X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2011 17:32:10 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from imr-mb02.mx.aol.com ([64.12.207.163] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.4.1) with ESMTP id 5122773 for lml@lancaironline.net; Tue, 13 Sep 2011 10:05:53 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=64.12.207.163; envelope-from=vtailjeff@aol.com Received: from mtaout-mb05.r1000.mx.aol.com (mtaout-mb05.r1000.mx.aol.com [172.29.41.69]) by imr-mb02.mx.aol.com (8.14.1/8.14.1) with ESMTP id p8DE51Jh024338 for ; Tue, 13 Sep 2011 10:05:01 -0400 Received: from [10.106.254.76] (mobile-166-137-142-046.mycingular.net [166.137.142.46]) (using TLSv1 with cipher AES128-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mtaout-mb05.r1000.mx.aol.com (MUA/Third Party Client Interface) with ESMTPSA id 1A774E000090; Tue, 13 Sep 2011 10:04:54 -0400 (EDT) References: In-Reply-To: Mime-Version: 1.0 (iPhone Mail 8L1) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-17-460560006 X-Original-Message-Id: <5471C71D-9F7C-478C-BC3F-983C3F719E86@aol.com> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (8L1) From: Jeff Edwards Subject: Re: [LML] Re: Fwd: Back Seaters X-Original-Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2011 09:04:47 -0500 X-Original-To: Lancair Mailing List x-aol-global-disposition: G X-AOL-SCOLL-SCORE: 0:2:478230656:93952408 X-AOL-SCOLL-URL_COUNT: 0 x-aol-sid: 3039ac1d29454e6f630657f4 X-AOL-IP: 166.137.142.46 --Apple-Mail-17-460560006 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Maybe he landed on the taxiway... AvSafe=20 Jeff Edwards 314.308.6719 mobile 636.532.5638 office Jeff.edwards@avsafe.com On Sep 13, 2011, at 5:20 AM, "William A. Hogarty" wr= ote: > Lynn: >=20 > I thought that the amount of exaggeration in all fighter pilot stories was= in direct proportion to the number of drinks consumed by the story teller p= rior to telling the story???? >=20 > BTW, are you a member of the SSS ? >=20 > Regards,Bill Hogarty >=20 > On Mon, Sep 12, 2011 at 9:04 AM, Karen Farnsworth = wrote: > Considering that the runways at Phan Rang were north/south it would have b= een very difficult to =E2=80=9Cland to the east=E2=80=9D. This little inaccu= racy leads me to believe that there just may be some exaggeration involved i= n the telling of this tale. >=20 > =20 >=20 > =20 >=20 > Lynn Farnsworth >=20 > F-100 Pilot at Rhan Rang >=20 > =20 >=20 > From: Lancair Mailing List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of vta= iljeff@aol.com > Sent: Monday, September 12, 2011 7:48 AM > To: lml@lancaironline.net > Subject: [LML] Fwd: Back Seaters >=20 > =20 >=20 > =20 >=20 > =20 >=20 > -----Original Message----- > From: Rick Hadden > To: Mr. Daniel R. Bott ; Jeff Edwards ; Bill Hinson ; Russell Schulz ;= Alan Shaw ; Mr. Richard Tems ; Mr= . Warren A. Wilbur, III ; Paul Ziemer > Sent: Sun, Sep 11, 2011 12:54 pm > Subject: Fwd: Back Seaters >=20 > A tale worth the read! I nominate this guy to the F-8 Crusader Assn! >=20 > Rick >=20 > True Story! For you non-aircrew guys, just call this "Four Beers!" ~~ (I= was=20 > there at the same time...Bill)~~("Aeroplane" is the correct British/Canadi= an=20 > word). > =20 > One of the best flying tales I've read in a long time. It's from the Ospre= y book=20 > B-57 ~ Canberra Units of the Vietnam War. The B-57 was in high demand due= to=20 > its loiter time, weapons loads and usually its accuracy. It was one of th= e few=20 > a/c that carried the M35/M36 Funny Bomb that was a good weapon against tru= ck=20 > targets.=20 > =20 > THE RELUCTANT BACK-SEATER=20 > =20 > Ed Rider was a Canberra pilot who had come up through the enlisted ranks, h= aving=20 > done a stint as an Airborne Electronics Technician on the B-57 in the late= =20 > 1950s. Ten years later he was a captain flying the Canberra out of Phan R= ang. =20 > Rider was known for his aggressive flying and his own particular tactics t= hat=20 > were more suited to a nimble fighter-bomber than the big B-57. And by Rid= er's=20 > own admission, 'there were only about two navigators left who would fly wi= th=20 > me'. Before the war was allover he had completed more than 400 combat mis= sions.=20 > The following is Rider's account of one such mission in 1968:=20 > =20 > 'The "Yellowbirds" were back at Phan Rang flying night interdiction missio= ns in=20 > the southern part of North Vietnam and along the supply routes down throug= h=20 > Laos. I had a patch on my party flight suit that said "Laotian Highway=20= > Patrol". 