X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Received: from rtp-iport-2.cisco.com ([64.102.122.149] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 4.3.4) with ESMTP id 987335 for flyrotary@lancaironline.net; Tue, 07 Jun 2005 11:43:27 -0400 Received-SPF: softfail receiver=logan.com; client-ip=64.102.122.149; envelope-from=echristley@nc.rr.com Received: from rtp-core-2.cisco.com (64.102.124.13) by rtp-iport-2.cisco.com with ESMTP; 07 Jun 2005 11:42:42 -0400 Received: from xbh-rtp-211.amer.cisco.com (xbh-rtp-211.cisco.com [64.102.31.102]) by rtp-core-2.cisco.com (8.12.10/8.12.6) with ESMTP id j57FgP5A011954 for ; Tue, 7 Jun 2005 11:42:40 -0400 (EDT) Received: from xfe-rtp-202.amer.cisco.com ([64.102.31.21]) by xbh-rtp-211.amer.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.211); Tue, 7 Jun 2005 11:42:32 -0400 Received: from [64.102.45.251] ([64.102.45.251]) by xfe-rtp-202.amer.cisco.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.211); Tue, 7 Jun 2005 11:42:32 -0400 Message-ID: <42A5C068.5070002@nc.rr.com> Date: Tue, 07 Jun 2005 11:42:32 -0400 From: Ernest Christley User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.2 (X11/20050317) X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Rotary motors in aircraft Subject: Re: [FlyRotary] Re: rotary risks. MTBE and the gospel ... References: In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-OriginalArrivalTime: 07 Jun 2005 15:42:32.0629 (UTC) FILETIME=[84FB9E50:01C56B77] al p wick wrote: >There are three components that define RISK. Most of your comments >address only 1 of those, the failure rate. Yes, it's a little tough to >nail the fail rate on the rotary engine. The other two components have >equal weight. What EFFECT the failed component will have on flight. How >likely to notice the defect before flight. It's not too difficult to >assess those two components accurately. So if we have the discipline to >use these methods, we've got most of the risk equation nailed. > > No, Al. We're still sitting at square one. What EFFECT will a broken wing spar have on flight. Fairly dramatic, I dare say. So where does that get us? What will we do differently, now that we have this valuable knowledge? Without the failure rate, the rest of the equation is nearly useless. Anything multiplied by 0 is still 0. All FMEA can do for us is to point out systematically which failure rates need to be driven to 0, but I think we already had a pretty good handle on that. HOW to drive the failure rates down? Now there's the bugaboo that keeps this list active. -- ,|"|"|, | ----===<{{(oQo)}}>===---- Dyke Delta | o| d |o www.ernest.isa-geek.org |