X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2014 08:25:10 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from nm19-vm0.bullet.mail.bf1.yahoo.com ([98.139.213.162] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 6.0.9e) with ESMTPS id 7100139 for lml@lancaironline.net; Sat, 16 Aug 2014 21:31:35 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=98.139.213.162; envelope-from=chris_zavatson@yahoo.com DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=s2048; d=yahoo.com; b=DbBmZSLb16tCmGwSAuNf0lPtN3yfcG4VgquI5JeUaL5+ZXS1HVhe76CG8d4UsNjt/KDYSkTTe8Bl71GNVgJJEwG3hbEGg/M/vbXY4qNPkUT76dFGkvfhH0o0M5CyjFwXaNXG7c154NBP5EoDi8lM1IJs1AclfNQAascTdxGfJacVm124BM54XDvbwD216MwmHh6VwBeF2X7vkDfVVGKgiH5Iah0uHV6jniZz2DfrDnQUU2WqCuip2PF7qO/ZE+VqTlV7THqwFuTjz/mwNdQeizO9jebUaxQT6Zgjtr02bLcgyrgXqXeADUZz1osPcuaMhi8mFnDOJwchEMxWP5JA8g==; Received: from [66.196.81.171] by nm19.bullet.mail.bf1.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 17 Aug 2014 01:31:01 -0000 Received: from [68.142.230.78] by tm17.bullet.mail.bf1.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 17 Aug 2014 01:31:00 -0000 Received: from [127.0.0.1] by smtp235.mail.bf1.yahoo.com with NNFMP; 17 Aug 2014 01:31:00 -0000 X-Yahoo-Newman-Id: 893766.18374.bm@smtp235.mail.bf1.yahoo.com X-Yahoo-Newman-Property: ymail-3 X-YMail-OSG: yMQKeR0VM1kTsSilCErWBeOPr20vi2xHJte6d_AWuKSpcvQ tZQOhS0qBL2ZKH4VNvAJP6CqIlVt8jWbudE7hfhjPtYmHXrOCL9gTI5PgXMR zKPr6H6pj9RsD9tnuELHrSmY6Nbkn5ADe67T8gMXdTHHEBVJP4ZDPaUvaGrA sCT2Mlqwijr_QURbX7sDbwOfprELya.sCeIoYBd0HMHdgHRxJBzjj3NM9gxv 42tMjOINoYA1O6TNtIJ.xHy88zbq_qwy8J.1s62Zsi1IXqcBXuLrlByAdjm5 nQxp9WqSKD6uB5c4LdErEXzfaL3pahgj80_hUvfAcDfA06SXXcH0f4Ej5cko 23OV1JZ3EiN0zBMHkaVF.QLV4ipP4RYoUPBj47q_hyBKtMVuwBSwbp6AugCz dCwmfZXT9_H6Zep4o3ZH0rQ4LuAH4hro.ud1Az8FpGDc6AommSl6WWUc75ij G0zI4Lm7XVif0pmEJA3I9Bad6RVm.jz6ZdDGVK2zNrXqwcVVdTIK9_ir5bXc ojCdO_xE8smRD5X47sWQNPSuMWtI3YcHpZbCwnPPrVHXm9wZ1_9kP4px8wT_ A3R7uXsxH4aHvRJ18lwXlufcUrpM.Y3DXYjF.Z2Mz4BPC6OC7CFCBHnVKOCY NAz6eoAp_1iULKo5YO4G12m_Vvw8_NPE3HFboTN8GFyL3BrhPnhE5_AV_EaN bpxJK04TnL6wumJfL0SvFojmOfl5.eMZHb7m.jhZvFyra3SPgU.ORerYn1kb PYq5_nPY- X-Yahoo-SMTP: 076hgjCswBC.G6e0vm7vgvZ9JJ0zmeBo_Oyw Subject: Re: [LML] TRAIN OR DIE here it is again, again References: From: Chris Zavatston Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-29FF96EC-3CDA-4E5B-B3BF-7AE29EE3B0CE X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (9A405) In-Reply-To: X-Original-Message-Id: <055FFE98-2B8E-45D8-9A2E-F68D1AA89AC9@yahoo.com> X-Original-Date: Sat, 16 Aug 2014 18:30:55 -0700 X-Original-To: Lancair Mailing List Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) --Apple-Mail-29FF96EC-3CDA-4E5B-B3BF-7AE29EE3B0CE Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Any word on what caused the sudden loss of torque? Chris Sent from my spiffy iPhone On Aug 16, 2014, at 10:20 AM, PETER WILLIAMS w= rote: > hi there >=20 > NTSB REPORT ON A 2012 FATAL ACCIDENT IN A 4P TURBINE >=20 >=20 > A factual report on the Feb. 3, 2012, crash that killed Micron Technology C= EO Steve Appleton released Aug. 12 by the NTSB sheds new light on the circum= stances, though a determination of probable cause may still be months away. >=20 > Investigators found no evidence of a mechanical failure that would have pr= ecluded normal operation, though there was significant corrosion in the fuel= control unit; NTSB investigators note that Appleton, who purchased the airc= raft from a previous owner less than two months before the crash, was relati= vely unfamiliar with the complex systems of an aircraft that Appleton himsel= f described as "squirrely." While insurers required Lancair-specific trainin= g at the time, there is no evidence cited in the report that Appleton had so= ught such training. >=20 > Appleton=E2=80=99s Lancair IV-TP appears to have suffered a power loss sho= rtly after a takeoff attempted minutes after a rejected takeoff; witnesses s= aw it pitch steeply and crash seconds after liftoff. >=20 >=20 > AN ATP WILL NOT KEEP YOU SAFE IN A LANCAIR - if you have not had proper tr= aining >=20 > Appleton held an airline transport pilot certificate with category ratings= for multiengine land, multiengine sea, and single-engine land airplanes, al= ong with various type ratings, and had private pilot priviliges for