'Other than the two navigators in the squadron who would willing= ly fly=20 > with me, the others did not like my highly unorthodox tactics. I tried to p= oint=20 > out to them that other pilots were getting shot up =E2=80=94 or shot down =E2= =80=94 while I=20 > never took hits and killed more trucks than most. Those idiots were coming= back=20 > with their aeroplanes full of holes and getting medals for it. Anyway, my=20= > navigator came down with a bad case of "Ho's Revenge" and the other naviga= tor=20 > was already flying, so someone had to be volunteered. The hand of fate la= id its=20 > clammy finger on Bill. After an earlier adventure that ended in a belly la= nding=20 > due to hydraulic failure, he had sworn never to fly with me again. We had t= o=20 > drag him scratching and spitting, so to speak, to the aeroplane.=20 > =20 > 'We were taking off at midnight to hit a truck park way up in Laos. I ask= ed the=20 > crew chief if his aeroplane was ready, and when he said yes I gave him fou= r=20 > beers to put into the rear compartment and told him to button it up (close= all=20 > inspection doors). I didn't insult him by inspecting the jet. The crew ch= iefs=20 > liked for me to fly their aeroplanes and I never had one let me down. I we= nt=20 > around with the armourer and checked the fuzes on the bombs for proper set= tings=20 > and the arming wires for proper routing. Then I spread my maps on the ram= p and=20 > showed the crew chief and armourer where we were going and what we were su= pposed=20 > to hit.=20 > =20 > 'We were in the northeast monsoon season and had 40 knots of wind blowing d= own=20 > the runway. The standard night departure called for a right turn to the s= outh=20 > after take-off until reaching the coast, then a turn to the east and then f= ollow=20 > the coast to Cam Ranh Bay and turn on course. This was supposed to keep yo= u out=20 > of the outgoing artillery, but it wasted about 3000 lbs of fuel, so natu= rally=20 > I didn't follow it. After I raised the gear I turned off all external ligh= ts so=20 > that the air traffic controllers in the tower could not see me. When I was= high=20 > enough to drop a wing, I turned right 270 degrees so as to cross the west e= nd of=20 > the runway headed northwest. I roared across the 101st Airborne encampmen= t and=20 > shook all the grunts out of bed and then headed up the valley that led t= o=20 > Dalat in the mountains. The hills on either side were invisible as there w= ere no=20 > lights on the ground, but if I maintained the proper heading I would not r= un=20 > into any rocks before I got high enough to clear them. Bill was somewhat u= nhappy=20 > with this exercise. In due course we climbed out of the valley and turned n= orth=20 > to Pleiku, and points north.'=20 > =20 > 'We checked in with "Blind Bat", our C-130 "flare ship", and from more tha= n 50=20 > miles out we could see his flares and the anti-aircraft fire he was attrac= ting.=20 > The gunners must have just gotten a fresh supply of ammo because they were= even=20 > shooting at his flares. We let down and coordinated altitudes so that we w= ould=20 > not run into each other. We made eight vertical dive-bomb passes dropping= our=20 > "funny bombs" =E2=80=94 this was the name that FACs gave to the M35 fire b= omb.=20 > =20 > 'This was the same bomb used to start the firestorms in Tokyo in World War= 2. =20 > It was a large cluster bomb that opened up a few thousand feet above the g= round. =20 > The falling bomblets made a fiery waterfall until they hit the ground. Th= en=20 > they spewed out burning white and yellow phosphorus like roman candles. R= eally=20 > something to see at night.=20 > =20 > 'We stirred up a hornets' nest and the flak was thick - when it got close y= ou=20 > could hear it popping like popcorn. We left the "flare ship" to count the= =20 > burning trucks and then headed for home. Just another routine mission. Bu= t we=20 > still had our 20 mm ammo left and I hated to take it home. I called the ai= rborne=20 > command post and asked if they had any gun targets. They told me to conta= ct a=20 > FAC at Tchepone. He had spotted trucks on a ferry crossing the river there= .=20 > =20 > 'We contacted the FAC to coordinate altitudes before we got into his area.= We=20 > used a secret "base" altitude which changed every 12 hours so that the e= nemy=20 > could not listen in and find out our heights and then set the fuzes on his= =20 > shells for that altitude. That night base altitude was 8000 ft. He said he= was=20 > at base plus four, or 12,000 ft. I said. "You must mean minus four?" He s= aid=20 > no. I asked what the hell he was doing way up there and he replied that hi= s=20 > Cessna O-2 wouldn't climb any higher! His flares were floating so high t= hat=20 > they did not illuminate the ground, and I had to circle until I got their=20= > reflection on the river before I could see it. Bill kept saying something= about=20 > "bingo" fuel (the minimum required to get back home with 2000 lbs of fuel=20= > remaining). 