Return-Path: Received: from rtp-iport-1.cisco.com ([64.102.122.148] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 4.3c2) with ESMTP id 769942 for flyrotary@lancaironline.net; Fri, 04 Mar 2005 10:12:34 -0500 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=64.102.122.148; envelope-from=echristl@cisco.com Received: from rtp-core-1.cisco.com (64.102.124.12) by rtp-iport-1.cisco.com with ESMTP; 04 Mar 2005 10:27:13 -0500 X-BrightmailFiltered: true X-Brightmail-Tracker: AAAAAA== X-IronPort-AV: i="3.90,135,1107752400"; d="scan'208"; a="39274279:sNHT19032574" Received: from [172.18.179.180] (echristl-linux.cisco.com [172.18.179.180]) by rtp-core-1.cisco.com (8.12.10/8.12.6) with ESMTP id j24FBl1j029751 for ; Fri, 4 Mar 2005 10:11:47 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <42287AB3.4070208@cisco.com> Date: Fri, 04 Mar 2005 10:11:47 -0500 From: Ernest Christley User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.7.3) Gecko/20040929 X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Rotary motors in aircraft Subject: Re: [FlyRotary] Re: fuel cutoff valve necessary? References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit rijakits wrote: > If you get distracted and fumble around in an emergency for the > fuel shut off you are way behind on your emergency procedure > practise anyway! That should be one of those items in your flying > career that should go automatic even if you are in a coma! > > If you don't use the fuel shut off regularly you still should be > able to get at it and actuate it blind/sleeping/dumbfounded/etc.!! > Extra training is NOT and will NEVER be an answer to poor ergonomic system design. Adding valves and switches should only happen if they actually increase safety, not to guard against a possible 'something might happen'. If there is a benefit to a pilot controlled shutoff valve (vs. the mechanic controlled one) that is not obtained by cutting the power to the pump, then I'm all ears. Otherwise, it appears that a cutoff valve is an additional piece of complexity that reduces safety by introducing additional failure modes and becoming a distraction (albeit, a small one) in an emergency. "You should be able to do *XXX* while in a coma" is obviated by "there is no *XXX* to do".