X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Received: from vms173007pub.verizon.net ([206.46.173.7] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.2.14) with ESMTP id 3674041 for flyrotary@lancaironline.net; Sat, 06 Jun 2009 15:47:51 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=206.46.173.7; envelope-from=finn.lassen@verizon.net MIME-version: 1.0 Content-transfer-encoding: 8BIT Content-type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Received: from [71.98.183.171] by vms173007.mailsrvcs.net (Sun Java(tm) System Messaging Server 6.3-7.04 (built Sep 26 2008; 32bit)) with ESMTPA id <0KKU009LF1ML8ZF0@vms173007.mailsrvcs.net> for flyrotary@lancaironline.net; Sat, 06 Jun 2009 14:47:11 -0500 (CDT) Message-id: <4A2AC833.2050008@verizon.net> Date: Sat, 06 Jun 2009 15:49:07 -0400 From: Finn Lassen User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.21 (Windows/20090302) To: Rotary motors in aircraft Subject: Re: [FlyRotary] Incident No. 5119 References: In-reply-to: Good job Ed. However, whatever happened to emergency checklists? (Not that I ever thought to use the ones I had developed when it actually came down to emergencies. I guess that takes a LOT of drilling: something is not right -- grab the emergency checklists). Finn Ed Anderson wrote: > > Certainly not trying to “TOP” Al’s door incident – by the way, good > airman ship and decisions, Al! Glad the damage was no worst that it was. > > But several folks who were not at the Texas Round up have asked about > the “Ed’s Incident”. For those of you who were at the roundup, you > will probably want to skip this repeat. > > Incident No. 5119 > > One the way to Texas I had an incident that ended up in with me and > aircraft making a 7 mile engine-out glide into Craig Field (Selma, > Alabama). Again – NO! It was not fault of the engine or even the > subsystems. But, the complete answer is not provided until after my > litany of the conditions and symptoms – can you figure it out? > > I took off on Thursday AM planning on stopping in Mississippi to join > up with Charlie England and Tracy. After spending the night there, we > all three would head for Texas. But, the weather (as you are aware) > has been laying over the southeast for days with rain and more rain – > but I launched into it anyway as past Atlanta, GA things were forecast > to improve.. > > Other than dodging lines of clouds and a bit of scud running, but not > much, I landed at Alexandria City to the southwest of Atlanta, GA to > take on fuel. I then climbed back in and fire it up and took off. > > I noticed that during climb-out the engine would occasionally miss and > thought the fuel might have had a bit of water in it, but was not > really concerned. So I fly on for approx another 45 minutes and had > just passed Selma, Alabama and old Craig Air Force base, and turned > west toward Mississippi, when more symptoms began to occur. > > It started to act like a case of SAG (fouled spark plugs) where the > rpm will drop a bit – not dangerous - just nerve racking. But, shortly > things began to go beyond the SAG symptoms, so I though I might have > an injector problem (like one sticking open or not opening at all). > Since our injectors are in pairs, I tried turning off one figuring if > things got better, then that pair might have a bad injector. > > So I turned off one pair and sure enough the symptoms abated a bit > (more on this later) so I figured I had a bad injector in that pair. > To be certain I turned this “bad” pair back on and turn off the “good” > pair expecting the symptoms to really get bad as I would now be > running on only the “bad” pair – much to my surprise when I turned off > the “good” pair – the symptoms also abated. So that indicated it was > not an injector problem – but what? > > About this time, I decided to turn the aircraft back around toward > Craig Field and dodging clouds headed back with the engine > progressively getting worst. It appeared to be a fuel problem (and > while that is ultimately the subsystem affected - it was not the root > cause). The fuel pressure was ranging from zero to 80 psi, other > electrical things were also misbehaving. I check the voltmeter > thinking perhaps the alternator had died – but it showed 14 volts. So > back to the fuel system. > > Finally, the engine just stops with the prop standing still - like a > hood ornament, I’m at around 4500-5000 MSL at this point having lost > some altitude dodging a cloud (good old GPS just kept pointing to > Craig Field). At that time I am 7 miles out from Craig Field at 4500 > msl with at stopped prop, a crippled seat cushion and a dry mouth. > Yes, I know I’ve been there before, but I don’t think you ever get > “use” to it. I recalled thinking things just can’t get worst when they > very shortly and suddenly - did. > > I keyed the radio