'A few guns were shooting at our sound, but not coming close= . I=20 > knew there were no radar-controlled guns because otherwise we would have b= een=20 > tracked and fired on accurately while we were circling. I finally got it w= orked=20 > out and caught the ferry in the flare reflection on the river and rolled i= n. I=20 > fired about a three-second burst in a 30-degree dive from about 1500 ft. T= he=20 > muzzle flashes lit us up like a Christmas tree and said, "Here I am! Shoot= me!"=20 > and did they ever! Now I knew why that FAC was so high. I pulled about 5= Gs to=20 > get pointed straight up. 'A small part of my mind registered a red light=20= > flashing somewhere in the cockpit but I was too busy to look at it. When I= ran=20 > out of airspeed at the top and had figured out up from down and was uprigh= t=20 > again the light was out.=20 > =20 > 'The FAC was encouraging, saying he had seen lots of hits on the ferry wit= h his=20 > night vision scope, so I got set up to go in again. Bill didn't think it w= as a=20 > good idea. Indeed, there were lots of guns protecting the ferry. Most of t= hem=20 > were twin barrel 37 mm weapons. I could tell because the "red hot beer c= ans"=20 > streaking past the aeroplane came up in strings of eight. The 37 mm gun f= ired=20 > clips of four rounds, so eight meant twin barrels. I was worried about=20 > radar-controlled 57 mm twin barrel units mounted on tracked vehicles that o= ften=20 > accompanied large truck convoys, but there was no evidence of them. The mo= st=20 > spectacular show was provided by the many 23 mm ZSU units. These were four= =20 > barrels mounted on a tracked vehicle, and they put out a string of tracers= that=20 > waved around the sky like a kid playing with a high-pressure water hose.=20= > =20 > 'My normal tactic at night over a well-defended target was to get directly= over=20 > it at about 8000 ft, roll inverted, and pull the nose down to the target, d= rop=20 > my bomb at about 5000 ft and then pull up into a vertical climb (essential= ly a=20 > loop beginning at the top). Just before I ran out of airspeed, I would pu= ll the=20 > nose down to level and roll upright. This faked out the gunners because t= hey=20 > expected me to be off to the side of the target. I was only vulnerable i= n the=20 > first part of my pull-up. Under very heavy fire I sometimes varied this by= not=20 > pulling up immediately but by turning 90 degrees and continuing down to l= ow=20 > altitude with low power and coasting a few miles away from the target (and= the=20 > guns). When using my guns, I would dive slightly off to the side, go lo= wer=20 > and pull up to a 30-degree dive before firing. 'Bill kept bothering me wi= th=20 > this "bingo" fuel business but I didn't have time to discuss it with him. O= n my=20 > second pass, I had to use the same heading as the first run in order to se= e the=20 > target - not a very smart thing to do. When our muzzle flashes lit us up a= gain,=20 > I had the feeling that if I pulled up as usual every gun would be aimed a= t our=20 > recovery path, so I didn't pull up. I used my alternate tactic. The sky b= ehind=20 > and above us was filled with a spectacular display of fireworks. The FAC w= as=20 > figuratively jumping up and down because we had torched off some of the tr= ucks=20 > on the ferry and on the south shore of the river, where the vessel was now= =20 > resting. Now we did not have to circle around to catch the reflection of t= he=20 > flares to locate the target.=20 > =20 > 'We still had 600 rounds left =E2=80=94 six seconds worth of firing. We co= uld approach=20 > from any direction since we could see the burning target. Bill was getting= a=20 > little shrill now and yelling something about "bingo minus two". I told hi= m I=20 > would wind it up with two more passes and then go home. After each pass, w= hen I=20 > was pulling 5-6Gs to fake out the gunners, there was that pesky red light i= n the=20 > cockpit. I was so busy trying not to join up with those strings of "red h= ot=20 > beer cans" that I didn't notice what it was. We left the FAC to add up th= e=20 > damage and headed home. 'Relieved of all ordnance and most of its fuel, t= he=20 > B-57 climbed like a homesick angel. In short order we were passing 35,000 f= t and=20 > I had Bill tighten his oxygen mask and check his system for pressure breat= hing.