X-Junk-Score: 0 [] X-KAS-Score: 0 [] From: "Stephen Izett stephen.izett@gmail.com" Received: from pmg.Logan.com ([207.170.160.161] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 6.4.0) with ESMTPS id 3771277 for flyrotary@lancaironline.net; Wed, 01 Jan 2025 03:43:49 -0500 Received: from pmg.Logan.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by pmg.Logan.com (Proxmox) with ESMTP id 2EA0D3102C for ; Wed, 1 Jan 2025 03:43:49 -0500 (EST) Received-SPF: pass (gmail.com ... _spf.google.com: Sender is authorized to use 'stephen.izett@gmail.com' in 'mfrom' identity (mechanism 'include:_netblocks.google.com' matched)) receiver=pmg.Logan.com; identity=mailfrom; envelope-from="stephen.izett@gmail.com"; helo=mail-pj1-f53.google.com; client-ip=209.85.216.53 Received: from mail-pj1-f53.google.com (mail-pj1-f53.google.com [209.85.216.53]) by pmg.Logan.com (Proxmox) with ESMTPS for ; Wed, 1 Jan 2025 03:43:48 -0500 (EST) Received: by mail-pj1-f53.google.com with SMTP id 98e67ed59e1d1-2f43d17b0e3so14651500a91.0 for ; Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:43:48 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20230601; t=1735721027; x=1736325827; darn=lancaironline.net; h=message-id:in-reply-to:to:references:date:subject:mime-version:from :from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=oxJrZVsCfFauaGRQOafcnmewYYE/RKhRxRqd5JBA1ac=; b=ZoXmyQFTkeO2G/sg/wwB1DZA1hk7/X2N7M4Lx+UpXy61tqhzs+BHfbN1t0lwCVlq+q fQ0YC2NwfnJXkzS92XzrcN5kpdsInsKLEVsVr5NrmcX/wkYqloD4lXZb/XzWn7JcvUZ4 wr/Jyi+Us2ITU8EvHWr4BA3iilLuyefDdWOfggM0IQvaVBVrvm/sDjFVRDiRO5Sd7496 iMttEzBgeFk16oNdJN+jn+lbOP7MAshXdz0+kf/kb4kIyJOV6WBNQa80BxMx6TEDx4TS 9uckwOsPBiZzqQF5+rhR663HGNgg2AMS5/vPPlH/f52p5CgzK4ovPaTnnKzS5WwjBzM0 kFYA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1735721027; x=1736325827; h=message-id:in-reply-to:to:references:date:subject:mime-version:from :x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=oxJrZVsCfFauaGRQOafcnmewYYE/RKhRxRqd5JBA1ac=; b=FoSVRPdwYL558BufyFOJdo3qFUelPjx2LPAUwni8bsSa2sxAnUUgUh0SW68iCBYrvP 3WOkbjgcgUkIxNlsIrXSfaKrUBUKAX/Xq5X+usXMyIo9W6gl4aplMlxl0RUbgPijm57x G/fIs6ELF5dgSxTRKGn8NL3nBNEgLzpppkPREnxaAO67xdF3yLrYsNdBvJcNCwWRHkwL rHgWAxHL62MZ6qWHeN9cglWQjdSNsb2MrSY6/lqVNrARmC73QE5q0bBOTcHUd2jJVZq8 qPba4kMc2GDTd/jFBfS15Umus8RkEgHnQsFNoNTbAvvHxXHliU/UhNLVv73BhZELZS41 sEmg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YzbBMsL0PrBxqmV30C0bnmCNwDYwec81g+tLs8f+M25hoUC+dHB C8EPUKTfZStBVPMqPnZoM8ONYtRtkIt0yBQ71olGA0f0HGP6m6Jps9Gl+g== X-Gm-Gg: ASbGncsNmMtHCVPBft7pIvAV14a5caoqWWjHOScOXoLv/YE8jtMXcILB+vVQIgHt3/A j2+qSZcSzFz9JDROHDPOSiV+Q9qmKpFM0wovCI6xR4GgITi84P4AvJtGknxzXpnq6wjV27RyMM1 DLqcChaqZ0FN3568TGSsA7TiCNCe/isxImEkUbb1RYYEJo/KCNPN08GruWcpIWt9rtUF2zz7Jcy okZ5JSnlw14VyKZSrmpgAf/wnm4IkRTVpjJHclt22I6XJ0jOjce/f4cuBttgYcvLTDcLEd6CrFG X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IGwwfWshXX6pMx46TEz1VaG9qSIQKxZc2zM8JWEQ7X1YZJ5bqCs9z2EqpicMDz13d4aom5S5A== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6a00:44c4:b0:725:ffe:4dae with SMTP id d2e1a72fcca58-72abdd8d672mr58734715b3a.10.1735721026614; Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:43:46 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtpclient.apple ([1.126.106.86]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 41be03b00d2f7-903f22c073fsm5158166a12.53.2025.01.01.00.43.44 for (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:43:46 -0800 (PST) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_86543CF2-BF86-45BD-82A4-A12718F9A703" Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 16.0 \(3826.200.121\)) Subject: Re: [FlyRotary] N214FL forced