _http://www.jpdo.gov/newsarticle.asp?id=3D146_=20 (http://www.jpdo.gov/newsarticle.asp?id=3D146) =20 The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association has a free interactive course,= =20 Unmanned Aircraft and the National Airspace System at: =20 * _http://www.airsafetyinstitute.org/unmannedaircraft_=20 (http://www.airsafetyinstitute.org/unmannedaircraft) =20 =20 CALLBACK Issue 397 _Download PDF & Print_ (http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/cb/cb_397.pdf) =20 _View HTML_ (http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback/cb_397.html) = =20 =20 =20 =20 ASRS Online Resources _CALLBACK Previous Issues_=20 (http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/callback.html) _Report to ASRS_= =20 (http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/report/electronic.html) _Search ASRS Database_= (http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/search/database.html) =20 _ASRS Homepage_ (http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/) =20 =20 =20 =20 (http://ui.constantcontact.com/d.jsp?m=3D1101073741327&p=3Doi)=20 =20 (http://ui.constantcontact.com/sa/fwtf.jsp?llr=3Dpq6xrobab&m=3D110107374132= 7&ea=3Dvtailjeff@aol.com&a=3D1112445893815)=20 (mailto:donald.w.purdy@nasa.gov)=20 =20 December 2012 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 4,037 General Aviation=20 Pilots 936 Controllers 710 Cabin 240 Mechanics 154 Dispatcher 104 =20 Military/Other 26 TOTAL 6,207=20 =20 =20 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft=20 Equipment 6 Airport Facility or Procedure 6 ATC Equipment or Procedure 9 = =20 Maintenance Procedure 2 Company Policy 1 TOTAL 24=20 =20 =20 =20 Special Studies =20 ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that= =20 occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the=20 cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. _Learn more = =C2=BB_=20 (http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/studies.html) _Read the Interim Re= port=20 =C2=BB_=20 (http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rs/64_ASRS_Meteorological_AIS_DataLinkStudy.= pdf)=20 =20 =20 In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake= =20 vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United = =20 States. _Learn more =C2=BB_ (http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/publications/studies.= html) =20 =20 =20 (http://ui.constantcontact.com/d.jsp?m=3D1101073741327&p=3Doi)=20 =20 (http://ui.constantcontact.com/sa/fwtf.jsp?llr=3Dpq6xrobab&m=3D110107374132= 7&ea=3Dvtailjeff@aol.com&a=3D1112445893815)=20 (mailto:donald.w.purdy@nasa.gov)=20 =20 =20 =20 (http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=3D00130OWeYhwmXjkOVxaX43MzBZnQSUy6Ah7VkWcOP3_U= 5S9h5G7pqo2xYhx20mAo3dV7y66bG7qnzkCcaG4E-B6cbINPaRVY4EdKFmlT2217g6BOtJZqcGG= HMa 41Jbn0aWeqpt5-1kXSWexyTdq04kjF3FQ7SsRm7TAcynGYLGTcjt0Fo_dEIDq5Q=3D=3D)=20 =20 (http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=3D00130OWeYhwmXhFQW4goG_I_0TpWk6FZgBR3m-RO4YNr= TAXkwQtaENA2qLhLP6lpwhbVf9Z_Lp3pa4Zg7CPqYWl-iXhj1VNcwVEG5O5UJcZh8YBiQRiprdD= 0Xe tXtmqbznsVROf2d-b0Ho4uWROizqp23Ur8Q2RIQBvWGL2KG13vw4=3D)=20 =20 (http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=3D00130OWeYhwmXjVv-tXM1By2O7JCqhD9WaOs10baTm2L= k81YgnSeCr4WCasxHfgYYib1cVmLOB0xC58KRwfWo SL2EKEr85yNANOpFXzF40J4NskIyR6BYulDVGLgv2dAqwvQN5f9lWVzwkua5fWDJpbCoY7DCEy5= R97vhnP0r5-LcPmIx6OXOTieA=3D=3D)=20 =20 (http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=3D00130OWeYhwmXiYe0P3UkqtdC7mllpTen93cAZFxwb-0= wceM4jaapw0CWFnGpx4mGDIzkergl88pAaTMYwOqF8dt7RNpSipnZkoY-QSWLDuf9A-97ignZTy= Hj5 0LOBvLfYZ)=20 NOTE TO READERS: =E2=96=A0 Indicates an ASRS report narrative [ ] = =20 Indicates clarification made by ASRS=20 A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety=20 Reporting System=20 Issue 397 _Forward to a Friend!_=20 (http://ui.constantcontact.com/sa/fwtf.jsp?llr=3Dpq6xrobab&m=3D110107374132= 7&ea=3Dvtailjeff@aol.com&a=3D1112445893815) =20 This email was sent to _vtailjeff@aol.com_ (mailto:vtailjeff@aol.com) by= =20 _arc-dl-callback-subscription@mail.nasa.gov_=20 (mailto:arc-dl-callback-subscription@mail.nasa.gov) =20 _Update Preferences/Email Address_=20 (http://visitor.constantcontact.com/do?p=3Doo&mse=3D001hKHmuNj9Yg3offQMZzaO= wS9GvptNJ_A4f8-PpPXx3qs=3D&t=3D001A1pXC-v8X_A4bZSy dPiOlQ=3D=3D&l=3D001FCSs65SMrsI=3D&llr=3Dpq6xrobab) | _Unsubscribe_=20 (http://visitor.constantcontact.com/do?p=3Dun&mse=3D001hKHmuNj9Yg3offQMZzaO= wS9GvptNJ_A4f8-PpPXx3q s=3D&t=3D001A1pXC-v8X_A4bZSydPiOlQ=3D=3D&l=3D001FCSs65SMrsI=3D&llr=3Dpq6xro= bab) |=20 _Privacy Policy_ (http://ui.constantcontact.com/roving/CCPrivacyPolicy.jsp)= =20 NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. 0.0.0 --part1_250c7.7ebe824f.3e555bb8_boundary Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en
Jeff,
 