=20 > As we passed 45,000 ft, we had to forcefully breathe out and just relax a= nd=20 > let the pressure blow up our lungs to breathe in. At 53,000 ft we were ab= ove=20 > over 95 percent of the atmosphere. At that altitude the engines used very l= ittle =20 > fuel. When we arrived over Pleiku we were 150 nautical miles from home and= had=20 > just 800 lbs of fuel! Normally, when you land with 2000 lbs that is consi= dered=20 > an emergency, but I had been through this many times before, and was only=20= > concerned with having enough fuel to taxi to the ramp.=20 > =20 > 'At that altitude, when you reduce power to idle, it only reduces slightly= =20 > because the engines cannot reduce fuel consumption very much without flami= ng=20 > out. So, in order to reduce power and expedite our decent, I had to shut o= ff one=20 > engine. I shut down the right engine because we would be flying a left han= d =20 > traffic pattern. Bill was somewhat unhappy. I maintained a 0.84 Mach desc= ent, =20 > which meant that the descent got progressively steeper as you got into the= =20 > denser air at low altitude. This let us down inside the hole of the artill= ery=20 > doughnut at 12,000 ft, keeping us out of the arc of outgoing artillery fir= e. We=20 > were approaching from the north and had to land to the east. Once inside t= he=20 > hole, I extended speed brakes and pushed the nose over to maintain speed. = =20 > Extending speed brakes at 500 knots is like running into a brick wall, and= we=20 > were thrown forward hard enough to lock our automatic shoulder harnesses. = That=20 > is when that pesky red light in the cockpit came on again. This time I=20= > determined what it was. It was the low fuel pressure light. This was conf= irmed=20 > by the unwinding of the left engine.=20 > =20 > 'I was at a critical point in my traffic pattern and had no time to deal w= ith a=20 > double engine flameout, so I shut off the left throttle, banked 90 degrees= right=20 > and pulled the nose around to a heading 180 degrees from the landing hea= ding.=20 > Then I rolled inverted, and with about 5Gs pulled the nose down the line= of=20 > approach lights to the end of the runway and then up the centre-of the r= unway=20 > lights, varying the Gs to complete my split-ess at about 1500 ft and at ab= out=20 > 400-450 knots. 'While I was busy doing this I asked Bill to inform the to= wer=20 > that we had a double engine flameout and might need a tug to tow us in. B= ill=20 > had lost his voice and never did make the call. When I leveled off from my= =20 > split-ess I hit both air-start ignition switches and advanced both throttl= es to=20 > idle. After a 4G break to downwind, I lowered gear and flaps and both engi= nes=20 > were making the low moaning sound they made when running at idle. After=20= > touchdown I raised the flaps and added power so I could hold the nose up= . With=20 > 40 knots of headwind it was a long taxi to the far end of the runway. I tr= ied to=20 > get Bill interested in betting on whether I could make it all the way into= the=20 > de-arming area without lowering the nose wheel to the ground. For some rea= son he=20 > was not interested. Anyway, I did make it with the nose wheel in the air, a= nd=20 > scared the bejesus out of the de-arming troops.=20 > =20 > 'While they were de-arming my guns I figured it out. It had to be an inope= rative=20 > forward boost pump in the main fuel tank. When I went to full power and pu= lled=20 > lots of Gs at Tchepone, one fuel pump could not handle the load and the pr= essure=20 > dropped =E2=80=94 not enough, thank God, to flame out the engines. When I= extended the=20 > speed brakes in my descent to Phan Rang, what little fuel we had left spla= shed=20 > against the forward wall of the tank, uncovering the rear fuel pump and=20= > resulting in a flameout. There is an old saying, "There are old pilots an= d=20 > there are bold pilots, but there are no old bold pilots". Not so, but we b= old=20 > pilots need more luck than most.=20 > =20 > 'We had enough fuel to make it back to the ramp. After we had parked and=20= > deplaned, I made an inspection tour with the crew chief, armed with powerf= ul=20 > electric torches. Not a scratch on her! Again, skill and cunning triumphs= over=20 > ignorance and stupidity. The crew chief brought out the four beers from t= he=20 > tail compartment, ice cold from their sojourn at 50,000 ft, and I spread = my=20 > maps on the ramp, giving a blow-by-blow description of the mission for my c= rew=20 > chief and armourer. I had an additional audience of most of the crew chie= fs and=20 > armourers on the ramp who were not otherwise busy. Bill did not want his b= eer so=20 > I drank it too. Needless to say, Bill never got into an aeroplane with me= =20 > again.'=20 > =20 > =20 > =20 > =20 >=20 >=20 --Apple-Mail-17-460560006 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Maybe he landed on the taxiway...
AvSafe 
Jeff Edwards
314.308.6719 mobile
636.= 532.5638 office

