I am sure you have all read my epistle
yesterday when I was still in shock.
Last night, needless to say, I did not have
the blessing of being able to sleep. I spent the night reviewing all the
situations, and wish to pass along some items for all to learn by.
When my Legacy was first finished and
brought to this field, I felt uncomfortable. I shared my thoughts with many
wise pilots, listened to their advice, got my angle of attack working, and
began to practice until I was, finally, more than comfortable in my
environment. (As long as everything was working well!) Peter
Stiles did an accelerate/stop distance for me,
and at 3000 feet density altitude, the total distance to accelerate to rotate speed
and stop was less than ½ of my runway distance. So far so good.
Let me share the runway data: 2600 feet
long at 1000 feet above sea level, newly surfaced asphalt, so far so good. Width
24 feet, not so good. Hump in the middle, (can’t see one end from the
other when on the ground), not so bad, but not real good. Runway is 12/30,
surrounded almost completely by the deep water of Table
Rock
Lake.
On the approach end of 30 there is a 400 foot AGL hill with a large Cell antennae
about 2500 feet from the approach end of 30. The other end has a hill 300 feet
AGL with a gradual rise starting almost immediately after lift off, top of hill
is about 1000’ from end of runway. All terrain in the vicinity has a
profuse stand of large old mature Oak Trees. There is no emergency field
anywhere near the airport, and neither runway has any significant over-run.
As I said, I finally felt more than comfortable,
but the nagging thought was that I needed to “be on my toes” at all
times. Unless I put it “on the numbers” on landing, I went around.
All take-offs were completely uneventful until yesterday.
Now for the list of things I SHOULD have done or considered.
# 1 I should have used a written list on
pre-flight (I know, that for most of us, that sounds silly, but for me this
would have saved my airplane) I missed looking adequately at the pitot tube.
# 2 At the first hint of airspeed
problems, I should have aborted. I should not have looked outside with the thought
of continuing, only to abort. When I saw the airspeed begin to accelerate once
again, I should have already been aborting.
# 3 I should have remembered the fact that
I had taped up the pitot tube, but can honestly say that until I came to rest,
I never even thought of that. As the unusual situation became an item, I let
the runway environment and stress get the best of me. Once again, this would
have saved my airplane.
# 3 I should have paid proper attention to
the perceived rate of speed instead of judging only by my airspeed and angle of
attack oral warning.
# 4 I could have easily glanced at my
MX-20 and read the correct ground speed. Really quite large numbers, and
readily there for me to cross check.
# 5 I should have had a better working
knowledge of my angle of attack (Jim Frantz PRO model). I should have known that
I would get a “warning” with pitot blockage. I “knew” the
angle of attack had a pitot and static input, because I physically hooked up
the tubing myself, even removed the unit and sent it in for repair once, and
re-installed it. I did not have a satisfactory working knowledge that the
angle of attack would give me a warning if the angle of attack was good, but
pitot was blocked. I did not take time to look at the angle of attack, only
used the oral warning as my decision maker that the airplane was not safe to
fly. I’m quite sure the angle of attack was and would have stayed in the
green had I referred only to the indicator and ignored the oral warning. Totally
my error in not fully understanding the system that would have, after I failed
to abort in item # 1 above, saved my airplane. I had plenty of speed to fly
safely, and I have had pitot failure both in the Navy and Airline after getting
airborne, so I know how to fly safely without pitot speed.
It all boils down to one simple fact. I
let the stress of a less than perfect runway cloud my mind and not allow for
proper and prudent judgment, plain and simple.
There was nothing wrong with the airplane
(other than pitot blockage), nothing wrong with the weather, nothing wrong with
the runway, and although I spent precious mini seconds analyzing engine
indications, I had more than adequate power. I suspect I will find something
inside the pitot tube, as I now believe that the prop wash, or initial airspeed
input either blew away the paper I taped over the tube as a precaution, or tore
it up and a small piece of paper lodged inside the tube. Otherwise, I would
have not had an airspeed indication at all, and would not have had any stress
in my decision to abort.
I sincerely hope at least one pilot learns something
from this sad loss. The only good news is that I am unhurt, and the bad news
is that I now can beat myself to pieces mentally by realizing all the things I “could”
have done to save my airplane (and the total embarrassment I am suffering,
which is almost as bad as losing N27RM). Even a relatively new student pilot should
not have made this many mistakes, all in the same day!
May I take a moment to caution all Lancair
pilots that you cannot see the pitot tube from the cockpit, and caution you to
take an extra measure to look inside the opening as well as uncover it on
pre-flight.
Regards,
Ron