X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 11:57:30 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from vms173017pub.verizon.net ([206.46.173.17] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 6.0.9e) with ESMTP id 7100567 for lml@lancaironline.net; Sun, 17 Aug 2014 11:32:41 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=206.46.173.17; envelope-from=bbradburry@verizon.net Received: from Desktop ([unknown] [173.57.170.65]) by vms173017.mailsrvcs.net (Sun Java(tm) System Messaging Server 7u2-7.02 32bit (built Apr 16 2009)) with ESMTPA id <0NAG008MYJ5DP020@vms173017.mailsrvcs.net> for lml@lancaironline.net; Sun, 17 Aug 2014 10:32:02 -0500 (CDT) From: "Bill Bradburry" X-Original-To: "'Lancair Mailing List'" References: In-reply-to: Subject: RE: [LML] Re: TRAIN OR DIE here it is again, again X-Original-Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 10:32:08 -0500 X-Original-Message-id: <8E9E308BAB274923B4288D4B312CB474@Desktop> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_000C_01CFBA06.7F8DC000" X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook 11 Thread-index: Ac+6FoMv2J5lRgt1S1KxFLrVrYzwYQAGZaew X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.0.6002.18463 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_000C_01CFBA06.7F8DC000 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit The way it reads the corrosion in the fuel control unit caused a fuel starvation? It appears that it had already happened at least two times previously but was intermittent and he never found the cause. _____ From: Lancair Mailing List [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of Chris Zavatston Sent: Sunday, August 17, 2014 7:25 AM To: Lancair Mailing List Subject: [LML] Re: TRAIN OR DIE here it is again, again Any word on what caused the sudden loss of torque? Chris Sent from my spiffy iPhone On Aug 16, 2014, at 10:20 AM, PETER WILLIAMS wrote: hi there NTSB REPORT ON A 2012 FATAL ACCIDENT IN A 4P TURBINE A factual report on the Feb. 3, 2012, crash that killed Micron Technology CEO Steve Appleton released Aug. 12 by the NTSB sheds new light on the circumstances, though a determination of probable cause may still be months away. Investigators found no evidence of a mechanical failure that would have precluded normal operation, though there was significant corrosion in the fuel control unit; NTSB investigators note that Appleton, who purchased the aircraft from a previous owner less than two months before the crash, was relatively unfamiliar with the complex systems of an aircraft that Appleton himself described as "squirrely." While insurers required Lancair-specific training at the time, there is no evidence cited in the report that Appleton had sought such training. Appleton's Lancair IV-TP appears to have suffered a power loss shortly after a takeoff attempted minutes after a rejected takeoff; witnesses saw it pitch steeply and crash seconds after liftoff. AN ATP WILL NOT KEEP YOU SAFE IN A LANCAIR - if you have not had proper training Appleton held an airline transport pilot certificate with category ratings for multiengine land, multiengine sea, and single-engine land airplanes, along with various type ratings, and had private pilot priviliges for single-engine seaplanes. He had logged more than 3,600 hours by the time he prepared for his final flight, though the NTSB report notes that flight data recovered from the aircraft indicates Appleton had logged less than 14 hours in the aircraft he bought from the previous owner in December 2011. Data recovered from the electronic flight information system, recording in detail the accident flight as well as previous flights, correlates to witness accounts and other evidence. Following a rejected takeoff, Appleton requested a departure clearance at Boise Air Terminal/Gowen Field in Boise, Idaho, shortly before 9 a.m., the report states. The EFIS data recorded a sharp drop in engine torque soon after liftoff, corresponding to the time Appleton notified the tower of his intention to turn back to the airport. During the last 16 seconds of the flight, which reached a maximum altitude of 325 feet above ground level, engine torque decreased to 14 percent-well below the normal operating range. A post-crash examination uncovered corrosion within the fuel control unit, WOULD YOU TURN BACK TO THE RUNWAY AT 300 FEET ABOVE THE AIRPORT? -IN A LANCAIR 4/4P/4PT though the report notes that while "numerous parts could not be examined due to the condition of the unit (corroded) precluding their removal," there was "no evidence of pre impact mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation." Investigators interviewed experts including an engineer formerly employed by Lancair, who said the aircraft (modified to accommodate a turboprop engine) had a dramatically higher wing loading than the original piston model, in the range of 40 to 45 pounds per square foot. The turboprop modifications exacerbated the aircraft's "already-existing aggressive stall characteristics," making the Lancair IV-TP a "challenging airplane to fly, which without adequate training, makes it a dangerous airplane because it was not designed for such a high-horsepower engine." A company pilot who had flown with Appleton in the accident aircraft told NTSB investigators that Appleton was "unfamiliar with the panel, which made the airplane even more challenging." UNFAMILIAR WITH THE PANEL? The former Lancair engineer told investigators that a pilot has very little time to react to a power reduction during or immediately after takeoff: Without an abrupt pitch correction (to reduce the angle of attack), the airplane would become "unrecoverable" within 5 seconds after a power loss during the initial climb. The engineer opined that the aircraft would stall at more than 80 knots indicated, with a tendency to drop a wing, and told investigators that he advises pilots to use a decision altitude of 1,500 feet agl, landing straight-ahead in case of any power loss below that altitude. The data, along with witness accounts and radio transcripts, shows Appleton attempted to turn back. Appleton's death drew significant media attention, and some questioned whether key corporate employees should fly general aviation aircraft. AOPA Foundation President Bruce Landsberg noted, days after the accident, that the Lancair has a heavily loaded wing, and higher stall speed than comparable certificated aircraft. "Does this make Lancairs bad aircraft? Not in my view. But before flying one pilots must understand the nature of the animal they're dealing with," Landsberg wrote . hi there, again you know, the MU2 had a high rate of accidents attributed to the high wing loading and different flight attributes. did not make it a bad airplane; just a plane that needed a properly trained pilot. Likewise the Lancair 4 series. (the MU2 autopilot problem is another story; another time) a sad loss of a good person and a good airplane peter ------=_NextPart_000_000C_01CFBA06.7F8DC000 Content-Type: text/html; charset="US-ASCII" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

The way it reads the corrosion in = the fuel control unit caused a fuel starvation?  It appears that it had = already happened at least two times previously but was intermittent and he never found = the cause.