On Sep 13, 2011, at 5:20 AM, "Willi= am A. Hogarty" <billhogarty@gmai= l.com> wrote:

Lynn:

I thought that the amount of exaggeration in all fi= ghter pilot stories was in direct proportion to the number of drinks consume= d by the story teller prior to telling the story????

BTW, are you a m= ember of the SSS ?

Regards,Bill Hogarty

On Mon, Sep 12, 2= 011 at 9:04 AM, Karen Farnsworth <farnsworth@ch= arter.net> wrote:

Considering that the r= unways at Phan Rang were north/south it would have been very difficult to =E2=80=9Cland to the e= ast=E2=80=9D. This little inaccuracy leads me to believe that there just may be some exagg= eration involved in the telling of this tale.

 <= /span>

 <= /span>

Lynn Farnsworth

F-100 Pilot at Rhan R= ang

 <= /span>

From:<= font face=3D"Tahoma" size=3D"2"> Lancair Mailing List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of vtailjeff@aol.com
Sent: Monday, September 12, 2= 011 7:48 AM
To: l= ml@lancaironline.net
Subject: [LML] Fwd: Back Seat= ers

 

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Rick Hadden <rickhadden@verizon.net>
To: Mr. Daniel R. Bott <dbottaz@earthlink.net<= /a>>; Jeff Edwards <vtailjeff@aol.com>; Bill Hinson <Willhinson@aol.com>; Russell Schulz <RKS64MRS@aol.com>; Alan Shaw <alan.shaw@vaxinnate.com>; Mr. Richard Tems <richrov@aol.com>; Mr. Warren A. Wilb= ur, III <warrenwilbur@comcast.net>; Paul= Ziemer <PLZJ@aol.com>
Sent: Sun, Sep 11, 2011 12:54 pm
Subject: Fwd: Back Seaters

A tale worth the r= ead!  I nominate this guy to the F-8 Crusader Assn!

Rick

True Story!&=
nbsp;  For you non-aircrew guys, just call this "Four Beers!" ~~ (I was=
 
there at the same=
 time...Bill)~~("Aeroplane" is the correct British/Canadian 
word).<=
/u>
 
One of the best f=
lying tales I've read in a long time. It's from the Osprey book 
B-57 ~ Can=
berra Units of the Vietnam War.  The=
 B-57 was in high demand due to 
its loiter time, w=
eapons loads and usually its accuracy.  It was one of the few 
a/c that carried t=
he M35/M36 Funny Bomb that was a good weapon against truck 
targets. <=
u>
 
THE RELUCTANT BAC=
K-SEATER 
 
= 
Ed Rider was a Canberra pilot who had come up through the enliste=
d ranks, having 
done a stint as a=
n Airborne Electronics Technician on the B-57 in the late 
1950s.  Ten y=
ears later he was a captain flying the Canberra o=
ut of Phan Rang.  
Rider was known f=
or his aggressive flying and his own particular tactics that <=
/span>
were more suited t=
o a nimble fighter-bomber than the big B-57.  And by Rider's =

own admission, 't=
here were only about two navigators left who would fly with 
me'.  Before=
 the war was allover he had completed more than 400 combat missions. =

The following is R=
ider's account of one such mission in 1968: 
 <=
/u>
'The "Yellowbirds" were back at Phan Rang flying night interdiction=
 missions in 
the southern part=
 of North Vietnam and along the supply routes do=
wn through 
Lao=
s.  I had a patch on my party  =
; flight suit that said "Laotian Highway =

