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Date: Tue, 04 Oct 2005 10:28:14 -0400
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From: "Robert R Pastusek" <rpastusek@htii.com>
Subject: RE: [LML] Re: Technology and the Airbus
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John Halle wrote:
... "Boeing will never say this officially but the statistics show that,
while the average airline pilot makes a fatal landing error every 100,000
landings, a modern autoland system will malfunction only once every
1,000,000 landings.  It follows that the less the pilots have to do with the
landing, the safer the airplane is."

We went through a similar "learning experience" many years ago with the
automatic terrain following system in the F-111 series of aircraft. These
systems were by no means as reliable as the above autoland systems, but
still proved to be much better than "hand flying" at low altitude,
especially at night and/or in weather.

The F-111's auto-TFR system could be configured to operate in a "hands-off"
mode that allowed the pilot to monitor and take control almost instantly if
he (we didn't have any she's in those days) chose to do so, or to set it up
to "monitor" the pilot, and take control of the aircraft (specifically to go
into an automatic "fly up" mode) when the system sensed certain out of
parameter conditions. The latter mode proved almost useless--most pilots
could "fly through" the warnings and auto-flyups easily, and some did so to
their demise. The system and operating proceedure that proved far and away
the more safe and reliable was to operate the TFR in its automatic mode
(200'AGL at 750 KTS, day/night/in weather were the ultimate system limits;
operational limits were a bit higher/slower for training), with the crew
monitoring all systems for malfunctions or other problems. This eventually
became our standard operating proceedure. I served on the accident board for
two crews that tried to re-establish the "hand flying is better" paradigm,
and the detailed accident analysis convinced me that good "automatic" flight
systems, monitored by an alert and KNOWLEDGEABLE crew was the best possible
use of both resources.

As an aside, I'll volunteer an interesting "war story" from that period. We
occasionally experienced "auto fly-ups" during night low level training in
New Mexico and Arizona--for no discernable reason. These were always
"attention getting" events, requiring a formal incident report and an
occasional clean up of the seat cushion. We had no similar incidents during
the day time, and this gave the problem a special significance--most crew
members didn't find flying around at 500 Kts below 1000' at night their most
enjoyable time anyway... It wasn't until we started working with the "new"
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in the mid '70's that
they helped us sort out the problem. Seems there were braver flyers than we
out in the NM/AZ badlands at night, low level, without lights, and without
our TFR systems. The AWACS's "look down" doppler radar could see them and
advise us. Even with "heads up" calls from AWACS, I never saw one of them,
but we must have really scared the --- out of even these brave souls. Can
you imagine flying into the jet wash of an F-111 around 400-500'AGL and
moving at 500 KTS--at night? ...but I never got the chance to ask one of
them what it felt like...to my knowledge, on one ever filed a near-miss
report...

Bob Pastusek