In Al's defense, my interpretation is that the CAS is a critical "single point of failure". While none of us have developed a failure at that point, a failure there is a show stopper. He was taking a "theoretical" failure risk and doing the math with it. Going from a 1:1000 chance of failure to a 1:1,000,000 chance of failure is a significant result.
 
To take the theoretical into practical, the Shuttle guys THOUGHT they had a 1:200 flight risk of catastrophic failure. 2 destroyed orbiters later, that risk is actually playing out to 1:50. It's about risk management, and the CAS is just one (of MANY) single points of failure that can be identified. That being said, there are many more risks out there that take precedence.

Dave

david mccandless wrote:

Hi Al,
I fail to see how installing another CAS will 'dramatically' reduce risk of all ECM causes.

We have already said we have no history of failure of the CAS, how can installing another CAS (with no history of failure), 'dramatically' reduce the risk of failure?


And how can installing another CAS have any influence on "the risk of all ECM causes" ?

I also have great respect for redundant systems, but I cannot see your logic in this one. It is the 'dramatic reduction' that troubles me. BR, Dave McC


On 06/06/2005, at 9:57 PM, al p wick wrote:

 
Regarding CAS risk. It's not just crank angle sensor that is the risk item. Going to redundancy with the CAS will dramatically reduce risk of all ECM causes. Like this connector risk. I'm not always proponent of redundancy, but with my limited info on this item, I SUSPECT it's significant, positive step.

-al wick
Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by stock Subaru 2.5
N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland, Oregon
Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel design info:
http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html

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