and made a call to Craig Field at 4 miles on the GPS > (I’m starting to get good at this) but before I could get their reply, > I heard a “CLANK” (without the engine running you can hear things like > that) like a relay springing open (it was) and the entire panel goes > dead!!!! No radio, no engine instruments, not even a stinking LED was > lit – only the battery powered GPS. Can you spell “total electrical > failure?” Talk about a lonely feeling – amazing how comforting having > lights on and radio – you could almost convince yourself this was just > a practice engine-out landing, but not when the panel goes dark. No > engine gauges, no radio, nada! > > Well not being one inclined to panic (but I seriously considered it > for a moment {:>)), I continued toward Craig field – I mean like there > were lots of other alternatives. Well Once again I found myself in the > “fortunate position” of being too high, too much altitude. So I put in > 40 degs of flaps to steepen my rate of descent. But, then I decided > this time that rather than do the 360 I had done on a previous > Incident to lose “excessive” altitude, I would try to glide - a more > or less - regular traffic pattern. > > However, I neglected to remember to retract the flaps. So I found > myself on the downwind around mid-field at pattern altitude (which > felt normal) until I suddenly realized that you CAN NOT maintain that > pattern altitude without an engine!!! Duh! > > I knew I could never make it to the far end of the runway before > turning base (toward the runway), so I started my turn immediately, to > make matters a bit worst - I had been paralleling the runway on the > downwind leg a bit too close – must have been the comforting feeling > of being close to safety. This position naturally required a tighter > turn and as I turned I saw I was likely to miss the runway and land in > the grass. So I though I need to steepen this turn further (this is > called COFFIN CORNER), but fortunately glanced at my airspeed > indicator to see it only registering 80 MPH and my rate of descent > (normally 400-500 feet per minute) up to over 1000 feet per minute. > The seat cushion suddenly vanished from this universe. > > But the REAL danger in this situation, as you all know, is your > airspeed gets low, you are in a steep bank which greatly raises the > stall speed - meaning at 80 mph you are close to a stall in a steep > turn while your are not in straight and level. So I immediately > straighten out of the turn – the little voice saying “better to land > in the grass than get their concrete runway all messed up”. So the > immediate danger of a stall was adverted, but I was still pointed > toward the ground with a sink rate twice as high as normal (and I’ve > manage a few hard landings even with a normal sink rate). > > The hardest thing to do when you are sinking at a 1000 fpm a couple > hundred feet above the ground (with your nose already pointed at the > ground) is to push the stick forward steeping the dive even more. But, > I manage to do that and picked enough air speed and energy to flair to > a nice touch down – not even a bump. I’ve always been amazed at what > total concentration does to improve you landing {:>). > > Rolled to the end of the runway and had energy to roll off onto the > taxiway. Got out, check under the aircraft for any evidence of leaks > and started pulling the aircraft toward the far –off – hangar which > had an airplane parked in front of it. A nice looking young woman > comes riding a bicycle out to meet me. Hopped off and holding out her > hand said “Hi I’m Angie, looks like we’ll be spending time together” – > so things are starting to look up {:>) > > So pulled the aircraft in to the hangar where the mechanic came over > and ask what the problem was. Well, I looked at the volt meter and it > said the battery was dead. Mechanic put on a battery charger and > announced “Yep! The battery is dead”. So we both concluded that the > alternator must have failed and not being able to replenish the drain > on the battery by all the electrical systems such as fuel pumps, > injectors, ignition coils, etc had drained the battery. > > However, there were a few problems with the analysis of a failed > alternator. First, the low voltage warning light never came on to warn > of an alternator problem, 2^nd I never notice the voltmeter showing > anything other than what it should for alternator voltage – like > around 14 volts. While checking the voltage after the Mechanic had > charged the battery, I noticed down below that the “essential bus” > switch was in the battery rather than the alternator position, so > flicked it back to the alternator position figuring I must have > accidentally kicked it while getting to some stuff in the baggage > compartment of my RV-6A. > > It was getting late and being a bit