single-e= ngine seaplanes. He had logged more than 3,600 hours by the time he prepared= for his final flight, though the NTSB report notes that flight data recover= ed from the aircraft indicates Appleton had logged less than 14 hours in the= aircraft he bought from the previous owner in December 2011. >=20 >=20 >=20 > Data recovered from the electronic flight information system, recording in= detail the accident flight as well as previous flights, correlates to witne= ss accounts and other evidence. Following a rejected takeoff, Appleton reque= sted a departure clearance at Boise Air Terminal/Gowen Field in Boise, Idaho= , shortly before 9 a.m., the report states. The EFIS data recorded a sharp d= rop in engine torque soon after liftoff, corresponding to the time Appleton n= otified the tower of his intention to turn back to the airport. During the l= ast 16 seconds of the flight, which reached a maximum altitude of 325 feet a= bove ground level, engine torque decreased to 14 percent=E2=80=94well below t= he normal operating range. A post-crash examination uncovered corrosion with= in the fuel control unit,=20 >=20 > WOULD YOU TURN BACK TO THE RUNWAY AT 300 FEET ABOVE THE AIRPORT? -IN A LAN= CAIR 4/4P/4PT >=20 > though the report notes that while =E2=80=9Cnumerous parts could not be ex= amined due to the condition of the unit (corroded) precluding their removal,= =E2=80=9D there was =E2=80=9Cno evidence of pre impact mechanical malfunctio= n or failure that would have precluded normal operation.=E2=80=9D >=20 > Investigators interviewed experts including an engineer formerly employed b= y Lancair, who said the aircraft (modified to accommodate a turboprop engine= ) had a dramatically higher wing loading than the original piston model, in t= he range of 40 to 45 pounds per square foot. The turboprop modifications exa= cerbated the aircraft=E2=80=99s =E2=80=9Calready-existing aggressive stall c= haracteristics,=E2=80=9D making the Lancair IV-TP a =E2=80=9Cchallenging air= plane to fly, which without adequate training, makes it a dangerous airplane= because it was not designed for such a high-horsepower engine.=E2=80=9D >=20 > A company pilot who had flown with Appleton in the accident aircraft told N= TSB investigators that Appleton was =E2=80=9Cunfamiliar with the panel, whic= h made the airplane even more challenging.=E2=80=9D=20 >=20 > UNFAMILIAR WITH THE PANEL?=20 >=20 > The former Lancair engineer told investigators that a pilot has very littl= e time to react to a power reduction during or immediately after takeoff: Wi= thout an abrupt pitch correction (to reduce the angle of attack), the airpla= ne would become =E2=80=9Cunrecoverable=E2=80=9D within 5 seconds after a pow= er loss during the initial climb. The engineer opined that the aircraft woul= d stall at more than 80 knots indicated, with a tendency to drop a wing, and= told investigators that he advises pilots to use a decision altitude of 1,5= 00 feet agl, landing straight-ahead in case of any power loss below that alt= itude. >=20 > The data, along with witness accounts and radio transcripts, shows Appleto= n attempted to turn back. >=20 > Appleton=E2=80=99s death drew significant media attention, and some questi= oned whether key corporate employees should fly general aviation aircraft. A= OPA Foundation President Bruce Landsberg noted, days after the accident, tha= t the Lancair has a heavily loaded wing, and higher stall speed than compara= ble certificated aircraft. >=20 > =E2=80=9CDoes this make Lancairs bad aircraft? Not in my view. But before f= lying one pilots must understand the nature of the animal they=E2=80=99re de= aling with,=E2=80=9D Landsberg wrote.=20 >=20 >=20 >=20 > hi there, again >=20 > you know, the MU2 had a high rate of accidents attributed to the high wing= loading and different flight attributes. did not make it a bad airplane; ju= st a plane that needed a properly trained pilot. Likewise the Lancair 4 seri= es. >=20 > (the MU2 autopilot problem is another story; another time) >=20 >=20 >=20 > a sad loss of a good person and a good airplane >=20 >=20 >=20 > peter >=20 >=20 --Apple-Mail-29FF96EC-3CDA-4E5B-B3BF-7AE29EE3B0CE Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Any word on what caused th= e sudden loss of torque?
Chris