Patrol".  'O=
ther than the two navigators in the squadron who would willingly fly =

with me, the othe=
rs did not like my highly unorthodox tactics. I tried to point 
out to them that o=
ther pilots were getting shot up =E2=80=94 or shot down =E2=80=94 while I 
never took hits a=
nd killed more trucks than most. Those idiots were coming back 
with their aeropl=
anes full of holes and getting medals for it. Anyway, my 
navigator came do=
wn with a bad case of "Ho's Revenge" and the other navigator <=
/span>
was already flyin=
g, so someone had to be volunteered.  The hand of fate laid its =

clammy finger on B=
ill. After an earlier adventure that ended in a belly landing =

due to hydraulic f=
ailure, he had sworn never to fly with me again. We had to 
drag him scratchi=
ng and spitting, so to speak, to the aeroplane. =

 <=
/u>
'We were taking off at midnight to hit a truck park way up in Laos.  I asked the <=
/tt>
crew chief if his=
 aeroplane was ready, and when he said yes I gave him four 
beers to put into=
 the rear compartment and told him to button it up (close all =

inspection doors)=
.  I didn't insult him by inspecting the jet. The crew chiefs 
liked for me to f=
ly their aeroplanes and I never had one let me down. I went 
around with the a=
rmourer and checked the fuzes on the bombs for proper settings 
and the arming wi=
res for proper routing.  Then I spread my maps on the ramp and <=
u>
showed the crew c=
hief and armourer where we were going and what we were supposed 
to hit. 
 
'We were in the n=
ortheast monsoon season and had 40 knots of wind blowing down =

the runway. =
 The standard night departure called for a right turn to the south 
after take-off un=
til reaching the coast, then a turn to the east and then follow 
the coast to Cam R=
anh Bay and turn on course. This was supposed to keep you out =

of the outgoing a=
rtillery, but it wasted about 3000 lbs of   fuel, so naturally =

I didn't follow i=
t. After I raised the gear I turned off all external lights so 
that the air traf=
fic controllers in the tower could not see me. When I was high 
enough to drop a w=
ing, I turned right 270 degrees so as to cross the west end of 
the runway headed=
 northwest.  I roared across the 101st Airborne encampment and <=
u>
shook all the gru=
nts out of bed and then   headed up the valley that led to =

Dalat in the moun=
tains. The hills on either side were invisible as there were no 
lights on the gro=
und, but if I maintained the proper heading I would not run 
into any rocks be=
fore I got high enough to clear them. Bill was somewhat unhappy 
with this exercis=
e. In due course we climbed out of the valley and turned north 
to Pleiku, and po=
ints north.' 
 
'We checked i=
n with "Blind Bat", our C-130 "flare ship", and from more than 50 =



miles out we coul=
d see his flares and the anti-aircraft fire he was attracting. 


The gunners must h=
ave just gotten a fresh supply of ammo because they were even =



shooting at his f=
lares. We let down and coordinated altitudes so that we would =



not run into each=
 other.  We made eight vertical dive-bomb passes dropping our 


"funny bombs" =E2=
=80=94 this was the name that FACs gave to the M35 fire bomb. =



 <=
/u>
'This was the same bomb used to start the firestorms in <=
/u>Tokyo in World War 2.  


It was a large cl=
uster bomb that opened up a few thousand feet above the ground.  


The falling bombl=
ets made a fiery waterfall until they hit the ground.  Then <=
/u>


they spewed out b=
urning white and yellow phosphorus like roman candles.  Really <=
u>


something to see a=
t night. 
 
=

'We stirred up a h=
ornets' nest and the flak was thick - when it got close you 


could hear it pop=
ping like popcorn.  We left the "flare ship" to count the 


burning trucks an=
d then headed for home. Just another routine mission.  But we 


still had our 20 m=
m ammo left and I hated to take it home. I called the airborne 


command post and a=
sked if they had any gun targets.  They told me to contact a =



FAC at Tchepone. H=
e had spotted trucks on a ferry crossing the river there. 


 <=
/u>
'We contacted the FAC to coordinate altitudes before we got into hi=
s area. We 


used a secret "ba=
se" altitude which changed every 12 hours so that   the enemy <=
/u>


could not listen i=
n and find out our heights and then set the fuzes on his 


shells for that a=
ltitude. That night base altitude was 8000 ft. He said he was =



at base plus four=
, or 12,000 ft. I said. "You must mean   minus four?" He said <=
/u>


no. I asked what t=
he hell he was doing way up there and he replied that his 


Cessna O-2 wouldn=
't climb any higher! His flares were   floating so high that 


they did not illu=
minate the ground, and I had to circle until I got their 


reflection on the=
 river before I could see it.  Bill kept saying something about =