tired not to mention stressed, I > needed to get a rental car and a motel for the night. Did that, eat > dinner and went to bed after sitting down and drawing out a problem > tree with the entire major elements of the electrical system. > > So next morning I show up at the hangar early and meet Ben, the > mechanic, the battery had received a charge of only 45 minutes the > evening before, So I suggested we charged it for another hour and try > to start the aircraft. Ben suggested a real stress test of the battery > and NOT charge it anymore. Made sense, so we rolled the aircraft out > of the hangar. I hopped in, threw a half dozen switches and punched > the starter button. The engine started on the first prop blade > rotation – so the battery was clearly OK. The engine is humming like a > top. So I looked over at the voltmeter expecting it to show only > around 12.8 volts instead of the 14 volts a functioning alternator > would produce. Much to my and Ben’s surprise the alternator voltage > read 14 volts. We loaded the alternator by turning on the both l00 > watt landing lights, all fuel pumps, the pitot heat, etc. The > alternator voltage only drops perhaps 0.4 volts clearly indicating the > alternator could carry the load and was OK. > > So here I am – battery is OK, alternator is OK – engine is purring > normally, so clearly this was all a figment of my deteriorating brain > cells. I loaded up the aircraft and launched to do a few circuits of > the airport – I did so and all was operating normally and so I radio > them I was head onward to Texas. While flying, my mind could not let > go of the problem and finally the light came on. > > The essential bus switch had (for my entire 10 + years of flying) been > in the alternator position. The purpose of this switch is to isolate > the battery from the alternator should the alternator fail - to > prevent an alternator problem from draining the battery. So in event > of an alternator problem, you move the switch from alternator to > battery. Its call the essential bus because you only have the > essential things drawing from the battery so you wont’ drain it as > quickly. The idea is to give you time (generally around 30 minutes) to > find a safe place to land in case of alternator failure. > > Well, at some point I had either (not paying attention) turned the > switch to battery thinking I was turning the voltmeter switch to > battery - or accidentally had move the switch from alternator to > battery without noticing it by kicking it, etc. However, it was sort > of protected in its position from accidental activation. It must have > happened during refueling – as I got approx 45 minutes down the road > on the battery after take off before quality battery time started to > deteriorate. As the battery voltage fell due to the load (and no > alternator link to replenish it), electrical things (mainly computers > first) started acting up until they could not longer run the engine. > The injectors would not open fully, etc. Then as the voltage level > further decreased, the master relay which the battery held closed and > which connected the (fully functional) alternator to the rest of the > electrical system - opened up and removed ALL power from the > electrical system. So no radio, no gauges, etc. > > Oh, another little factor that may have contributed, the voltmeter has > a tiny toggle switch by it marked ALT BAT1 BAT2 for checking > alternator battery 1 and battery 2 (which I no longer fly with) > voltages. Down below It a couple of inches and off to the right is the > essential bus normal size toggle switch – also marked ALT BAT1 BAT1. I > normally never touch it and don’t even think about it. But I could > have reached for the voltmeter toggle thinking to check my battery > voltage (which I do as a regular thing) and perhaps distracted by > something reach a bit further down and instead moved the essential bus > switch from Alternator to Battery cause this entire event. I know that > I did not consciously do it. So it is either accidental or absence > minded activation - either way ends with the same results {:>) > > Now it became clear why it didn’t matter which pair of fuel injectors > I turned off – turning off either pair improved the situation because > it slightly reduced the electrical load by a few amps – and the engine > ran slightly better for a few moments. The same thing had happened > when turning off one of the EFI fuel pumps – but what threw me was the > alternator voltage continued to be normal during this. > > After I knew the cause (switch in wrong position), I decided the > problem was fixed so no reason to return to NC, and I just continued > on to Texas. > > I know some of you may think that removing my second battery was a > mistake – but, consider this, having another battery could have meant > I would have