X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Sender: To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Wed, 09 Jan 2013 11:01:32 -0500 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from mail-ye0-f176.google.com ([209.85.213.176] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 6.0.1) with ESMTPS id 6002651 for lml@lancaironline.net; Wed, 09 Jan 2013 09:44:44 -0500 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=209.85.213.176; envelope-from=pjdmiller@gmail.com Received: by mail-ye0-f176.google.com with SMTP id m1so335237yen.21 for ; Wed, 09 Jan 2013 06:44:11 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 10.236.145.38 with SMTP id o26mr75745299yhj.89.1357742651096; Wed, 09 Jan 2013 06:44:11 -0800 (PST) X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from [192.168.1.137] ([68.202.59.203]) by mx.google.com with ESMTPS id q4sm66389014anp.18.2013.01.09.06.44.09 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=OTHER); Wed, 09 Jan 2013 06:44:09 -0800 (PST) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.2 \(1499\)) Subject: Re: [LML] lml Stalls From: Paul Miller In-Reply-To: X-Original-Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2013 09:44:05 -0500 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Original-Message-Id: References: X-Original-To: "Lancair Mailing List" X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1499) I find the most interesting part of this discussion is the risk of loss = of control at low altitudes and how that is basically unrecoverable. And = that's what HPAT reinforces each time I attend with the Legacy so we are = taught to stay away from that regime. 120K minimum unless we're on = final to land. Easy to do here. In our certified TBM 700 aircraft during training, we regularly stall in = both power on/off modes with sharp differences between the two but they = are manageable at all times. The SIMCOM sim does not simulate stalls = and they are not performed in the sim. The TBM has aft bottom strakes = that I understand are to help with stability in that regime. They only = come into play at higher angles of attack. Does stall training help safety? Not sure, because many of the TBM = accidents I'm familiar with are low speed, low altitude approaches to = landing. The TBM has no AOA device. If you reduce power on the = turbine too far the airspeed deceleration rate is so high that by the = time the stall warning horn annunciates you can be at stall speed or = worse. Then, the pilot applies panic power which causes the left wing = to roll down and stall further. That seems to be the marker of many of = these incidents. So, while stall [and spin] training may be useful, does it really help = as much as perhaps training to use devices (such as AOA) that would = prevent getting into that spot in the first place? Devices on the EFIS = that predict deceleration rates and prevent entry into that regime. = Autopilots that prevent stalling speeds and so forth. Single pilot ops = should have all the bells and whistles and it shouldn't be seen as any = reduction of a person's abilities to use them. Paul Legacy Spruce Creek