 

From: = Lancair Mailing List = [mailto:lml@lancaironline.net] On Behalf Of Chris Zavatston
Sent: Sunday, August 17, = 2014 7:25 AM
To: Lancair Mailing List
Subject: [LML] Re: TRAIN = OR DIE here it is again, again

 

Any word on what caused the sudden loss of = torque?

Chris

Sent from my spiffy iPhone


On Aug 16, 2014, at 10:20 AM, PETER WILLIAMS <peterpawaviation@hotmail.com= > wrote:

hi there

NTSB REPORT ON A 2012 FATAL ACCIDENT IN A 4P = TURBINE

A factual report on the Feb. 3, 2012, crash that = killed Micron Technology CEO Steve Appleton released Aug. 12 by the NTSB sheds = new light on the circumstances, though a determination of probable cause may = still be months away.

Investigators found no = evidence of a mechanical failure that would have precluded normal operation, though = there was significant corrosion in the fuel control unit; NTSB = investigators note that Appleton, who purchased the aircraft from a previous owner less = than two months before the crash, was relatively unfamiliar with the complex = systems of an aircraft that Appleton himself described as "squirrely." = While insurers required Lancair-specific training at the time, there is no = evidence cited in the report that Appleton had sought such training.

Appleton’s Lancair IV-TP appears to have suffered a power loss shortly after a takeoff attempted minutes after a rejected takeoff; witnesses saw = it pitch steeply and crash seconds after liftoff.


AN ATP WILL NOT KEEP YOU SAFE IN A = LANCAIR - if you have not had proper = training

Appleton held an airline transport pilot certificate with category ratings for multiengine land, multiengine sea, and single-engine land airplanes, = along with various type ratings, and had private pilot priviliges for single-engine seaplanes. He had logged more than 3,600 hours by the time he prepared = for his final flight, though the NTSB report notes that flight data recovered = from the aircraft indicates Appleton<= span style=3D'font-weight:bold'> had logged less than 14 hours in the = aircraft he bought from the previous owner in December 2011.

 

Data recovered from the electronic flight information system, recording in detail the accident = flight as well as previous flights, correlates to witness accounts = and other evidence. Following a rejected takeoff, Appleton requested a departure clearance at Boise Air Terminal/Gowen Field in Boise, Idaho, shortly before 9 = a.m., the report states. The EFIS data recorded a sharp drop in engine torque soon = after liftoff, corresponding to the time Appleton notified the tower of his intention to turn back to the airport. During = the last 16 seconds of the flight, which reached a maximum altitude of 325 = feet above ground level, engine torque decreased to 14 percent—well = below the normal operating range. A post-crash examination uncovered corrosion within the = fuel control unit,

WOULD YOU = TURN BACK TO THE RUNWAY AT 300 FEET ABOVE THE AIRPORT? -IN A LANCAIR = 4/4P/4PT

though the report notes that = while “numerous parts could not be examined due to the condition of the = unit (corroded) precluding their removal,” there was “no evidence = of pre impact mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal = operation.”

Investigators interviewed = experts including an engineer formerly employed by Lancair, who said the = aircraft (modified to accommodate a turboprop engine) had a dramatically higher = wing loading than the original piston model, in the range of 40 to 45 pounds = per square foot. The turboprop modifications exacerbated the = aircraft’s “already-existing aggressive stall characteristics,” making = the Lancair IV-TP a “challenging airplane to fly, which without adequate training, makes it a dangerous = airplane because it was not designed for such a high-horsepower = engine.”

A company pilot who had = flown with Appleton in the accident aircraft told NTSB = investigators that Appleton was “unfamiliar with the panel, which made the airplane even more = challenging.”

UNFAMILIAR = WITH THE PANEL?

The former Lancair engineer = told investigators that a pilot has very little time to react to a power = reduction during or immediately after takeoff: Without an abrupt pitch correction = (to reduce the angle of attack), the airplane would become = “unrecoverable” within 5 seconds after a power loss during the initial climb. The engineer opined = that the aircraft would stall at more than 80 knots indicated, with a = tendency to drop a wing, and told investigators that he advises pilots to use a = decision altitude of 1,500 feet agl, landing straight-ahead in case of any power = loss below that altitude.

The data, along with witness = accounts and radio transcripts, shows Appleton attempted to turn back.

Appleton’s death drew significant media attention, and some questioned whether key corporate employees = should fly general aviation aircraft. AOPA Foundation President Bruce Landsberg = noted, days after the accident, that the Lancair has a heavily loaded wing, and = higher stall speed than comparable certificated aircraft.

“Does this make Lancairs bad = aircraft? Not in my view. But before flying one pilots must understand the nature of the = animal they’re dealing with,” Landsberg wrote.

 

hi there, = again

you know, the = MU2 had a high rate of accidents attributed to the high wing loading and different = flight attributes. did not make it a bad airplane; just a plane that needed a = properly trained pilot. Likewise the Lancair 4 = series.

(the MU2 = autopilot problem is another story; another time)

 

a sad loss of = a good person and a good airplane

 

peter

 

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