Return-Path: Sender: (Marvin Kaye) To: lml@lancaironline.net Date: Sat, 20 Sep 2003 17:09:01 -0400 Message-ID: X-Original-Return-Path: Received: from mail.inter-linc.net ([12.10.101.4] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 4.1.3) with ESMTP id 2586887 for lml@lancaironline.net; Sat, 20 Sep 2003 11:23:33 -0400 Received: from s0026980490 (unverified [12.28.51.24]) by mail.inter-linc.net (Vircom SMTPRS 2.0.244) with ESMTP id ; Sat, 20 Sep 2003 10:21:30 -0500 From: "Ron and Marlene Brice" X-Original-To: "Lml" , "'Terry Flatebo'" , "'Rob Logan'" , "'Don Barnes'" Subject: Needless loss N27RM X-Original-Date: Sat, 20 Sep 2003 10:23:14 -0500 X-Original-Message-ID: <003601c37f8b$1da5c250$18331c0c@s0026980490> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0037_01C37F61.34CFBA50" X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook, Build 10.0.4510 Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0037_01C37F61.34CFBA50 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I am sure you have all read my epistle yesterday when I was still in = shock. =20 Last night, needless to say, I did not have the blessing of being able = to sleep. I spent the night reviewing all the situations, and wish to pass along some items for all to learn by. =20 When my Legacy was first finished and brought to this field, I felt uncomfortable. I shared my thoughts with many wise pilots, listened to their advice, got my angle of attack working, and began to practice = until I was, finally, more than comfortable in my environment. (As long as everything was working well!) Peter Stiles did an accelerate/stop = distance for me, and at 3000 feet density altitude, the total distance to = accelerate to rotate speed and stop was less than =BD of my runway distance. So = far so good. =20 Let me share the runway data: 2600 feet long at 1000 feet above sea level, newly surfaced asphalt, so far so good. Width 24 feet, not so = good. Hump in the middle, (can=92t see one end from the other when on the = ground), not so bad, but not real good. Runway is 12/30, surrounded almost completely by the deep water of Table Rock Lake. On the approach end of = 30 there is a 400 foot AGL hill with a large Cell antennae about 2500 feet = from the approach end of 30. The other end has a hill 300 feet AGL with a gradual rise starting almost immediately after lift off, top of hill is about 1000=92 from end of runway. All terrain in the vicinity has a = profuse stand of large old mature Oak Trees. There is no emergency field = anywhere near the airport, and neither runway has any significant over-run. =20 As I said, I finally felt more than comfortable, but the nagging thought = was that I needed to =93be on my toes=94 at all times. Unless I put it = =93on the numbers=94 on landing, I went around. All take-offs were completely uneventful until yesterday. =20 Now for the list of things I SHOULD have done or considered. =20 # 1 I should have used a written list on pre-flight (I know, that for = most of us, that sounds silly, but for me this would have saved my airplane) = I missed looking adequately at the pitot tube. =20 # 2 At the first hint of airspeed problems, I should have aborted. I should not have looked outside with the thought of continuing, only to abort. When I saw the airspeed begin to accelerate once again, I should have already been aborting. =20 =20 # 3 I should have remembered the fact that I had taped up the pitot = tube, but can honestly say that until I came to rest, I never even thought of that. As the unusual situation became an item, I let the runway = environment and stress get the best of me. Once again, this would have saved my airplane. =20 # 3 I should have paid proper attention to the perceived rate of speed instead of judging only by my airspeed and angle of attack oral warning. =20 # 4 I could have easily glanced at my MX-20 and read the correct ground speed. Really quite large numbers, and readily there for me to cross = check. =20 # 5 I should have had a better working knowledge of my angle of attack = (Jim Frantz PRO model). I should have known that I would get a =93warning=94 = with pitot blockage. I =93knew=94 the angle of attack had a pitot and static = input, because I physically hooked up the tubing myself, even removed the unit = and sent it in for repair once, and re-installed it. I did not have a satisfactory working knowledge that the angle of attack would give me a warning if the angle of attack was good, but pitot was blocked. I did = not take time to look at the angle of attack, only used the oral warning as = my decision maker that the airplane was not safe to fly. I=92m quite sure = the angle of attack was and would have stayed in the green had I referred = only to the indicator and ignored the oral warning. Totally my error in not fully understanding the system that would have, after I failed to abort = in item # 1 above, saved my airplane. I had plenty of speed to fly safely, = and I have had pitot failure both in the Navy and Airline after getting airborne, so I know how to fly safely without pitot speed. =20 It all boils down to one simple fact. I let the stress of a less than perfect runway cloud my mind and not allow for proper and prudent = judgment, plain and simple. =20 There was nothing wrong with the airplane (other than pitot blockage), nothing wrong with the weather, nothing wrong with the runway, and = although I spent precious mini seconds analyzing engine indications, I had more = than adequate power. I suspect I will find something inside the pitot tube, = as I now believe that the prop wash, or initial airspeed input either blew = away the paper I taped over the tube as a precaution, or tore it up and a = small piece of paper lodged inside the tube. Otherwise, I would have not had = an airspeed indication at all, and would not have had any stress in my decision to abort. =20 I sincerely hope at least one pilot learns something from this sad loss. The only good news is that I am unhurt, and the bad news is that I now = can beat myself to pieces mentally by realizing all the things I =93could=94 = have done to save my airplane (and the total embarrassment I am suffering, = which is almost as bad as losing N27RM). Even a relatively new student pilot should not have made this many mistakes, all in the same day! =20 May I take a moment to caution all Lancair pilots that you cannot see = the pitot tube from the cockpit, and caution you to take an extra measure to look inside the opening as well as uncover it on pre-flight. =20 Regards, =20 Ron =20 ------=_NextPart_000_0037_01C37F61.34CFBA50 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

I am sure you have all read my = epistle yesterday when I was still in shock.

