X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2010 22:47:13 -0500 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from web57502.mail.re1.yahoo.com ([66.196.100.69] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.3.2) with SMTP id 4131854 for lml@lancaironline.net; Sat, 20 Feb 2010 08:07:41 -0500 Received-SPF: none receiver=logan.com; client-ip=66.196.100.69; envelope-from=casey.gary@yahoo.com Received: (qmail 71819 invoked by uid 60001); 20 Feb 2010 13:07:05 -0000 DomainKey-Signature:a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=s1024; d=yahoo.com; h=Message-ID:X-YMail-OSG:Received:X-Mailer:References:Date:From:Subject:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=oI68u+9+4oHRu6o24UR7mAntfhOmpmJMlBMC8D148FdrGSG3KsIhIhFZncD1W40Tk8pQ2idiA4oRMkgxU/6Ky4hqwVi4Ae3yhBMtysysUmG0EkYfBZBmNCzbmvcFJDbIagMJuorz9IPr+kGPZrj3brhfZnQdCj9H5u8vdxrUXdg=; X-Original-Message-ID: <59020.71761.qm@web57502.mail.re1.yahoo.com> X-YMail-OSG: K5TuCIcVM1ksRui7qyxJPYNb7SlNLRAAhIHSf8i2w7OivgfihPaWR2N8q_2sbgKP_CCT5oMma9wKvoJbo9ISEeQZkrrNiX_KyiL12_B7C1IVOBqjyjJ8eNxcTMjDv3TvjonDkHJFclM2fnebx7UhJ07OfVnftKyDcXqAfIjFyuaYZDQGyAxNfprINthzPJsNhvcojDC18vSQoaxIv3momFlqqWgxpHqVg9Q9c8QRW3PU_70M7Yqay_81De0WMSvxlTHk2KhQh_aW3u2T2kGrC6Xe6LrVneyzAdF0Ht3Q61w_d3rqi8u2wWM2dQIQzi_u47xWZYAQvtjxFoxNJdNBxseuyCqsdeVHHxAgEv30ztQ- Received: from [97.122.190.63] by web57502.mail.re1.yahoo.com via HTTP; Sat, 20 Feb 2010 05:07:04 PST X-Mailer: YahooMailRC/300.3 YahooMailWebService/0.8.100.260964 References: X-Original-Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2010 05:07:04 -0800 (PST) From: Gary Casey Subject: Re: B&C Regulators X-Original-To: Lancair Mailing List X-Original-Cc: Mark Miller In-Reply-To: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0-953165090-1266671224=:71761" --0-953165090-1266671224=:71761 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I assume that this most excellent report was also published on the Aeroelec= tric List. If not, it should be. On that list the subject of over-voltage= protection has been discussed at immense length. The B&C regulator has be= en (correctly) lauded for its overvoltage protection. However, a device ca= nnot be expected to protect the aircraft against the result of a failure of= itself. Therefore, the system should have a monitor that will warn the pi= lot of an over-voltage condition. It is just a conjecture on my part, but = in the case described below, there was probably plenty of time before any p= ermanent damage was done to shut down the secondary alternator - if there h= ad been a warning that it was in trouble. If there exists two independent = electrical systems(a battery connected to a functioning alternator) EACH sh= ould have a voltage monitor to warn the pilot of over- or under-voltage con= ditions. I don't know if the accident plane had such a warning system, but I suspect not.=0AGary Casey=0AES, single battery/alternator/B&= C regulator, all under the hood, and an independent monitoring system.=0A= =0A=0A=0A________________________________=0AFw: B&C Regulators=0AB&C Regula= tors=0AFebruary 19, 2010 11:17:50 AM MST=0AFrom:=0A"Robert Pastusek" =0ATo:=0A"" =0ALML Family,=0A =0ABill = Harrelson and I had a chance to review the investigation and preliminary ca= uses of an in-flight fire in a Lancair IV-P that occurred last spring (2009= ). The findings and conclusions are not yet established, but the investigat= or felt that some of the information discovered was not in question, and wo= uld be useful to the experimental community. We agreed to help spread the w= ord=E2=80=A6as follows:=0A =0AThe accident aircraft experienced an in-fligh= t battery fire of the secondary electrical system shortly after takeoff. Th= e pilot was able to return to the airport and extinguish the fire in the ta= il section of the aircraft after landing. The battery, case, and nearby com= ponents were consumed/destroyed, and the aircraft fuselage sustained signif= icant heat damage from the aft pressure bulkhead to the elevators/rudder. T= he cause of the fire has not been absolutely determined, but the lead/acid = battery vents had apparently been obstructed, resulting in a case rupture a= nd venting of hydrogen gas into the tail section of the airplane. The exact= cause of this apparent over pressurization and rupture awaits additional i= nformation and analysis. This finding and the final NTSB report are expecte= d within a month and we will disseminate this report through the LML and LO= BO newsletter.=0A =0AOne initial result of the investigation was that the B= &C regulator for the secondary electrical system was inoperative upon post-= flight analysis. The NTSB investigator conducted a detailed examination and= analysis of the defective unit and determined that the electrical design w= as robust and appropriate to the task. The unit was mounted to the engine s= ide of the firewall with the spade terminal connectors projecting to the si= de of the aircraft. This unit is not sealed, and at some point liquid (prob= ably water) entered the metal box, most likely through the opening around t= he spade terminals, and filled it to a depth of =C2=BC to =C2=BD inch. The = liquid allowed arcing among internal components and to the case ground, lea= ving carbon tracks on the circuit board and case, and destroying the electr= ical functionality.=0A =0AA review of installation instructions provided wi= th B&C regulators recommends they be installed inside the cockpit or in a s= imilar environmentally-protected area. This regulator was mounted inside th= e engine compartment, as we believe are the vast majority of Lancair instal= lations. When so installed, regulators are subject to additional heat and c= ooling stresses, as well as water/solvents from engine cleaning and other m= aintenance when the cowling is removed. If mounted in any position other th= an with the spades down, liquid can enter in the area of the spade terminal= s and will then be trapped within the lower part of the enclosure, immersin= g part of the main circuit board.=0A =0AIf you are still building and have = the option, review the B&C recommendations on mounting location and consid= er locating your B&C regulator(s) inside the cockpit; preferably with the s= pades down if there is any possibility of liquid exposure. No matter the lo= cation, mount them in such a way that they cannot ingest and retain water.= =0A =0AIf you are not able to locate the regulator(s) as recommended by B&C= , consider shielding the terminal strip area from liquids. We expect to con= tact B&C about the feasibility of other improvements that could be made, bu= t will refrain from making any recommendations until we receive their comme= nts. =0A =0ABob Pastusek & Bill Harrelson=0AFor the Lancair Owners & Build= ers Organization (LOBO)=0A=0A=0A --0-953165090-1266671224=:71761 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I assume that this most excellent report was also = published on the Aeroelectric List.  If not, it should be.  On th= at list the subject of over-voltage protection has been discussed at immens= e length.  The B&C regulator has been (correctly) lauded for its o= vervoltage protection.  However, a device cannot be expected to protec= t the aircraft against the result of a failure of itself.  Therefore, = the system should have a monitor that will warn the pilot of an over-voltag= e condition.  It is just a conjecture on my part, but in the case desc= ribed below, there was probably plenty of time before any permanent damage = was done to shut down the secondary alternator - if there had been a warnin= g that it was in trouble.  If there exists two independent electrical systems(a battery connected to a functioning alternator) EACH s= hould have a voltage monitor to warn the pilot of over- or under-voltage co= nditions.  I don't know if the accident plane had such a warning syste= m, but I suspect not.
Gary Casey
ES, single battery/alt= ernator/B&C regulator, all under the hood, and an independent monitorin= g system.