Thanks for sending a copy of that issue of CallBack since most=20 probably don't receive it. Interesting list of UAS control failures - = Read=20 on.
 
The FAA seems to be focused on having UASs avoiding other aircraft in = their=20 flight path - even to the extent that the UAS must simulate see and avoid r= ules=20 (still some non-electric aircraft out there).
 
But hey, we see how these things wander about, lose their controller, = have=20 controller errors, etc.
 
How about GA having the ability to see them?  Huh? Huh?
 
Wait, that sounds a lot like ADS-B!
 
Here is part of what I wrote to the NTSB (met a rep at OSH) = after=20 last year's AirVenture:
 

At OSH I= talked=20 to the Army about their 100 Kt, 14' wing span UAV and whether it would be= =20 equipped with ADS-B out. While the responder knew nothing about ADS-B, he= =20 claimed that the FAA required them to have "see-and-avoid" capability befor= e=20 operating in the NAS. To that end, they would be equipped with 3 radars,=20 supposedly allowing them to "avoid." That is inadequate as GA would not "se= e"=20 them, either electronically or visually. That UAV is very small (even small= er=20 than my wee Lancair 320) and would not be seen visually until it is too lat= e.=20 For these UAVs to operate in NAS they should also be transmitting ADS-B out= (or,=20 minimally - Mode S) so that ATC or on-board equipment could warn the GA pil= ot of=20 their presence. Another problem is that UAVs, whether military or not, will= grow=20 in size and speed. So, the question is whether UAVs will be equipped with A= DS-B=20 out technology in order to safely operate any aircraft in the=20 NAS?

&nb= sp;

I also t= alked=20 to Air Force personnel unaware of NEXGEN and ADS-B. I asked whether MTRs=20 (Military Training Routes) were still in use and they replied in the=20 affirmative. I then asked if such military aircraft using those routes woul= d be=20 equipped with ADS-B out capabilities? They didn't know. This, of course lea= ds to=20 the question of whether any military aircraft operating in the NAS, whether= or=20 not on a MTR, would be issuing ADS-B out data for the safety of all aircraf= t=20 operating in the area?

&nb= sp;

&nb= sp;

It would= =20 contribute to flight safety if military aircraft operating in MOAs were als= o=20 transmitting ADS-B out information.

&nb= sp;

The FAA = seems=20 to be encouraging GA to adopt ADS-B before the 2020 deadline and its u= se by=20 the military would certainly be a positive argument for GA use. Garmin's re= cent=20 announcements about ASD-B equipment (and other avionics that are available)= =20 certainly brings the price within reason along with the FAA's commitment to= have=20 all 800 ADS-B ground stations operable in 2013.

 

...= ....

&nb= sp;

I received no response or acknowledgment of these concerns.
 
Then I wrote Aero-News about this topic - again no response.
 
Notice the glaring absence of any reference to UAS/Military use of ADS= -B by=20 either the FAA, NTSB or any news media such as AOPA, Aero-News, AvWeb,=20 etc.
 
To further educate yourself about the ever growing population of UASs,= see=20
http://flash.aopa.org/asf/unmannedaircraft/= index.cfm?WT.mc_id=3D130215epilot&WT.mc_sect=3Dsap
 
Note again no reference of the use of ADS-B in UASs for safety's= =20 sake.
 
What's up? 
 
