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Jeff,
As I said before, telling us all to “be more responsible” is
like telling somebody to be “smarter”. It has absolutely no meaning. Scolding
us over and over is not going to change one single thing. In your long email
below you don’t offer one single useful piece if information that might contribute
to prevention of accidents. Everybody already knows there’s a problem.
Please please Jeff, think of some useful concrete recommendations
for our behavior as pilots and let us know what they are……….. (I have already
posted 3 of them.)
Your split of “group a” and “group b” is an illusion. Every
Lancair pilot I know is dead serious about his entire setup as a pilot and
takes the whole process dead seriously. The accidents we have had cover all
types of pilots anyway in terms of the types of training they have had and
their experience. You can’t make any generalizations about all the crash victims
together because there are none.
Like I said before, please focus on concrete options that all
pilots should be looking at now to make themselves better pilots.
Dave T.
Legacy RG
From: Lancair Mailing
List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of vtailjeff@aol.com
Sent: Sun, August 31, 2008 7:52
To: lml@lancaironline.net
Subject: [LML] Re: Lancair Accidents
This thread started out by
talking about the recent spate of accidents and what we could do to address it.
Then we got off on the subject of videos and low passes. Meanwhile, while we
have been chatting on the internet, three more Lancairs bit the dust in the
last ten days, fortunately with pride being the only injury. One IVP (N516DB)
went off the runway in Hays, KS on 8/25. A 360-- N6114 experienced a gear
collapse (hard landing?) also on 8/25 in Vancouver, WA and another 360 (N360J)
landed gear up in Windsor Locks, CT. We are having a horrible year. Dennis
is correct, if this were a military squadron, heads would be rolling.
Training has been addressed here ad nauseum and it is evident we could all
benefit from more training, but training is worthless without pilot discipline.
Some of our pilots have the "right stuff" and some don't and some
don't. There seems to be an odd dichotomy of pilot types in this group of
Lancair pilots. This division of the GA pilot community is not restricted to
Lancairs-- we just see the microcosm of it through this list. On the one hand
(Group A) there are those who are well trained, follow regulations, stays
current, stays proficient and pretty much stays in the middle of the air. As
Brent Regan says--they don't let their kid fly the airplane. The opposing group
(Group B) seems to have a bit of a rebel inside. They want the freedom flying
offers without the responsibility. Some do not know what the federal air
regulations are, don't like20to follow them anyway, and some don't
care--but when things are going badly this second group seems to be the ones
who blame the airplane. This is unfortunate and is currently causing
others (FAA, EAA and the insurance industry) to take a hard look at us.
What will happen? As I said earlier these three groups (FAA, EAA &
insurance) really do not care about you or me. The FAA loves to regulate--so
guess what is coming? More regulations. Guess who will pay for it? All of you.
The FAA will likely (my prediction based on the rumor mill) make training
mandatory for you to operate your Lancair as PIC. How much will this cost you?
Current rates run between $1000 and $3000 dollars. Are you happy yet? Normally
I would be upset but since I am a CFI and I teach in the Lancair group-- I
want to thank you very very much.
The insurance industry will make insurance unavaliable or very expensive for
those who can get it. AIG--who is the largest Lancair undrerwriter-- is making
everyone resubmit an application. They will then cherry pick the insured
(remember those of us with over 1000 hours in type that have 0 Lancair
accidents?). They will be able to get insurance--at a much higher premium.
Those with under 100 hours in type are probably screwed. Still happy? BTW --did
you know an Eclipse insurance policy is cheaper than a IVP policy?
Think because you have a Legacy or a 360 you won't see an insurance
bump?--think again. The IV & IVP is o nly 30% of the accident total. Keep
piling up 320's, 360's, ES's and Legacies and you will be in the same insurance
boat. Speaking of totals, as of 2004 Lancair had sold 1870 kits (see
Lancair website). 1077 Lancairs are currently registered with the FAA. There
have been over 150 Lancair accidents in the U.S. and elsewhere. I will
breakdown the accidents, causes, types, etc. tomorrow. If Marv is kind enough,
I will post the OSH powerpoint on the LML website. Decide for yourselves what
is causing the accidents.
So bottom line: if you have a IV or IVP the group B pilots will likely cost you
over $5000 this year. Thank them next time you see them! I know I will.
