X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Received: from m12.lax.untd.com ([64.136.30.75] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 5.0.3) with SMTP id 863121 for flyrotary@lancaironline.net; Sun, 04 Dec 2005 18:41:19 -0500 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=64.136.30.75; envelope-from=alwick@juno.com Received: from m12.lax.untd.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by m12.lax.untd.com with SMTP id AABB3G9TXA576ZUA for (sender ); Sun, 4 Dec 2005 15:39:33 -0800 (PST) Received: (from alwick@juno.com) by m12.lax.untd.com (jqueuemail) id LBERC3X9; Sun, 04 Dec 2005 15:39:23 PST To: flyrotary@lancaironline.net Date: Sun, 4 Dec 2005 15:36:41 -0800 Subject: Re: [FlyRotary] Re: Intersting flight Message-ID: <20051204.153846.932.0.alwick@juno.com> X-Mailer: Juno 5.0.33 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Juno-Line-Breaks: 0,2,4-7,14-15,20-21,25-26,28-30,33-40 From: al p wick X-ContentStamp: 12:6:1155139680 X-MAIL-INFO:4604040c752d0d2161814d0c004d118459c0e54d804119c97580e5c0809580f0bd39602904e00cd90c74757111f94071212d20 X-UNTD-OriginStamp: L941HVjjYzDhN3itp//mkMjpvRnD3YXCW5AC2A0POcIVlUMbAwBzJA== X-UNTD-Peer-Info: 127.0.0.1|localhost|m12.lax.untd.com|alwick@juno.com On Sun, 4 Dec 2005 14:32:10 -0500 "Ed Anderson" writes: > I think the old adage KISS goes a long ways - as you know, it is possible to > decrease reliability (not to mention increasing weight and cost) by > increasing redundancy pass a certain point - more parts to break. Wow, I TOTALLY disagree with above statement. But note that I define "redundant" as having independent failure odds (same as logical "or" circuit). We always have risk reduction with redundancy. HUGE risk reduction, because you multiply the odds. So 1 circuit has 1 in 100 odds of failure. 2nd independent circuit jumps the odds to 1 in 10000! That's why they run two power leads to the ECM on OEM cars. Also multiple ground leads. Much much safer. Perhaps you allude to cases where you add a second switch, but power has to flow thru both switches for circuit to operate. In that case, yes, you actually increase your risk. Those switches would not have independent failure odds. If one fails, so does the other. So they are not redundant, you just have two items (logically "and" type of circuit). I also don't subscribe to the "single failure point" principal. Yes, risk often has correlation to single point, but not always. Risk = odds of failure * Effect failed component has on aircraft * odds(inverse) that you will notice failure before flight. > My design is such that you can even shut off the master switch and the > engine will continue to run. That is good! So you have to really work at it to get it to shut off. Yes! Yes! I'm impressed with your custom gages Ed. It's great seeing you take action on those items. Good stuff. -al wick Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by stock Subaru 2.5 N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland, Oregon Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel design info: http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html