Scott Krueger
   
Trouble? You bet UASs
 
In a message dated 2/13/2013 2:59:02 P.M. Central Standard Time,=20 vtailjeff@aol.com writes:
=


 
Problem viewing / mobile device: CLICK HERE
3D"
Issue 397 February 2013
3D"You
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) =E2= =80=94 also=20 referred to as =E2=80=9CUnmanned Aerial Vehicles=E2=80= =9D (UAV=E2=80=99s), =E2=80=9CRemotely=20 Piloted Vehicles=E2=80=9D (RPV=E2=80=99s), =E2=80=9Cunm= anned aircraft=E2=80=9D or =E2=80=9Cdrones=E2=80=9D =E2=80=94=20 come in a wide range of configurations and sizes, and h= ave=20 multiple military and civilian functions.

UAS= =20 operations utilize a Pilot-in-Command who is controllin= g the=20 aircraft from a remote location. In the event of a data= link=20 failure or other malfunction the system may revert to a= =20 pre-programmed mode.

The FAA is under congressi= onal=20 mandate to integrate most UAS into the National Airspac= e=20 System (NAS) by 2015 (2014 for UAS weighing less than 5= 5=20 pounds) with the primary focus and authority being safe= ty.=20 In planning the integration of UAS into the NAS, the FA= A has=20 to develop a safe and efficient way that these systems = can=20 operate in the same airspace as crewed aircraft without= =20 creating a hazard to other aircraft or to people and=20 property on the ground.

To date, UAS access to = the=20 NAS remains restricted pending development of appropria= te=20 operational procedures, standards, and policies. The FA= A=20 approves UAS operations on a case-by-case basis. UAS=20 authorized by the FAA to operate in controlled airspace= have=20 to comply with appropriate FAR or equivalent military= =20 standards related to aircraft and operator certificatio= n as=20 well as equipment and communication requirements.=20

The following ASRS reports are presented to inc= rease=20 Pilot and Controller awareness of UAS operations and to= =20 provide some insight into the systems from an Operator= =E2=80=99s=20 viewpoint. Additionally, UAS Operators may gain a bette= r=20 appreciation of the interaction of UAS with other eleme= nts=20 in the NAS. UAS Altitude Excursions Four ASRS reports describe incidents = in=20 which UAS departed from their assigned altitude. In the= =20 first report, an Air Traffic Controller observed a UAS= =20 altitude deviation and also expressed concern for the= =20 consequences of UAS data link failures. =E2=96=A0 While working an adj= acent sector, I=20 witnessed a UAS deviate from his assigned altitude. Thi= s UAS=20 was cleared to maintain FL350. The [UAS] aircraft desce= nded=20 out of FL350 to FL300 without a clearance. When questio= ned=20 by the Air Traffic Controller, the Remote Pilot stated = that=20 he could not maintain FL350 so he descended.

I = feel=20 this event happened due to the training of the Remote P= ilots=20 of the unmanned aircraft. The accountability and standa= rds=20 for remotely piloted, unmanned aircraft should be equal= to=20 the standards of commercial pilots.

Also, unman= ned=20 aircraft must be held to the same restrictions as manne= d=20 aircraft. For example, in a [UA] System, if the aircraf= t=20 loses data link it will fly its programmed flight plan.= It=20 will not maintain its last assigned altitude. This can= =20 affect the Controller=E2=80=99s ability to maintain pos= itive=20 separation.
An Operator reported losing aerodynam= ic=20 control of the UAS and was too busy reestablishing cont= rol=20 to immediately notify ATC of the problem. It is not kno= wn if=20 the UAS Copilot had communications capability with ATC.= =20 =E2=96=A0 I requested a climb = from FL190 to=20 FL250 to climb above weather. Before entering into a cl= imb,=20 I asked the Copilot to perform a full sweep with the ca= mera=20 to look for clouds and adverse weather. None was noted.= =20

Climbing through FL210, conditions were encount= ered=20 that affected the performance of the [UAS] aircraft and= =20 resulted in a loss of altitude from FL210 to 16,500 fee= t=20 MSL. Due to my efforts to fully regain positive control= of=20 the aircraft, I failed to declare an emergency. As soon= as I=20 regained positive control, I initiated an immediate cli= mb to=20 the cleared altitude of FL250. ATC advised of the devia= tion=20 in altitude. I advised ATC that the descent was due to= =20 weather and the aircraft was currently in a climb to FL= 250.=20 The flight level request was amended to FL290 in order = to=20 fly above the weather.
A Certificate of Authorization (COA) = from=20 the FAA authorizes a UAS operator to use a defined airs= pace=20 and includes special provisions unique to each operatio= n.=20 Most, if not all, COAs require coordination with an=20 appropriate Air Traffic Control facility and may requir= e the=20 UAS to have a transponder to operate in certain types o= f=20 airspace. The UAS Operator who submitted this report to= ASRS=20 was operating in accordance with a COA when the data li= nk to=20 the UAS was lost. =E2=96=A0 My UAV was conductin= g assigned=20 missions at FL200 in accordance with a COA issued by th= e=20 FAA. At one point in the mission the UAV descended to F= L190=20 without an ATC clearance. At the time of this violation= , we=20 lost a control link=E2=80=A6with the [UAS] aircraft. As= we were then=20 unable to verify the aircraft=E2=80=99s position or obt= ain critical=20 flight information, the command link with the [UAS] air= craft=20 was disabled releasing it on its emergency mission prof= ile=20 in accordance with the approved emergency checklist. Th= e=20 [UAS] aircraft then began squawking 7600 and entered=20 autonomous flight proceeding direct to the assigned=20 emergency mission loiter point and descended to a=20 pre-programmed altitude of FL190.