Jeff Edwards
CFI
LIVP
-----Original Message-----
From: Taylor, David <dtaylor@crescentpark.com>
To: lml@lancaironline.net
Sent: Thu, 28 Aug 2008 1:55 pm
Subject: [LML] Re: Lancair Accidents
I would say in summary regarding IMC in general that you should
not be flying one of these fast airplanes unless you are INSTRUMENT RATED, and
are CURRENT ON INSTRUMENTS. At the very very least you should be ab le to
execute a 180 degree turn in IMC easily and comfortably. Inadvertent IMC
is a killer in these machines.
Can anybody not understand how planes go into T-storms after
reading this?
I would almost say that if you’re flying in the ATC system IMC,
you should only do so if you have on-board weather.
Like everyone else, I’ve been troubled by the seemingly
large number of Lancair accidents since I started building my Legacy in
2004. And like everyone else, I’ve given it a lot of thought.
Despite that, I really can’t propose a solution with any confidence that it
would help.
But this is becoming an emergency. Back in my Air
Force days, long before it got this bad, wing commanders would have been fired,
airplanes grounded for in spections, and pilots grounded until they received
additional training. The current situation is unacceptable. As a
result, even though I have no confidence in my ideas on this, here is what I
would propose for discussion. Maybe there’s the seed of a good idea here;
maybe not.
1. Flight into Thunderstorms Leading to In-Flight
Breakup
Since we all know that we shouldn’t fly into a thunderstorm,
I’d suggest assembling a volunteer panel of instructor pilots to analyze the
Lancair thunderstorm accidents. The objective is to understand what
specific chain of events lead good pilots to do something that turned out to be
so obviously wrong. Understanding the details of how it happens is the
first step towards structuring a response to prevent it.
These accidents are really baffling to me, which means I
don’t understand them. And as an instrument pilot, this is something I
need to understand. For example, were they flying in IMC and unknowingly
flew into an embedded thunderstorm they couldn’t see? Did they see the
thunderstorm and fly into it anyway, not recognizing it? Or had they
allowed themselves to get into a position from which they had no alternative
but to fly into a thunderstorm? Did they use onboard systems for
thunderstorm avoidance th at weren’t adequate for that?
Telling each other to avoid flying into thunderstorms isn’t
working. Understanding the specifics of what lead to these accidents
might reveal circumstances for which we are unprepared.
2. Stall/Spin Close to the Ground
While I don’t understand the circumstances leading to flying
into a thunderstorm, the cause of the stall/spin accident seems clearer.
IMO, the stall/spin accident includes a lack of basic airmanship skills.
Two fatal accident examples are Legacies that took off with the canopy open and
it seems possible the pilots forgot rule #1 of any emergency: “fly the
airplane.” Other examples include flying too slow in the traffic pattern,
probably trying to stay behind slow traffic, and then not recognizing the start
of a stall. Or pulling too many Gs in the final turn to avoid
overshoot.
Maybe HPAT could publish a number of specific lesson plans
for Lancair pilots to fly for self-training. HPAT could make the syllabus
available for free in the hope that it might be good publicity for HPAT and
they might get back their cost through more HPAT training.
Each lesson plan would=2 0be a short, fifteen minute
exercise on a skill that will help avoid stall/spin accidents. They would
be intended for a solo pilot to use to maintain his skill level in a critical
area that we demonstrate too often that we have allowed to decay. Instead
of just flying from here to that next hamburger, spend fifteen minutes enroute
going through a specific lesson exercise that focuses on one specific skill and
then record it in the pilot’s log book.
Use peer pressure to instill an atmosphere that continued
training is what good pilots do. Have monthly local lunchtime Lancair
fly-ins that include going around the table and giving each pilot the chance to
tell which lesson plan they’ve done since the last meeting and how it
went. Create the sense that this is what good pilots do and if you’re not
doing it, there’s something wrong with you.
It won’t work for everyone, but this sort of thing worked in
the Air Force, where nearly every pilot wanted to be one of the top pilots in
the squadron and would jump through whatever hoops were necessary to achieve
it. Even if it only works for half of us, that could result in fewer accidents.
For pilots who didn’t get HPAT or equivalent training at the
start, they wou ld do the lesson plans with a qualified instructor or
experienced Lancair pilot in their local area until they acquire the
skills. Once the skills are acquired, they would continue the lesson
plans solo to maintain the skills, which would continue as long as the person
was flying a Lancair.
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