Fw: = B&C Regulators
<= div class=3D"subjectbar fontT2" style=3D"font-family: arial, sans-serif; fo= nt-size: 11px; line-height: 13px; left: 0px; padding-top: 0px; padding-righ= t: 5px; padding-bottom: 0px; padding-left: 5px; position: relative; top: 0p= x; ">

B&C Regulators

February 19, 2010 11:17:50 A= M MST
<= /div>
From:
"Robert = Pastusek" <rpastusek@htii.com>
To:
"" = <lml@lancaironline.net>

LML Famil= y,

 

Bill Harrelson and I had a chan= ce to review the investigation and preliminary causes of an in-flight fire = in a Lancair IV-P that occurred last spring (2009). The findings and conclu= sions are not yet established, but the investigator felt that some of the i= nformation discovered was not in question, and would be useful to the exper= imental community. We agreed to help spread the word=E2=80=A6as follows:

 

The accident aircraft experienced an in= -flight battery fire of the secondary electrical system shortly after takeo= ff. The pilot was able to return to the airport and extinguish the fire in = the tail section of the aircraft after landing. The battery, case, and near= by components were consumed/destroyed, and the aircraft fuselage sustained = significant heat damage from the aft pressure bulkhead to the elevators/rud= der. The cause of the fire has not been absolutely determined, but the lead= /acid battery vents had apparently been obstructed, resulting in a case rup= ture and venting of hydrogen gas into the tail section of the airplane. The exact cause of this apparent over pressurization and rupture awaits additi= onal information and analysis. This finding and the final NTSB report are e= xpected within a month and we will disseminate this report through the LML = and LOBO newsletter.

 

One initial r= esult of the investigation was that the B&C regulator for the secondary= electrical system was inoperative upon post-flight analysis. The NTSB inve= stigator conducted a detailed examination and analysis of the defective uni= t and determined that the electrical design was robust and appropriate to t= he task. The unit was mounted to the engine side of the firewall with the spade terminal connectors projecting to the side of the aircraft. This uni= t is not sealed, and at some point liquid (probably water) entered the meta= l box, most likely through the opening around the spade terminals, and fill= ed it to a depth of =C2=BC to =C2=BD inch. The liquid allowed arcing among = internal components and to the case ground, leaving carbon tracks on the ci= rcuit board and case, and destroying the electrical functionality.

 

A review of installation instructions prov= ided with B&C regulators recommends they be installed inside the cockpi= t or in a similar environmentally-protected area. This regulator was mounte= d inside the engine compartment, as we believe are the vast majority of Lancair ins= tallations. When so installed, regulators are subject to additional heat an= d cooling stresses, as well as water/solvents from engine cleaning and othe= r maintenance when the cowling is removed. If mounted in any position other= than with the spades down, liquid can enter in the area of the spade termi= nals and will then be trapped within the lower part of the enclosure, immer= sing part of the main circuit board.

 

&nb= sp;

If you are not able to locate the regulator(s) as reco= mmended by B&C, consider shielding the terminal strip area from liquids= . We expect to contact B&C about the feasibility of other improvements = that could be made, but will refrain from making any recommendations until = we receive their comments.  

 

For the Lancair Owner= s & Builders Organization (LOBO)

=
=0A=0A=0A

=0A=0A --0-953165090-1266671224=:71761--