The remote co= mmand=20 link with the UAV was lost for several minutes. This co= mmand=20 link allows the aircraft to be flown by a PIC approxima= tely=20 1,000 miles away using satellite relayed commands. It w= as=20 this link that was lost and the aircraft was then relea= sed=20 to its pre-programmed emergency rendezvous point where = it=20 would then be picked up visually and landed by on-site= =20 operators. In this case the command link was regained a= fter=20 several minutes and the aircraft flown directly by the = PIC=20 to a point where it could be visually acquired by the= =20 on-site crew and was landed safely. Maintenance=20 investigation is required to ascertain the reason for t= he=20 lost link before the aircraft is again released for fli= ght=20 operations. In another report from a UAS Operator= , the=20 aircraft experienced an altitude and heading deviation = due=20 to loss of the data link, but the Operator made a timel= y=20 report to ATC. =E2=96=A0 Due to an inadverten= t SPMA (Signal=20 Processor Modem Assembly) reset during a backup=20 communications power up, the UAS experienced a Lost Lin= k=20 situation. The UAS was cruising at FL230 to avoid weath= er=20 when the Lost Link occurred. The Operator failed to upd= ate=20 the Lost Link Profile to reflect the ATC clearance whic= h=20 caused the aircraft to turn towards the closest Lost Li= nk=20 entry point and initiate a descent to FL190 which was t= he=20 previous Lost Link Profile. The Operator immediately ca= lled=20 ATC and notified Center that the link should be regaine= d=20 within two minutes. Once the SPMA link was reestablishe= d,=20 the aircraft climbed to its previous altitude of FL230.= =20

No additional information was requested by Cent= er=20 after communications were regained and the flight conti= nued=20 without further incident. A software change request is = being=20 researched for added protection from inadvertent SPMA= =20 resets. Close Encounter A small UAS encountered by the Pilot = of a=20 manned aircraft may have been outside its designated=20 airspace. If ATC is not aware of a UAS, Pilots have to = rely=20 on see and avoid procedures and handle UAS conflicts th= e=20 same as conflicts with manned aircraft. =E2=96=A0 My passengers and I = noticed an=20 oblong shaped UAV (approximately two to three feet long= with=20 a long antenna) passing us in the opposite direction wi= thin=20 100 feet of our left wing on the 45-degree entry to Run= way=20 15=E2=80=A6. The object did not show up on my TCAS syst= em as a=20 threat. These vehicles need to show up in the cockpit a= s a=20 threat or stay within the Military Operating Area (MOA)= .=20 Additional UAS information can be fou= nd at=20 the following FAA websites:=20
  • http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/= uas/=20
  • http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?news= Id=3D68004=20
  • http://www.jpdo.gov/newsarticle.asp?i= d=3D146=20
    • The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Associ= ation=20 has a free interactive course, Unmanned Aircraft and th= e=20 National Airspace System at:=20
  • http://www.airsafetyinstitute.org/unm= annedaircraft=20
    • CALLBACK Issue 397
    =
    3D" Download PDF & Print
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    December 2012
    Report=20 Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 4,037 General Aviation Pilots 936 Controllers 710 Cabin 240 Mechanics 154 Dispatcher 104 Military/Other 26 TOTAL 6,207
    ASRS=20 Alerts Issued: Subject No. of=20 Alerts
    Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 6 Airport Facility or Procedure 6 ATC Equipment or Procedure 9 Maintenance Procedure 2 Company Policy 1 TOTAL 24
    Special Studies
    =20 ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is= =20 gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilo= ts=20 were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpi= t=20 obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn mo= re =C2=BB Read the= Interim=20 Report =C2=BB
    =20 In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is= =20 conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents,= =20 enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United= =20 States. Learn mo= re =C2=BB=20
    3D"
    <= /DIV>
    NOTE TO READERS:   =E2=96=A0  = Indicates an ASRS=20 report narrative    [=20   ]  Indicates clarifica= tion=20 made by ASRS
    A Monthly Safety Bulletin from The Office o= f the=20 NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
    Issue=20 397
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