Sent from my spiffy iPhone

On Aug 16, 2014, at 10:20 AM, PETER WILLIAMS <peterpawaviation@hotmail.com> wrote= :

hi there

NTSB REPORT ON A 2012 FATAL ACCIDENT IN A= 4P TURBINE



factual report on the Feb. 3, 2012, crash that killed Micron Technology CEO Steve=20 Appleton released Aug. 12 by the NTSB sheds new light on the=20 circumstances, though a determination of probable cause may still be=20 months away.

Investigators found no evidence of a=20 mechanical failure that would have precluded normal operation, though=20 there was significant corrosion in the fuel control unit; NTSB=20 investigators note that Appleton, who purchased the aircraft from a=20 previous owner less than two months before the crash, was relatively=20 unfamiliar with the complex systems of an aircraft that Appleton himself described as "squirrely." While insurers required Lancair-specific=20 training at the time, there is no evidence cited in the report that=20 Appleton had sought such training.

Appleton=E2=80=99s Lancair IV-TP appears to h= ave=20 suffered a power loss shortly after a takeoff attempted minutes after a= =20 rejected takeoff; witnesses saw it pitch steeply and crash seconds after liftoff.

=20
=09 =09
=09
=09
AN ATP WILL NOT KEEP YOU SAFE IN A LANCAIR - if you have not had prop= er training

=09
=20
=09 =09 =09 =09 =09
=20

Appleton held a= n airline transport=20 pilot certificate with category ratings for multiengine land,=20 multiengine sea, and single-engine land airplanes, along with various=20 type ratings, and had private pilot priviliges for single-engine=20 seaplanes. He had logged more than 3,600 hours by the time he prepared=20 for his final flight, though the NTSB report notes that flight data=20 recovered from the aircraft indicates Appleton had logged less than 14=20= hours in the aircraft he bought from the previous owner in December=20 2011.


