Posted for
Laurie Fitzgerald:
As the video has turned up on the LML I
guess a description of the event may provide some useful information for
those interested. Please feel free to post the following:
VH-FTZ is an Australian registered Aircraft constructed from a
Lancair IV-P fast build kit and heavily modified to accept the Walter
M601D Turbine.
The aircraft is not entirely the same as a
factory Propjet as it was conceived and built prior to Lancair releasing
a Propjet. Construction commenced in June 1999 and the
first flight was June 2003.
The Aircraft is based at
Jandakot airport in Perth Western Australia and has flown just short of
500 hours.
Prior to this event there have only two
maintenance issues firstly a broken spring on the nose gear was ingested
by the turbine requiring a compressor rebuild (thanks Diemech) and second was
a cracked windscreen due to the Australian sun in the outback causing
temperatures sufficient to soften the perspex which then cracked when cooled.
The windscreen was replaced with a 1/2 inch screen.
I
am the owner, builder and pilot of FTZ and in the absence of
organisations such as LOBO in Australia have personally researched and
filtered all available information to enable me establish a safe
operating regime for my aircraft.
I am a relatively low
time private pilot with 1650 hours total time. 1000 hours on a Glasair
1RG and 500 on the Lancair.
For the record, FTZ approaches a
stall at 80 knots clean at 14000 feet. On normal operations I rotate for take
off at 90 knots and touch down at 100 knots.
On
February 7, 2010 I conducted a return flight from the south coast
of Western Australia, shortly after takeoff on climb through 5000 ft at
200 knots I heard a distinct sound that I soon realised was hydraulic
fluid escaping, the hydraulic pressure gauge was indicating a rapid loss
of pressure. I immediately shut the throttle, held the nose up attitude
and selected gear down as the airspeed decayed below 160knots. The gear
dropped but there was insufficient hydraulic pressure to extend or lock
the gear. I pulled the hydraulic pump breaker and levelled out and
maintained 130 knots and exercised the manual hydraulic pump, this confirmed
that hydraulic pressure could not be maintained and that a gear extension was
not possible.
I held overhead an 1800 metre runway
and assessed the situation. I was carrying 300 litres of JetA1 and the
annunciator panel indicated the main doors were open with no
greens.
I contacted ATC and advised them of my situation
and arranged to transit back to Jandakot Airport where emergency services
were available.
On arrival at Jandakot I conducted a
low level pass and ATC confirmed the nose gear was half extended and no
mains were visible and the main doors appeared
closed.
I left the control zone and burnt off the excess
fuel, during the hour and a half taken to reduce the fuel load I slowed
the aircraft to 100 knots to determine whether the nose gear gas strut
would lock the nose gear at touchdown speeds, transferred all fuel from
the belly tank and briefed myself for a wheels up landing.
I returned to Jandakot with approximately 50 litres of fuel per
side and conducted a final fly past the tower to confirm no change to the
gear configuration and then joined the circuit for a landing. I flew a
three mile final (flapless) with 450 ft per minute descent and at one and
a half miles reduced to 200 ft per min descent.
At 500
metres from touchdown I was indicating 115 knots and shut down
the turbine and turned off the master switch, I did not attempt to flare
but held off slightly to lose as much speed as possible. The tail
contacted the runway lightly and I released back pressure on the control and
let the propellor contact the runway.
At this point
I was surprised that the aircraft did not have sufficient mass or inertia
to immediately bend the blades which I had left in fine pitch
to facilitate braking and I thought in this configuration they would bend
rather that dig in.
On each rotation of the windmilling
propellor the nose of the aircraft was walked right on the tip of the
blades causing a significant yawing. Full rudder slowed but would not
arrest the yaw. When the blades finally bent sufficient to allow the belly of
the aircraft to settle on the runway the rudder authority was adequate to
steer the aircraft on to the centreline and maintain a straight ahead
line.
The aircraft stopped sliding and I exited
uninjured, largely due to the fact that the energy was all dissipated
during the slide on the runway and there was no real vertical
component.
The Aircraft was raised, I
pulled the wheels from their wells and pushed them to the locked position
and towed the aircraft to my hanger.
The aircraft
sustained remarkably little damage:
Abrasion damage to the
belly tank and just behind the wing spar down to the nomex
core.
Paint damage to the gear doors and left
wing.
Require new Pitot and TX antenna
Require one aileron
hinge and rod end.
Paint damage to tail.
And the big one
require new prop and engine overhaul.
The cause of the
hydraulic failure was a failed flare fitting on the main hydraulic line
between the pump and the hydraulic valve that actuates gear and
flaps.
The cause of the flare fitting failure is not yet
finally determined but the flare was correctly manufactured, however over
torquing or repeated torquing may have assisted the
failure.
My research to date has revealed
that single flares are not adequate for aluminium lines below 3/8 of an
inch and that lines of this size should be double flared. I will be
replacing all high pressure lines with double flares. I intend to liase
with Fred Moreno and study the failed flare, one of us will report on
this list the final outcome.
Although a little off topic I need to address Scott's
comment "Yes, very professional looking chap flying
shoeless." Without wishing to be over sensitive that comment would be
acceptable if I
were British. As an Australian the following
would be more correct. "Yes, very
professional looking Bloke flying
shoeless."
On the matter of flying sans shoes I adopted this
habit when flying the Glasair 1RG, as shoes, boots and wooden legs
interfered with the operation of the toe brakes and on occasions
passengers managed to put their number 9's up into the wiring behind the
rather tight panel.
I
maintained the habit (although I usually wear socks) in the Lancair
after seeing a pilot badly burnt after an accident when their feet and
legs where trapped under the panel and they could not extricate
themself.
Also I have often puzzled at the reason for
wearing footwear as in most accidents I have witnessed, the shoes are
found many metres away from the owner. Finally if a flying suit, boots,
helmet and visor made us more professional I'd probably have felt better
at the post landing media circus.
Safe flying to
all
Regards
Laurie Fitzgerald