"bingo" fuel (the=
 minimum required to get back home with 2000 lbs of fuel 


remaining). =
  'A few guns were shooting at our sound, but not coming close. I 


knew there were n=
o radar-controlled guns because otherwise we would have been <=
/span>


tracked and fired=
 on accurately while we were circling. I finally got it worked 


out and caught th=
e ferry in the flare reflection on the river and rolled in. I =



fired about a thr=
ee-second burst in a 30-degree dive from about 1500 ft. The 


muzzle flashes li=
t us up like a Christmas tree and said, "Here I am! Shoot me!" 


and did they ever=
!  Now I knew why that FAC was so high.  I pulled about 5Gs to =



get pointed strai=
ght up.  'A small part of my mind registered a red light =



flashing somewher=
e in the cockpit but I was too busy to look at it.  When I ran <=
u>


out of airspeed a=
t the top and had figured out up from down and was upright 


again the light w=
as out. 
 


'The FAC was enco=
uraging, saying he had seen lots of hits on the ferry with his 


night vision scop=
e, so I got set up to go in again. Bill didn't think it was a =



good idea. Indeed=
, there were lots of guns protecting the ferry. Most of them <=
/span>


were twin barrel 3=
7 mm weapons. I could tell because the "red   hot beer cans" 


streaking past th=
e aeroplane came up in strings of eight.  The 37 mm gun fired 


clips of four rou=
nds, so eight meant twin barrels. I was worried about <=
/font>


radar-controlled 5=
7 mm twin barrel units mounted on tracked vehicles that often =



accompanied large=
 truck convoys, but there was no evidence of them. The most 


spectacular show w=
as provided by the many 23 mm ZSU units. These were four 


barrels mounted o=
n a tracked vehicle, and they put out a string of tracers that 


waved around the s=
ky like a kid playing with a high-pressure water hose. =



 <=
/u>
'My normal tactic at night over a well-defended target was to get d=
irectly over 


it at about 8000 f=
t, roll inverted, and pull the nose down to the target, drop <=
/span>


my bomb at about 5=
000 ft and then pull up into a vertical climb (essentially a <=
/span>


loop beginning at=
 the top).  Just before I ran out of airspeed, I would pull the =



nose down to leve=
l and roll upright. This faked out the   gunners because they <=
/u>


expected me to be=
 off to the side of the target. I was   only vulnerable in the =



first part of my p=
ull-up. Under very heavy fire I sometimes varied this by not <=
/span>


pulling up immedi=
ately but by turning 90 degrees   and continuing down to low 


altitude with low=
 power and coasting a few miles away from the target (and the =



guns).  When=
 using my guns, I would dive   slightly off to the side, go lower <=
u>


and pull up to a 3=
0-degree dive before firing.  'Bill kept bothering me with 


this "bingo" fuel=
 business but I didn't have time to discuss it with him. On my 


second pass, I ha=
d to use the same heading as the first run in order to see the 


target - not a ve=
ry smart thing to do. When our muzzle flashes lit us up again, 


I had the feeling=
 that   if I pulled up as usual every gun would be aimed at our 


recovery path, so=
 I   didn't pull up. I used my alternate tactic. The sky behind 


and above us was f=
illed with a spectacular display of fireworks. The FAC was 


figuratively jump=
ing up and down because we had torched off some of the trucks =



on the ferry and o=
n the south shore of the river, where the vessel was now 


resting. Now we d=
id not have to circle around to catch the reflection of the 


flares to locate t=
he target. 
 
=

'We still had 600=
 rounds left =E2=80=94 six seconds worth of firing. We could approach 


from any directio=
n since we could see the burning target. Bill was getting a 


little shrill now=
 and yelling something about "bingo minus two". I told him I <=
/span>


would wind it up w=
ith two more passes and then go home. After each pass, when I =



was pulling 5-6Gs=
 to fake out the gunners, there was that pesky red light in the 


cockpit. I was so=
 busy trying not to   join up with those strings of "red hot 


beer cans" that I=
 didn't notice what it was.  We left the FAC to add up the 


damage and headed=
 home.  'Relieved of all ordnance and most of its fuel, the <=
/u>


B-57 climbed like=
 a homesick angel. In short order we were passing 35,000 ft and 


I had Bill tighte=
n his oxygen mask and check his system for pressure breathing. 