Data=  recovered from the electronic flight=20 information system, recording in detail the accident flight as well as=20 previous flights, correlates to witness accounts and other evidenc= e.=20 Following a rejected takeoff, Appleton requested a departure clearance=20 at Bois= e Air Terminal/Gowen Field in Boise, Idaho, shortly before 9 a.m., the report states. The EFIS=20 data recorded a sharp drop in engine torque soon after liftoff,=20 corresponding to the time Appleton notified the tower of his intention=20 to turn back to the airport. During the last 16 seconds of the flight,=20 which reached a maximum altitude of 325 feet above ground level, engine=20 torque decreased to 14 percent=E2=80=94well below the normal operating range= . A=20 post-crash examination uncovered corrosion within the fuel control unit,

WOULD YOU TURN BACK TO THE RUNWAY AT= 300 FEET ABOVE THE AIRPORT? -IN A LANCAIR 4/4P/4PT

though the report notes that while =E2=80=9Cnumerous part= s could not be=20 examined due to the condition of the unit (corroded) precluding their=20 removal,=E2=80=9D there was =E2=80=9Cno evidence of pre impact mechanical ma= lfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation.=E2=80=9D

Investigators interviewed experts=20 including an engineer formerly employed by Lancair, who said the=20 aircraft (modified to accommodate a turboprop engine) had a dramatically higher wing loading than the original piston model, in the range of 40=20 to 45 pounds per square foot. The turboprop modifications exacerba= ted=20 the aircraft=E2=80=99s =E2=80=9Calready-existing aggressive stall characteri= stics,=E2=80=9D=20 making the Lancair IV-TP a =E2=80=9Cchallenging airplane to fly, which= without=20 adequate training, makes it a dangerous airplane because it was not=20 designed for such a high-horsepower engine.=E2=80=9D

A company pilot who had flown with=20 Appleton in the accident aircraft told NTSB investigators that Appleton= =20 was =E2=80=9Cunfamiliar with the panel, which made the airplane even more=20= challenging.=E2=80=9D

UNFAMILIAR W= ITH THE PANEL?

The former Lancair engineer told=20 investigators that a pilot has very little time to react to a power=20 reduction during or immediately after takeoff: Without an abrupt pitch=20 correction (to reduce the angle of attack), the airplane would become=20 =E2=80=9Cunrecoverable=E2=80=9D within 5 seconds after a power loss during t= he initial=20 climb. The engineer opined that the aircraft would stall at more than 80 knots indicated, with a tendency to drop a wing, and told investigators that he advises pilots to use a decision altitude of 1,500 feet agl,=20 landing straight-ahead in case of any power loss below that altitude.

The data, along with witness accounts and ra= dio transcripts, shows Appleton attempted to turn back.

Appleton=E2=80=99s death drew significant media attention, and some questioned whether key corporate employees should fly general=20 aviation aircraft. AOPA Foundation President Bruce Landsberg noted, days after the accident, that the Lancair has a heavily loaded wing, and=20 higher stall speed than comparable certificated aircraft.

=E2=80= =9CDoes this make Lancairs bad aircraft? Not in my view. But before flying one pilots must understand the nature of=20 the animal they=E2=80=99re dealing with,=E2=80=9D Landsberg wrote.


hi there, again

you know, the MU2 had a high rate of accidents at= tributed to the high wing loading and different flight attributes. did not m= ake it a bad airplane; just a plane that needed a properly trained pilot. Li= kewise the Lancair 4 series.

<= font style=3D"" color=3D"#2672EC">(the MU2 autopilot problem is another stor= y; another time)


a sad loss of a good person and a good airplane<= /p>


= peter


= --Apple-Mail-29FF96EC-3CDA-4E5B-B3BF-7AE29EE3B0CE--