been much further from a suitable airfield before they > both went south. On the other hand, it might have caused me to at > least think to throw the essential bus switch to the second battery > and have the Light bulb come on. Who really knows. But, I have in mind > a simply addition to my electrical circuit that should help in the > future. > > I do want to state that this time when the problems started I DID > switch fuel tanks – but naturally it had no effect because this time > it turned out, it was not a fuel problem – not the root cause at least. > > So what are the lessons learned: > > 1. Put EVERY critical switch on your before-takeoff Check list > 2. Perhaps put a guard around such critical switches to force > conscious activation > 3. Don’t (hard not to) get overly focused on what you think is the > problem – consider other possibilities. I thought it was a fuel > problem (I even switched fuel tanks this time) – it turned out > to be electrical in its root cause. > 4. While the fuel pressure was jumping all over the place and the > EGT was erratic and engine surging strongly indicating a fuel > problem – the ultimate cause was electrical. Once the voltage > got below a certain point the EC2 was still trying to pull the > injectors open, but with the voltage so low it could not do it > properly. > 5. When the battery voltage dropped below a certain point, the > master relay released and removed the alternator from the > electrical system and the panel went dark – even though the > alternator was still working > 6. Immediately turn to the nearest airfield when serious problems > occur - THEN work on fixing them. I only delayed for perhaps 2-3 > minutes, but that could have made a difference. > 7. Watch out for *Coffin Corner* turn when turning base to final – > airspeed really bleeds off fast with no engine pulling you along > (and especially with flaps deployed!) > 8. IF you change your mind about landing approach type - remember > to reconfigure your aircraft for the last decision – I had left > my flaps deployed when I should have remembered to retracted > them. Did that help prevent a Coffin Corner stall and spin or > would it have put me closer to it? > 9. You must increase airspeed over the wing to get the sufficient > energy to over come a high sink rate. Pulling back on the stick > when the ground is staring you in the face is the natural > reaction – but, pushing forward to lower the nose is the correct > action – providing of course you have sufficient altitude! > 10. Battery life – I had a two year old 680 odyssey battery which I > maintain a trickle charge on whenever I’m not flying. With two > EFI fuel pumps, boost pump, injectors, coils, EC2 and radio and > just having started the engine before take off – this battery > lasted 55 minutes. Well, the last 5 minutes was not quality > battery time. So in my case, 30 minutes appears to be a very > realistic battery life. In fact, had I turned off one EFI pump > and the boost pump would have gained a few more miles. But, if I > had recognized the need to turn them off at that time (I > normally turn them off at cruise altitude), then I would have > known how to “fix” the problem. > 11. I’ve decided to add a Schokkty diode between my essential bus > and the alternator – so that as long as the alternator is > producing sufficient voltage, then the battery will be getting > some charge to replace the drain. I’ve also decided to make that > switch position a check-list item. > > So what it boils down to – if I had recognized early on that it was an > electrical problem and not focused so much on the fuel system, I may > have noticed the essential bus switch in the wrong position. Force > yourself to examine other possible causes (easy to say – harder to do). > > NEVER, NEVER forget that flying the airplane is the first and only > priority in this type of situation > > NEVER, NEVER forget that saving your butt is the ultimately end-all > priority. When I decided that landing on the grass was preferable to > putting a hole in their concrete – I just may have made a life-saving > decision. > > If anybody else wants to pick up this baton – I’m ready to hand it > over – what? no volunteers? {:>) > > So that’s my story and I’m sticking to it. > > Fly safe, guys!! > > Ed > > Ed Anderson > > Rv-6A N494BW Rotary Powered > > Matthews, NC > > eanderson@carolina.rr.com > > http://www.andersonee.com > > http://www.dmack.net/mazda/index.html > > http://www.flyrotary.com/ > > http://members.cox.net/rogersda/rotary/configs.htm#N494BW > > > http://www.rotaryaviation.com/Rotorhead%20Truth.htm > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Internal Virus Database is out of date. > Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com > Version: 8.0.169 / Virus Database: 270.10.1/1870 - Release Date: 12/31/2008 8:44 AM > >