 

Last night, needless to say, I did = not have the blessing of being able to sleep.=A0 I spent the night reviewing all = the situations, and wish to pass along some items for all to learn = by.

 

When my Legacy was first finished = and brought to this field, I felt uncomfortable.=A0 I shared my thoughts = with many wise pilots, listened to their advice, got my angle of attack working, = and began to practice until I was, finally, more than comfortable in my environment. (As long as everything was working well!)=A0 = Peter Stiles did an accelerate/stop distance for = me, and at 3000 feet density altitude, the total distance to accelerate to = rotate speed and stop was less than =BD of my runway distance.=A0 So far so = good.

 

Let me share the runway = data:=A0=A0=A0 2600 feet long at 1000 feet above sea level, newly surfaced asphalt, so far so = good.=A0 Width 24 feet, not so good.=A0 Hump in the middle, (can’t see one end = from the other when on the ground), not so bad, but not real good. =A0Runway is = 12/30, surrounded almost completely by the deep water of Table Rock Lake.=A0 On the approach end of 30 there is a 400 foot AGL hill with a large Cell = antennae about 2500 feet from the approach end of 30.=A0 The other end has a hill = 300 feet AGL with a gradual rise starting almost immediately after lift off, top = of hill is about 1000’ from end of runway.=A0 All terrain in the vicinity = has a profuse stand of large old mature Oak Trees.=A0 There is no emergency = field anywhere near the airport, and neither runway has any significant = over-run.

 

As I said, I finally felt more than = comfortable, but the nagging thought was that I needed to “be on my toes” = at all times. =A0Unless I put it “on the numbers” on landing, I = went around.=A0 All take-offs were completely uneventful until = yesterday.

 

Now for the list of things I = SHOULD have done or = considered.

 

# 1=A0 I should have used a written = list on pre-flight (I know, that for most of us, that sounds silly, but for me = this would have saved my airplane) I missed looking adequately at the pitot = tube.

 

# 2=A0 At the first hint of airspeed problems, I should have aborted.=A0 I should not have looked outside = with the thought of continuing, only to abort.=A0 When I saw the airspeed begin to = accelerate once again, I should have already been aborting.=A0

 

# 3=A0 I should have remembered the = fact that I had taped up the pitot tube, but can honestly say that until I came to = rest, I never even thought of that.=A0 As the unusual situation became an = item, I let the runway environment and stress get the best of me.=A0 Once again, = this would have saved my airplane.

 

# 3=A0 I should have paid proper = attention to the perceived rate of speed instead of judging only by my airspeed and = angle of attack oral warning.

 

# 4=A0 I could have easily glanced = at my MX-20 and read the correct ground speed.=A0 Really quite large numbers, = and readily there for me to cross check.

 

# 5=A0 I should have had a better = working knowledge of my angle of attack (Jim Frantz PRO model).=A0 I should have = known that I would get a “warning” with pitot blockage.=A0 I = “knew” the angle of attack had a pitot and static input, because I physically = hooked up the tubing myself, even removed the unit and sent it in for repair once, = and re-installed it.=A0 I did not have a satisfactory working knowledge that = the angle of attack would give me a warning if the angle of attack was good, = but pitot was blocked.=A0 I did not take time to look at the angle of = attack, only used the oral warning as my decision maker that the airplane was not = safe to fly.=A0 I’m quite sure the angle of attack was and would have = stayed in the green had I referred only to the indicator and ignored the oral = warning.=A0 Totally my error in not fully understanding the system that would have, after I = failed to abort in item # 1 above, saved my airplane.=A0 I had plenty of speed = to fly safely, and I have had pitot failure both in the Navy and Airline after = getting airborne, so I know how to fly safely without pitot = speed.

 

It all boils down to one simple = fact.=A0 I let the stress of a less than perfect runway cloud my mind and not allow = for proper and prudent judgment, plain and simple.

 

There was nothing wrong with the = airplane (other than pitot blockage), nothing wrong with the weather, nothing = wrong with the runway, and although I spent precious mini seconds analyzing engine indications, I had more than adequate power. =A0I suspect I will find = something inside the pitot tube, as I now believe that the prop wash, or initial = airspeed input either blew away the paper I taped over the tube as a precaution, = or tore it up and a small piece of paper lodged inside the tube.=A0 Otherwise, I = would have not had an airspeed indication at all,=A0 and would not have had = any stress in my decision to abort.

 

I sincerely hope at least one pilot = learns something from this sad loss.=A0 The only good news is that I am unhurt, and the = bad news is that I now can beat myself to pieces mentally by realizing all the = things I “could” have done to save my airplane (and the total embarrassment I am = suffering, which is almost as bad as losing N27RM).=A0 Even a relatively new = student pilot should not have made this many mistakes, all in the same day!

 

May I take a moment to caution all = Lancair pilots that you cannot see the pitot tube from the cockpit, and caution = you to take an extra measure to look inside the opening as well as uncover it = on pre-flight.

 

Regards,

 

Ron

 

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