Sender: <marv@lancaironline.net> (Marvin Kaye)
To: lml@lancaironline.net
Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2003 22:08:10 -0400
Message-ID: <redirect-2588415@logan.com>
From: <edechazal@comcast.net>
References: <list-2587657@logan.com>
Subject: Re: Legacy Accident
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Ron's accident made me recall something that I was taught that might help
others.  Mike Dehate, when he transitioned me into my 360 after first flight,
gave me the hairy eyeball about a couple of things:  1) Never, ever, leave the
tow bar attached to the nose gear.  When you're done with it, remove it, and
never let the handle end touch the ground.  That way you can't leave it on,
and don't give yourself a chance to miss it on the next preflight.  How many
times have we gotten into the airplane ready to go only to have the helpful
lineman say, "hang on", while he pulls the nose wheel chocks?  I've done it
more than once.  2)  Treat uneven ground as dangerous for taxi (there is
uneven concrete adjacent to my hangar that will eat a prop if given a chance).
A few people on this list will have wished Mike gave them the hairy eyeball.

In the past, I've left jobs not quite done overnight, with the thought being
that I'd button them up the next day and do a test flight.  Here's a case in
point:  I disconnected the right fuel line from the facet pump under the seat
in order to get better clearance for some gear door work I was doing.  The
next day, at work, I realized that I had forgotten to reattach that line and
might have missed it when it came time to re-install the interior and do a
test flight.  I made a note and stuck it to my forehead in order not to
forget.  Another instance:  I did an oil change and forgot to install the
remote filter safety wire.  The cowlings were reattached and I was driving
away from the hangar when I remembered my mistake.  I was tired, and toyed
with fixing it the next time.  Fortunately, I turned the car around and
attended to it then and there, preventing the possibility of forgetting the
lapse.

I serve these up partly for Ron's benefit to show that those of us without
accidents still do dumb things.  But I also think that certain things are
trouble waiting to happen (not directed at Ron, but possibly others).  When I
do a pre-flight, there is no one thing on the checklist that, if missed, is an
automatic disaster.  I have learned that forgetting to put the flaps down 10
degrees is an attention getter, as the takeoff roll and initial climb out are
dramatically affected.  But other than that, 99% of the time, nothing else
will hurt me.  Oh, and I always put my hand on the gear switch before
activating the master.  On the other hand, these pitot tube covers, gust
locks, etc. seem to me to be more dangerous than the ailment they are designed
to address.  Put it this way:  if your preflight is not 100% effective, and
you use a device that must be removed before flight, you are in trouble.  I
look inside the pitot tube during every pre-flight (don't forget those fuel
tank vents too!) and have never noticed the first hint of plugging.  I also
decided not to use covers since I figure I will forget one.  My forgetfulness
is also why I had Lancair design me an automatic fuel transfer system between
the wing tanks and header tank.

Oh, and I've done a few other bone headed things:  Didn't jam the nut properly
on the flap motor which lead to a flap disconnect during short final.  Thank
goodness the flaps are hard connected to each other at least (outback).
Forgot to attach the nuts to the canopy front bracket bolts after maintenance
(forward hinge unit) and flew.  No adverse symptoms, just a sinking feeling in
my stomach after the flight when I remembered my oversight.  I guess those gas
struts load things up enough to keep the bolts from working out during taxi,
huh?  Damn!  The most dangerous thing I missed early on was not riveting the
inside aileron push tubes at the idler arms, both sides.  That went a whole
year until I caught it at my first annual (I mentioned this to this group back
at that time).  Obviously, the bearing press fit was sufficient for ailerons,
but had this been in the elevator mechanism, where loads are much higher, the
story could have ended differently.

And, I've had just plain good luck:  three deer were crossing the runway at
dusk and I didn't see them until they were in the landing lights.  Luckily (!)
I had enough speed in the flare left to balloon over them as I poured on the
power.  I hit one with my left inboard gear door (it was that close).  Had I
already set the wheels down, it would have been all over, with an 80 mph
impact.  I have not the slightest doubt of what that outcome would have been.
I remember strangely realizing that my brain was not processing the image of
the deer very quickly and that it felt like a few seconds before my hand
instinctively pulled back on the stick only after I realized danger.  At a
moment like this, all you have is instinct, reflex, whatever, that hopefully
has been instilled by training.  And then you hope it's good enough (mine
almost wasn't).  And luck helps too.

Back to prevention:  personally, I've never taped over any part of the pitot
static system for any reason (washing, bugs, etc.) nor do I see a reason too.
The pitot tube has a drain, the static ports drain themselves due to the
interior tube routing and there's a catch bottle at the low spot.  If you
don't cover it in the first place, you don't have to worry about removing the
tape, figuring out multiple data sources on takeoff, etc.  Ron, in his last
message, listed a number of things he could have done differently.  In his
defense, I don't agree with most of them.  I think his only shot was to abort
instinctively when his glance at the airspeed indicator told his brain
"what?".  After that, there is just not enough bandwidth in the normal pilot's
mind to process much more complexity in so short a time.  We all know the
partial panel statistics, obviously much harder in real life than in the
classroom.  Same here.  I won't second guess Ron, he had confusing data.  But
one take-away here is that if something doesn't feel right, chop the power
right now, while you can, and sort it out.

Back to the gear switch.  I too installed a squat system, the "gear minder"
that Lancair was selling a few years ago.  Unfortunately, it failed a few
times for unknown reasons, preventing me from putting my gear up.  Most
disconcertingly, it sometimes would tell me to "put your gear up", while I'm
taxiing at 10 knots (!)  Consequently, I disconnected the intervention feature
and left the aural warnings on (yes, even the occasional false raise-your-gear
commands that get a passenger chuckle).  Humor aside, I don't feel good about
not having a safety backup on that gear switch.  I live with it for now.

There are clearly risks associated with our endeavor of building and flying
our own machines.  The statistics have, and will continue to bear this out.
But forums like this, where we can share with each other our mistakes, so that
others can learn from them and perhaps not repeat them, do immeasurable good
toward making our sport safer.   Those of you that have had bloopers but don't
share them, could do more (you don't have to incriminate yourself if you don't
want to).

Thank you Ron for telling us your story and to Marv for your work over these
years.

Best Regards,
Ed de Chazal, 361DC