landing Date: Wed, 1 Jan 2025 16:43:31 +0800 References: To: Rotary motors in aircraft In-Reply-To: Message-Id: X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3826.200.121) X-SPAM-LEVEL: Spam detection results: 0 AWL -0.874 Adjusted score from AWL reputation of From: address BAYES_00 -1.9 Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% DKIM_SIGNED 0.1 Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid DKIM_VALID -0.1 Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature DKIM_VALID_AU -0.1 Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain DKIM_VALID_EF -0.1 Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from envelope-from domain DMARC_PASS -0.1 DMARC pass policy FREEMAIL_FROM 0.001 Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider FREEMAIL_REPLY 1 From and body contain different freemails HTML_MESSAGE 0.001 HTML included in message KAM_INFOUSMEBIZ 0.75 Prevalent use of .info|.us|.me|.me.uk|.biz|xyz|id|rocks|life domains in spam/malware RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3 0.001 Good reputation (+3) RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL 0.001 Mailspike good senders SPF_HELO_NONE 0.001 SPF: HELO does not publish an SPF Record SPF_PASS -0.001 SPF: sender matches SPF record --Apple-Mail=_86543CF2-BF86-45BD-82A4-A12718F9A703 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Yes. You=E2=80=99re right, another single point of failure. There are = many! I ranked this switch as a lower risk of failure than say a set of relays = that then introduces other fuse/circuit breakers, connections, switches = etc. I originally had tracy=E2=80=99s switching to the injectors that turned = off the Primary or Secondary injectors doubled the fueling to the = others. I removed this feature as I decided the risk of an injector failing as = being lower than the risk of the switches failing or being knocked and = not noticing. I questioned having the backup Engine pump trigger circuit except I have = had a failure of a pump and noticed how often I forgot to turn on the = backup pump.=20 I originally used a Narva automotive ignition switch feeding all engine = power and single point of failure. It died from too much current for its = spec - my very foolish mistake, which is why I now have the Primary and = Backup Engine Power Switches. I realised I have many single points of failure eg. My soldering of the = D37 EC2 wiring being one of many. A number of these wires/pins breaking = will ruin my day and I wonder if I have tied these looms well. I would appreciate peoples thoughts on where they see the higher risk = points in their systems. I suppose we must choose our poison.=20 An example was it appears to me that Fuel management failure stops = engines at a comparatively high rate, so I went with the Engine pumps = drawing from the 8 Gal Header tank with circulation pump/backup from = main wing tank. No Fuel Switching BUT complexity of pumps needed to keep the = header/reserver tank full at all times. Happy New year Steve =09 =09 =09 =09 > On 1 Jan 2025, at 12:13=E2=80=AFpm, Charlie England = ceengland7@gmail.com wrote: >=20 > # Twin 25Ah batteries connected via dual battery isolator switch Off / = A / B / BOTH >=20 > Single point of failure? If that's the only path for electrons, switch = mechanical failure takes both batteries.