As we  =
 passed 45,000 ft, we had to forcefully breathe out and just relax and 


let the pressure b=
low up our lungs to breathe in.  At 53,000 ft we were above <=
/u>


over 95 percent o=
f the atmosphere. At that altitude the engines used very little   <=
u>


fuel. When we arr=
ived over Pleiku we were 150 nautical miles from home and had =



just 800 lbs of f=
uel!  Normally, when you land with 2000 lbs that is considered <=
u>


an emergency, but=
 I had been through this many times before, and was only 


concerned with ha=
ving enough fuel to taxi to the ramp. 
 =

'At that altitude, when you reduce power to idle, it only reduce=
s slightly 


because the engin=
es cannot reduce fuel consumption very much without flaming 


out. So, in order=
 to reduce power and expedite our decent, I had to shut off one 


engine. I shut do=
wn the right engine because we would be flying a left hand   


traffic pattern. B=
ill was somewhat unhappy.  I maintained a 0.84 Mach descent,  =
; 


which meant that t=
he descent got progressively steeper as you got into the 


denser air at low=
 altitude. This let us down inside the hole of the artillery <=
/span>


doughnut at 12,00=
0 ft, keeping us out of the arc of outgoing artillery fire.  We =



were approaching f=
rom the north and had to land to the east. Once inside the 


hole, I extended s=
peed brakes and pushed the nose over to maintain speed.  =



Extending speed b=
rakes at 500 knots is like running into a brick wall, and we <=
/span>


were thrown forwa=
rd hard enough to lock our automatic shoulder harnesses.  That <=
u>


is when that pesk=
y red light in the cockpit came on again.  This time I 


determined what i=
t was.  It was the low fuel pressure light. This was confirmed <=
u>


by the unwinding o=
f the left engine. 
 <=
/tt>
'I was a=
t a critical point in my traffic pattern and had no time to deal with a <=
/u>


double engine fla=
meout, so I shut off the left throttle, banked 90 degrees right 


and pulled the no=
se around to a heading 180 degrees from the landing   heading. =



Then I rolled inv=
erted, and with about 5Gs pulled the nose down the   line of 


approach lights t=
o the end of the runway and then up the centre-of   the runway =



lights, varying t=
he Gs to complete my split-ess at about 1500 ft and at about <=
/span>


400-450 knots.&nb=
sp; 'While I was busy doing this I asked Bill to inform the tower =



that we had a&nbs=
p;  double engine flameout and might need a tug to tow us in. Bill <=
/u>


had lost his voic=
e and never did make the call. When I leveled off from my 


split-ess I hit b=
oth air-start ignition switches and advanced both throttles to 


idle. After a 4G b=
reak to downwind, I lowered gear and flaps and both engines 


were making the l=
ow moaning sound they made when running at idle. After =



touchdown I =
  raised the flaps and added power so I could hold the nose up. With 


40 knots of headw=
ind it was a long taxi to the far end of the runway. I tried to 


get Bill interest=
ed in betting on whether I could make it all the way into the =



de-arming area wi=
thout lowering the nose wheel to the ground. For some reason he 


was not intereste=
d. Anyway, I did make it with the nose wheel in the air, and <=
/span>


scared the bejesu=
s out of the de-arming troops. 
 
'While they were de-arming my guns I figured it out. It had to be an in=
operative 


forward boost pum=
p in the main fuel tank. When I went to full power and pulled =



lots of Gs at Tch=
epone, one fuel pump could not handle the load and the pressure 


dropped =E2=80=94=
 not enough, thank God, to flame out the engines.  When I extended the <=
u>


speed brakes in m=
y descent to Phan Rang, what little fuel we had left splashed =



against the forwa=
rd wall of the tank, uncovering the rear fuel pump and =



resulting in a fl=
ameout.  There is an old saying, "There are old pilots and 


there are bold pi=
lots, but there are no old bold pilots".  Not so, but we bold 


pilots need more l=
uck than most. 
 =

'We had eno=
ugh fuel to make it back to the ramp. After we had parked and =



deplaned, I made a=
n inspection tour with the crew chief, armed with powerful 


electric torches.=
  Not a scratch on her! Again, skill and cunning triumphs over <=
u>


ignorance and stu=
pidity.  The crew chief brought out the four beers from the <=
/u>


tail compartment,=
 ice cold from their sojourn at 50,000 ft, and I spread   my 


maps on the ramp,=
 giving a blow-by-blow description of the mission for my crew =



chief and armoure=
r.  I had an additional audience of most of the crew chiefs and =



armourers on the r=
amp who were not otherwise busy. Bill did not want his beer so 


I drank it too.&n=
bsp; Needless to say, Bill never got into an aeroplane with me 


again.' 
 


 <=
/u>
 

 


= --Apple-Mail-17-460560006--