X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com X-PolluStop: No license found, only first 5 messages were scanned Return-Path: Sender: To: lml Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2006 23:56:58 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from host421.ipowerweb.com ([72.22.69.104] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.1c.1) with SMTP id 1208912 for lml@lancaironline.net; Tue, 27 Jun 2006 17:54:09 -0400 Received-SPF: none receiver=logan.com; client-ip=72.22.69.104; envelope-from=bjburr@mwheli.com Received: (qmail 67907 invoked from network); 27 Jun 2006 21:41:59 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO mountain0676a7) (24.10.172.111) by host421.ipowerweb.com with SMTP; 27 Jun 2006 21:41:59 -0000 Reply-To: From: X-Original-To: "'Lancair Mailing List'" Subject: RE: [LML] Re: no more tragic news please! X-Original-Date: Tue, 27 Jun 2006 15:53:16 -0600 X-Original-Message-ID: <003801c69a34$18a82f10$0500a8c0@mountain0676a7> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0039_01C69A01.CE0DBF10" X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.2627 X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.2869 Importance: Normal In-Reply-To: This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0039_01C69A01.CE0DBF10 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit I believe there where severe thunderstorms on the ILS approach path. This is why the pilot cancelled IFR 10 miles south. He new he could not fly the ILS and remain out of the Tstorm cells. If you follow the flight path on Flight Tracker.com the airplane made it to FFU vortac the IAF for the ILS 13 approach. But he never flew the approach. The pilot then headed for the airport. He never was established on the ILS but he was aligned with the runway. Earlier that week he had received extensive flight training from HPATS, Pete Z. Much of this training involved flying the ILS13 approach to PVU so it was not new to him. He was at the IAF and was IFR but he elected to forgo the IFR approach opportunities and cancelled. He was also an active CFI out of the PVU airport and had a lot of experience teaching the ILS to students. As a note, the last advice given the pilot was to not fly the airplane at night until he had 50 hours and not fly IMC until he had 100 hours. My theory is that he left the FFU vortac heading and decending for PVU. He didn't realize how fast the IVPT accelerates in a decent and how slow it loses acceleration. These airplanes are just "slippery". He couldn't lose the airspeed before making the runway threshold and decided to make a 360 instead of aborting the landing, flying a missed approach, and re entering the pattern. He starts the turn, continues to lose altitude dips a wing and cartwheels the airplane. It is possible he had one chance to make the airport before another thunderstorm got in his way. And we know the rest of the story. I had a friend working in his hangar until 2:00 am the night of the accident. The storms were so intense he thought he was going to loose his door and roof that night. I don't think the pilot ever penetrated a thunderstorm cell but they were certainly having an effect on his decision making. Bryan N132BB -----Original Message----- From: Lancair Mailing List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of Sky2high@aol.com Sent: Tuesday, June 27, 2006 2:07 PM To: Lancair Mailing List Subject: [LML] Re: no more tragic news please! In a message dated 6/27/2006 5:07:54 A.M. Central Standard Time, skipslater@earthlink.net writes: The reason for the turn at 1.5 miles was threefold: 750' AGL (300' above a normal glidepath) 210 KIAS (about 100 knots too fast) 1900 fpm rate of descent (around 1200 fpm higher than a normal descent rate) That plane was coming down like a clean brick to try to salvage an unsalvageable approach when at 1.5 miles, it became obvious that a right 360 was needed to get down and slow down enough to land. Apparently, the turn into the dark combined with an unarrested sink rate resulted in flying into the water a little over halfway through the turn. Skip, Hmmmm, I just looked at the ILS and GPS plates for runway 13 at KPVU. This is another example of a puzzler that makes one wonder what was the start of the chain of errors and why it wasn't broken. There should have been plenty of "instrument" guidance available - even in the VMC conditions that existed. Turning over the dark water should have been a non-event with an approach dialed into the system and reversion to instrument scan. I remember that during a night currency flight on a dark "cloudless" night with the city lights to the east and the unlit cornfields to the west, I was on the downwind to rwy 9 and the turn to base left me in the black hole of an errant cloud. Reverting to instruments kept the plane level until emerging from that little bugger. The lesson learned was to expect anything at night and dial in the ILS if one is available for the runway. Scott ------=_NextPart_000_0039_01C69A01.CE0DBF10 Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I believe there = where severe thunderstorms on the ILS approach path.  This is why the pilot cancelled = IFR 10 miles south.  He new he = could not fly the ILS and remain out of the Tstorm = cells.  If you follow the flight path = on Flight Tracker.com the airplane made it to FFU vortac the IAF for the ILS 13 approach.  But he never flew the approach.  = The pilot then headed for the airport.  = He never was established on the ILS but he was aligned with the runway. =  Earlier that week he had = received extensive flight training from HPATS, Pete Z.  Much of this training involved = flying the ILS13 approach to PVU so it was not new to him. He was at the IAF = and was IFR but he elected to forgo the IFR approach opportunities and = cancelled.  He was also an active CFI out of = the PVU airport and had a lot of experience teaching the ILS to students.  As a note, the last advice = given the pilot was to not fly the airplane at night until he had 50 hours and not = fly IMC until he had 100 hours.

 

My theory is that he left the FFU = vortac heading and decending for PVU.  He didn’t = realize how fast the IVPT accelerates in a decent and how slow it loses = acceleration.  These airplanes are just = “slippery”.  He couldn’t lose the = airspeed before making the runway threshold and decided to make a 360 instead of = aborting the landing, flying a missed approach, and re entering the pattern.  He starts the turn, continues = to lose altitude dips a wing and cartwheels the airplane. =

 

It is possible he had one chance to = make the airport before another thunderstorm got in his way.  And we know the rest of the = story…

 

I had a friend working in his = hangar until 2:00 = am the night of the accident.  The storms were so intense he thought he was going to loose his = door and roof that night.  I = don’t think the pilot ever penetrated a thunderstorm cell but they were = certainly having an effect on his decision making.

 

Bryan

N132BB

 

-----Original = Message-----
From: Lancair Mailing = List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On = Behalf Of Sky2high@aol.com
Sent: Tuesday, June 27, = 2006 2:07 PM
To: Lancair Mailing = List
Subject: [LML] Re: no = more tragic news please!

 

In a message dated 6/27/2006 5:07:54 A.M. Central Standard Time, skipslater@earthlink.net writes:

   The reason for the turn at 1.5 miles was = threefold:

   750' AGL = (300' above a normal glidepath)

   210 = KIAS (about 100 knots too fast)

   1900 fpm = rate of descent (around 1200 fpm higher than a normal = descent rate)

 

That plane was coming down like a clean brick to try to salvage an = unsalvageable approach when at 1.5 miles, it became obvious that a right 360 was = needed to get down and slow down enough to land.  Apparently, the turn into = the dark combined with an unarrested sink rate resulted in flying into the = water a little over halfway through the turn.

Skip,=

 

Hmmmm, I just looked at the ILS and GPS plates for runway 13 at = KPVU.  This is another example of a puzzler that makes one wonder what was the start = of the chain of errors and why it wasn't broken.  There should have been = plenty of "instrument" guidance available - even in the VMC = conditions that existed.  Turning over the dark water should have been a non-event with an approach dialed into the system and reversion to instrument scan.

 

I remember that during a night currency flight on a dark = "cloudless" night with the city lights to the east and the unlit cornfields to = the west, I was on the downwind to rwy 9 and the turn to base left me = in the black hole of an errant cloud. Reverting to instruments kept the = plane level until emerging from that little bugger.  The lesson learned = was to expect anything at night and dial in the ILS if one is available for the runway.

 

Scott=

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