=20 >=20 > Get BlueMail for Android > On Dec 31, 2024, at 6:56 PM, "Stephen Izett stephen.izett@gmail.com" = > = wrote: >>=20 >> Sorry to hear of your mishap Finn, glad your Ok. >>=20 >> Much appreciate your reflection and to revaluate my own risk >>=20 >> I agonised over the electrical risk / failure modes. Opting to = =E2=80=98kiss' and not seek full redundancy. >> Your experience brings a sober reconsideration of my assumptions and = decisions which I=E2=80=99m trying to recollect and would value others = critique. >>=20 >> My system: >> # Single automotive Alternator - Fused B-lead - NO Over-voltage = Crowbar circuit >> # Twin 25Ah batteries connected via dual battery isolator switch Off = / A / B / BOTH. >> # Engine Power through Primary SPST switch with backup SPST upstream = of current shunt >> # Primary and Backup Fuel Pumps with automatic backup activation on = low fuel pressure >> # Engine Fuel pumps fed from Header/ReserveTank. Header fed via = single wing tank via Primary and Backup transfer pumps >> # EC2 redundant ECU's >> # Armoured CAS wiring >> # =E2=80=98Audible' EFIS Alarms for Volts, Amps, Fuel Pressure, = Transfer Fuel Flow, Fuel Level, Gear etc. >>=20 >> Pre Flight Testing >> Before Engine Start >> # Measure individual battery volts while 2 x main 25Ah batteries = disconnected (Isolator switch in Off position) via EFIS on its own = battery backup delta V < 0.3v if OK then switch isolator to Both >> After Engine Start >> # Check Alternator Charging Both A, B and back to Both batteries. >> # Test Both Primary and Backup Engine Power Switches >> # Test Engine Fuel Pumps - Switch Off Main Pump to test auto = activation of backup, reset/arm >> # Test Fuel Transfer Pumps - Switch Off Main Transfer Pump to test = auto activation of backup, reset/arm >> # Test ECU B and Coils >> After Engine shut down >> # Turn battery Isolator Switch to Off position and note Battery = delta V before turning Off EFIS >>=20 >> My Key Failure mode consideration / assumptions >> Alternator - >> Short Circuit (Low risk but catastrophic) must be protected against = via fuse >> Over Voltage (Low risk) - EFIS Alarm - On reflection perhaps I = ought include a Crow Bar but it does introduce complexity/danger >> Batteries - >> Open Circuit (Significant risk) - Solution - two batteries tied = together reducing chances of failure and protects should failure occur >> Shorted Cell (Low risk) - Outcome ???? Battery fire - Halon = extinguisher=20 >> Testing before and after flight picks up failure and lowers risk=20 >> Keep Batteries away fro heat and vibration >> Second battery provides more air time in case of Alternator failure = though introduces significant weight >> Crank Angle Sensor -=20 >> Failure is catastrophic so armour and attention added=20 >> Power Switching -=20 >> Failure (High risk) therefore backup required=20 >> No Relays as they introduce complexity >>=20 >> Key Questions=20 >> Crow Bar on Alternator? >> Should I have gone with AeroElectriic circuit with Backup Buss etc. = ? >>=20 >>=20 >> Appreciate peoples thoughts. >>=20 >> Steve Izett - Perth Western Australia >> Glasair Super II RG=20 >> Renesis 4 port EC2 EM3 RD1C Prop MTV 7 Elec >> =20 >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >> Steve Izett. >>=20 >>=20 >>=20 >>> On 1 Jan 2025, at 3:55=E2=80=AFam, Finn Lassen = finn.lassen@verizon.net wrote: >>>=20 >>> Not sure if I should re-post the following and its two referenced = threads here. >>>=20 >>> https://vansairforce.net/threads/n214fl-forced-landing.232017/ >>>=20 >>> The battery failure mode must definitely be made well-known for = electrical-dependent engine installations. >>>=20 >>> Finn >>>=20 >>=20 --Apple-Mail=_86543CF2-BF86-45BD-82A4-A12718F9A703 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Yes. You=E2=80=99= re right, another single point of failure. There are = many!

