X-Virus-Scanned: clean according to Sophos on Logan.com Return-Path: Received: from mxsf30.cluster1.charter.net ([209.225.28.230] verified) by logan.com (CommuniGate Pro SMTP 4.3.4) with ESMTP id 987271 for flyrotary@lancaironline.net; Tue, 07 Jun 2005 10:50:25 -0400 Received-SPF: pass receiver=logan.com; client-ip=209.225.28.230; envelope-from=cardmarc@charter.net Received: from mxip13a.cluster1.charter.net (mxip13a.cluster1.charter.net [209.225.28.143]) by mxsf30.cluster1.charter.net (8.12.11/8.12.11) with ESMTP id j57EncZc023275 for ; Tue, 7 Jun 2005 10:49:39 -0400 Received: from fep06.charter.net (HELO 209.225.8.224) (209.225.8.86) by mxip13a.cluster1.charter.net with SMTP; 07 Jun 2005 10:49:39 -0400 Message-Id: <4403a9$12gkrie@mxip13a.cluster1.charter.net> X-IronPort-AV: i="3.93,179,1115006400"; d="scan'208,217"; a="1158311502:sNHT27941984" X-Mailer: Openwave WebEngine, version 2.8.18 (webedge20-101-1108-20050216) From: To: "Rotary motors in aircraft" Subject: Re: [FlyRotary] Re: EC2 problems - solved / rotary risks Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2005 10:49:38 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=____1118155778812_GAkVP7iT9M" This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=____1118155778812_GAkVP7iT9M Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit So is the single shaft of the distributor/electronic ignition. ??? You CAN go the FD style dual electonic pulley pickup if you can so plan to. Marc Wiese > > From: David Staten > Date: 2005/06/06 Mon PM 05:03:14 EDT > To: "Rotary motors in aircraft" > Subject: [FlyRotary] Re: EC2 problems - solved / rotary risks > > ------=____1118155778812_GAkVP7iT9M Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii; name="reply" Content-Disposition: inline; filename="reply" In Al's defense, my interpretation is that the CAS is a critical "single point of failure". While none of us have developed a failure at that point, a failure there is a show stopper. He was taking a "theoretical" failure risk and doing the math with it. Going from a 1:1000 chance of failure to a 1:1,000,000 chance of failure is a significant result.

To take the theoretical into practical, the Shuttle guys THOUGHT they had a 1:200 flight risk of catastrophic failure. 2 destroyed orbiters later, that risk is actually playing out to 1:50. It's about risk management, and the CAS is just one (of MANY) single points of failure that can be identified. That being said, there are many more risks out there that take precedence.

Dave

david mccandless wrote:

Hi Al,
I fail to see how installing another CAS will 'dramatically' reduce risk of all ECM causes.

We have already said we have no history of failure of the CAS, how can installing another CAS (with no history of failure), 'dramatically' reduce the risk of failure?

And how can installing another CAS have any influence on "the risk of all ECM causes" ?

I also have great respect for redundant systems, but I cannot see your logic in this one. It is the 'dramatic reduction' that troubles me. BR, Dave McC

On 06/06/2005, at 9:57 PM, al p wick wrote:

Regarding CAS risk. It's not just crank angle sensor that is the risk item. Going to redundancy with the CAS will dramatically reduce risk of all ECM causes. Like this connector risk. I'm not always proponent of redundancy, but with my limited info on this item, I SUSPECT it's significant, positive step.

-al wick
Artificial intelligence in cockpit, Cozy IV powered by stock Subaru 2.5
N9032U 200+ hours on engine/airframe from Portland, Oregon
Prop construct, Subaru install, Risk assessment, Glass panel design info:
http://www.maddyhome.com/canardpages/pages/alwick/index.html

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