I ranked this switch as a lower risk of failure = than say a set of relays that then introduces other fuse/circuit = breakers, connections, switches etc.

I = originally had tracy=E2=80=99s switching to the injectors that turned = off the Primary or Secondary injectors doubled the fueling to the = others.
I removed this feature as I decided the risk of an = injector failing as being lower than the risk of the switches failing or = being knocked and not noticing.

I questioned = having the backup Engine pump trigger circuit except I have had a = failure of a pump and noticed how often I forgot to turn on the backup = pump. 

I originally used a Narva = automotive ignition switch feeding all engine power and single point of = failure. It died from too much current for its spec - my very foolish = mistake, which is why I now have the Primary and Backup Engine Power = Switches.

I realised I have many single points = of failure eg. My soldering of the D37 EC2 wiring being one of many. A = number of these wires/pins breaking will ruin my day and I wonder if I = have tied these looms well.

I would appreciate = peoples thoughts on where they see the higher risk points in their = systems.

I suppose we must choose our = poison. 
An example was it appears to me that Fuel = management failure stops engines at a comparatively high rate, so I went = with the Engine pumps drawing from the 8 Gal Header tank with = circulation pump/backup from main wing tank.
No Fuel Switching = BUT complexity of pumps needed to keep the header/reserver tank full at = all times.

Happy New = year

Steve









=


On 1 Jan 2025, at 12:13=E2=80=AFpm, Charlie England = ceengland7@gmail.com <flyrotary@lancaironline.net> wrote:

# Twin 25Ah batteries connected = via dual battery isolator switch Off / A / B / BOTH

Single point of failure? If that's the only path for = electrons, switch mechanical failure takes both batteries. =

On Dec 31, 2024, at 6:56 PM, "Stephen Izett = stephen.izett@gmail.com" <flyrotary@lancaironline.net> wrote:
Sorry to hear of your mishap Finn, glad your Ok.

Much = appreciate your reflection and to revaluate my own = risk

I agonised over the electrical risk / = failure modes. Opting to =E2=80=98kiss' and not seek full = redundancy.
Your experience brings a sober reconsideration of = my assumptions and decisions which I=E2=80=99m trying to recollect and = would value others critique.

My = system:
# Single automotive Alternator - Fused = B-lead - NO Over-voltage Crowbar circuit
# Twin 25Ah = batteries connected via dual battery isolator switch Off / A / B / = BOTH.
= # Engine Power through Primary SPST switch with backup SPST = upstream of current shunt
# Primary and Backup Fuel Pumps with = automatic backup activation on low fuel pressure
# Engine Fuel = pumps fed from Header/ReserveTank. Header fed via single wing tank via = Primary and Backup transfer pumps
# EC2 redundant ECU's
# Armoured = CAS wiring
# =E2=80=98Audible' EFIS Alarms for = Volts, Amps, Fuel Pressure, Transfer Fuel Flow, Fuel Level, Gear = etc.

Pre Flight Testing
Before Engine = Start
= # Measure individual battery volts while 2 x main 25Ah batteries = disconnected (Isolator switch in Off position) via EFIS on its own = battery backup  delta V < 0.3v if OK then switch isolator to = Both
= After Engine Start
# Check Alternator Charging Both A, B = and back to Both batteries.
# Test Both Primary and Backup Engine = Power Switches
# Test Engine Fuel Pumps - Switch Off = Main Pump to test auto activation of backup, reset/arm
# Test Fuel = Transfer Pumps - Switch Off Main Transfer Pump to test auto activation = of backup, reset/arm
# Test ECU B and Coils
After Engine = shut down
# Turn battery Isolator Switch to Off = position and note Battery delta V before turning Off = EFIS

My Key Failure mode consideration / = assumptions
Alternator -
Short = Circuit (Low risk but catastrophic) must be protected against via = fuse
= Over Voltage (Low risk) - EFIS Alarm - On reflection perhaps I = ought include a Crow Bar but it does introduce = complexity/danger
Batteries -
Open Circuit = (Significant risk) - Solution - two batteries tied together reducing = chances of failure and protects should failure occur
Shorted = Cell (Low risk) - Outcome ???? Battery fire - Halon = extinguisher 
Testing before and after flight picks = up failure and lowers risk 
Keep Batteries away fro heat and = vibration
Second battery provides more air time = in case of Alternator failure though introduces significant = weight
Crank Angle Sensor - 
Failure is = catastrophic so armour and attention added 
Power = Switching - 
Failure (High risk) therefore backup = required 
No Relays as they introduce = complexity

Key Questions =
Crow Bar on = Alternator?
Should I have gone with AeroElectriic = circuit with Backup Buss etc. = ?


Appreciate peoples = thoughts.

Steve Izett - Perth Western = Australia
Glasair Super II RG 
Renesis 4 port = EC2 EM3 RD1C Prop MTV 7 Elec
=




<= div>




=
Steve Izett.



On 1 Jan 2025, at 3:55=E2=80=AFam, Finn Lassen = finn.lassen@verizon.net <flyrotary@lancaironline.net> = wrote:



= --Apple-Mail=_86543CF2-BF86-45BD-82A4-A12718F9A703--